COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. RAGNAR BENSON, INC., Appellant.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Oct. 5, 1978.
Reargument Denied Nov. 22, 1978.
393 A.2d 634
Argued May 23, 1978.
Before EAGEN, C. J., and O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ.
OPINION OF THE COURT
O‘BRIEN, Justice.
Appellant, Ragnar Benson, Inc. (Benson), an engineering and construction firm, designed and built two cooling towers at the Philadelphia Electric Corporation‘s Limerick power plant near Pottstown, Pennsylvania.1 Benson was assessed a use tax by appellee, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, on certain items and material used in the construction of the cooling towers.2 In August and September of 1972, the Commonwealth completed an audit of Benson‘s business activities in connection with the construction of the Limerick cooling towers. As a result of this audit, Benson was assessed $3,206.03. This amount represented the Commonwealth‘s determination of Benson‘s deficiency in the use tax payable to the Commonwealth. Benson filed a petition for reassessment with the Commonwealth Sales Tax Board of Review, contesting $582.80 out of the $3,206.03 deficiency sought by the Commonwealth. The Sales Tax Board of Review denied Benson‘s petition. Benson then sought relief by filing a petition for review with the Board of Finance and Revenue. The Board of Finance and Revenue deter-
Commonwealth Court, on June 16, 1977, denied both sets of exceptions and entered a final judgment in favor of the Commonwealth. On July 13, 1977, Benson filed an appeal to this court. The Commonwealth has not filed an appeal or a cross-appeal from the final order of the Commonwealth Court in the instant case.3
Appellant argues that it is entitled to a public utility exemption from the Pennsylvania Use Tax. We do not agree.
The use tax was assessed under the
“The exercise of any right or power incidental to the ownership, custody or possession of tangible personal property and shall include, but not be limited to transportation, storage or consumption.”
Art. II, § 201(o)(1) ,72 P.S. § 7201(o)(1) .
The tax does not apply to property used in:
“The producing, delivering or rendering of a public utility service, or in constructing, reconstructing, remodel-
ing, repairing or maintaining the facilities which are directly used in such service. . . .” § 201(o)(4)(B)(iii) .
But this exemption does not apply to:
“. . . materials or supplies to be used or consumed in any construction, reconstruction, remodeling, repair or maintenance of real estate other than machinery, equipment or parts therefor that may be affixed to such real estate . . . the purchase or use of tangible personal property by any person other than the person directly using the same . . . [providing public utility service], the purchase or use of tangible personal property by any person other than the person directly using the same in [such service, or] tools and equipment used but not installed in the maintenance of facilities used directly in the production, delivering or rendition [thereof]. . . .”
§ 201(o)(4)(B) .
We find that the exemption does not apply to the items involved (see n. 2, supra) and that appellant is not entitled to any applicable exemption. The involved items consist of materials used in the construction of the cooling towers and were, therefore, used in the construction of real estate. They are subject to tax because they were not affixed to the real estate as required. See Commonwealth v. Beck Electric Construction, Inc., 32 Pa.Cmwlth. 229, 379 A.2d 626 (1977).
The order of the Commonwealth Court is affirmed.
POMEROY, J., concurs in the result.
MANDERINO, J., files a dissenting opinion.
MANDERINO, Justice, dissenting.
I dissent. The appellant is entitled to an exemption from the Pennsylvania Use Tax.
The parties stipulated, that this same Section would exclude from tax these same tools, materials and supplies if the public utility utilized these items in the identical manner as appellant utilized them. (R-12a)
The majority errs when it says that this appellant must be taxed for these items because they were not affixed. The last paragraph of
Additionally, the legislature carefully stated in this same section that “tools and equipment used but not installed in the maintenance of facilities” are subject to tax. If the legislature had meant this same standard to apply to tools and equipment utilized in construction activities, it would have so stated in the same unambiguous language.
