Commonwealth v. ManzuetaCommonwealth v. Manzueta
- Reporters:
- Before:
- David A. Deakin
The defendant advances three arguments in support of his claims for suppression. First, he argues that, even assuming that the events triggering the
BACKGROUND1
The Anticipatory Search Warrant
Beginning in 2018, Massachusetts law enforcement officials investigated reports that Joseph Alicea was overseeing a cocaine trafficking enterprise from his home in Lowell. The investigation apparently grew out of a 2017 investigation by the New
The Affidavit challenged in Manzueta‘s several motions to suppress alleges that Alicea continued to conduct his narcotics distribution enterprise from a prison cell. Upon his release from incarceration, law enforcement officials surveilled Alicea and, between January and May 2019, conducted six controlled purchases of cocaine from him.2
On Friday afternoon, June 14, 2019, law enforcement officials monitoring a wiretap of Alicea‘s cellular telephone overheard a conversation between him and a then-unidentified man, soon after identified as Manzueta. Over the course of that afternoon and evening, police listened in on a series of conversations between Alicea and Manzueta discussing the latter‘s proposed purchase of 100 grams of cocaine from the former. Later that evening, police watching Alicea‘s residence at 850 Lakeview
The Mazda then drove away, followed by police surveillance. Officers watched the Mazda – which was registered to an owner (not Manzueta) living at 64 Richardson Street, Apartment 17, in Lowell – as it drove for some distance before pulling next to a pickup truck. Police were unable to stop to determine whether the driver of the Mazda interacted with anyone in the pickup truck. Surveillance officers were able to look at the driver of the Mazda, whom they later identified as Manzueta by referring to his driver‘s license photograph. Shortly thereafter, police drove to 64 Richardson Street and found the Mazda parked in the lot there.
Two days later, on June 16, 2019, police overheard another call from Alicea to Manzueta. In the conversation, the two men discussed a sale of between 250 and 300 grams of cocaine. The following day, police heard Alicea and Manzueta discussing a sale of a slightly reduced amount of cocaine. The sale was to take place the next day, June 18, 2019, at Alicea‘s residence.
In anticipation of the sale that day, Troopers Shea and Cain on June 18, 2019, applied for, and obtained, an anticipatory warrant to search the residence at 64 Richardson Street, as well as Manzueta‘s automobile and person. The affidavit set out,
At approximately 7:34 p.m. that evening, law enforcement officials monitored a call from Alicea to Manzueta. In the conversation, Alicea asked Manzueta, “[y]ou wanna come through and grab that?” Manzueta responded that he did and that he would “be . . . there” in approximately fifteen minutes. Twenty minutes later, police overheard a second telephone conversation in which Manzueta told Alicea that he was “in the back.” Alicea responded by inviting Manzueta to “come up.” At 7:56 p.m., police saw – and photographed – Manzueta entering Alicea‘s residence. He was in the building only very briefly before re-emerging, getting back into his car, and driving away.
Trooper Danab Shea followed Manzueta as he drove in the Mazda “directly back [from Alicea‘s residence] to 64 Richardson Street.” Hrng. Test. The distance between the two residences is between one eighth and one quarter of a mile and is roughly a two- minute drive. Police watching images from a pole camera erected outside 64 Richardson Street confirmed that Manzueta arrived in his car at 64 Richardson Street just a very few minutes after leaving Alicea‘s residence. Manzueta was wearing a distinct, “bright, fluorescent windbreaker jacket.” Hrng. Test. He was neither carrying anything nor wearing a backpack when he went into the residence. At approximately 8:10 p.m. – just
The Execution of the Anticipatory Warrant
Concluding that the triggering condition had occurred, law enforcement officials executed the search warrant. Within a very short time of Manzueta‘s return to 64 Richardson Street, ten or twelve officers gathered at the residence. They knocked and announced their presence and their purpose to execute the search warrant. Detective Justin Velez, who was closest to the door, heard sounds of rummaging from within the apartment, but no one answered. After one or two minutes, police forced the door using a battering ram. When the police entered, they saw Manzueta in the hallway. When he saw Detective Velez, the first law enforcement official into the apartment, Manzueta moved to the bathroom. Police apprehended him as he tried to flush a plastic bag of oxycodone pills down the toilet. They handcuffed Manzueta and took him to the back bedroom. There, they advised him pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and gave him a copy of the search warrant. Manzueta told police that he had no cocaine but that he had marijuana. He pointed to a backpack, which, he indicated, contained the marijuana.
During the search, police found in a backpack: crack cocaine, methamphetamine pills, suboxone film strips, MDMA (commonly known as Ecstasy), and marijuana. Police also found a large amount of cash and a digital scale. Most significantly, police found approximately 100 grams of cocaine in the distinctive windbreaker that Manzueta had worn into the residence minutes before.
Procedural History
The defendant was arrested in his residence by police executing the warrant. The grand jury returned the indictment in this case on August 23, 2019, and Manzueta was arraigned on September 17, 2019. On December 11, 2020, Manzueta filed a Motion to Dismiss (Paper No. 16), which was denied on August 12, 2021, after hearing on June 28, 2021. On January 6, 2021, Manzueta filed three related motions to suppress: a Motion to Suppress Warrantless Search and Seizure (Paper No. 18); a Motion to Suppress Warrantless Search of 64 Richardson Street Apartment 17 Residence (Paper No. 20); and a Motion to Suppress Evidence from an Invalid Search Warrant (Paper No. 21). I conducted a hearing on all three motions on July 12, 2022, and heard argument on August 18, 2022.
ANALYSIS
In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence gathered pursuant to a search warrant, the court must determine whether the warrant was supported by probable cause. See Commonwealth v. Perkins, 478 Mass. 97, 102 (2017), citing Commonwealth v.Valerio, 449 Mass. 562, 566 (2007). That determination is made from the “four corners of the [search warrant] affidavit.” Id. (brackets in original), quoting Commonwealth v. O‘Day, 440 Mass. 296, 297 (2003). “To establish probable cause, the facts . . . in the warrant affidavit, and the reasonable inferences drawn from them, must be sufficient for the issuing judge to conclude that the police seek items related to criminal activity and that the items described ‘reasonably may be expected to be located in the place to be searched at the time the warrant issues.‘” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Walker, 438 Mass. 246, 249 (2002). In evaluating an affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant, a magistrate may draw reasonable inferences from the facts set out therein. See O‘Day, 440 Mass. at 297. Affidavits supporting search warrant applications are reviewed “as a whole and in a commonsense and realistic fashion ” Commonwealth v. Dorelas, 473 Mass. 496, 501 (2016), quoting Commonwealth v. Cavitt, 460 Mass. 617, 626 (2011). They are not to be “parsed, severed, and subjected to hypercritical analysis.” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Donahue, 430 Mass. 710, 712 (2000). As the Supreme Judicial Court observed in Commonwealth v. Anthony,
In dealing with probable cause . . . we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.
Police may seek an anticipatory warrant to search a location. Commonwealth v. Colondres, 471 Mass. 192, 196 (2015), citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Staines, 441 Mass. 521, 525 (2004). “An anticipatory warrant, by definition, is a warrant that has been issued before the necessary events have occurred which will allow a constitutional search of the premises . . . .” Id., quoting United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Grant v. United States, 493 U.S. 943 (1949). For an anticipatory warrant to establish probable cause to search, “the so-called ‘triggering condition‘” set out in the affidavit must first occur. Id., citing United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 94 (2006).
I. The Warrant to Search the Residence at 64 Richardson Street, Apartment 17
A. Probable Cause
Manzueta bases his claim for suppression on the proposition that probable cause to believe that someone is distributing narcotics does not, standing alone, establish probable cause to search the person‘s home. See Commonwealth v. Dillon, 79 Mass. App. Ct. 290, 294 (2011) (“Probable cause to expect that drugs will be present in a home is not established by the fact that the defendant [who is plausibly suspected of drug-dealing] lives there.“), quoting Commonwealth v. Pina, 453 Mass. 438, 441 (2009); see also Perkins, 478 Mass. at 104 (“Information establishing that a person is guilty of a crime does not necessarily constitute probable cause to search the person‘s residence.“), quoting Commonwealth v. Cinelli, 389 Mass. 197, 213 (1983). Instead, “[t]o establish probable cause to search an individual‘s house, the search warrant must establish a ‘substantial basis for concluding that evidence connected to the crime will be found on the specified
At the heart of Manzueta‘s argument for suppression is his claim that the anticipatory warrant did not establish a nexus between his alleged drug distribution and his apartment.3 Manzueta maintains that – even assuming that the triggering condition occurred (but see Section I, B, infra) – police lacked sufficient probable cause to search his home for evidence of cocaine trafficking. This argument is unpersuasive.
The affidavit established ample probable cause to believe that Alicea distributed cocaine and that, in the days leading up to the search of Manzueta‘s home, the two men discussed a purchase of between 250 and 300 grams of cocaine. Further, after a second telephone conversation in the evening of June 18, 2019, about a sale of cocaine later that evening, Manzueta drove to Alicea‘s home and went inside. He remained in Alicea‘s home for a very short time, after which he re-emerged, got into his car, and drove directly to 64 Richardson Street. He arrived there within minutes. He went inside and called Alicea to discuss why he had been given only 222 grams of cocaine, rather than the 250 grams upon which they had agreed. These undisputed facts establish that the triggering condition set out in the warrant occurred and, therefore, there was probable cause to search Manzueta‘s home for the cocaine and the cellular telephone that he used to arrange the suspected transaction.
Implicitly acknowledging that it had not established a nexus between Manzueta‘s suspected drug distribution and his residence when the warrant issued, the Commonwealth obtained an anticipatory warrant. The triggering condition required that Manzueta travel to Alicea‘s residence – presumably to purchase a significant quantity of cocaine – and then return to his home.4 Once Manzueta followed this path – as the testimony established that he did – police had probable cause to believe that he would take both the cocaine and the cellular telephone that he used to set up the purchase with him into his home.
Manzueta contends that the Commonwealth‘s evidence failed to exclude the possibility that – even if he went straight from Alicea‘s home to the residence at 64 Richardson Street – Manzueta might have left the cocaine behind in his automobile. Manzueta notes, in this context, that Detective Burd conceded that the pole camera footage revealed that Manzueta did not appear to be carrying anything as he went from
This argument fails to persuade because it ignores that “[a] warrant application ‘need not establish to a certainty that the items to be seized will be found in the specified location, nor exclude any and all possibility that the items might be found elsewhere.‘” Commonwealth v. Escalera, 462 Mass. 636, 646 (2012), quoting, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Young, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 381, 336 (2010). I need not assess the likelihood – or, more accurately, unlikelihood – of a drug dealer leaving a quantity of cocaine sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the trafficking statute unattended in an automobile. That is because, as the SJC observed in Escalera, “[t]hat evidence of the defendant‘s drug sales might also have been found in the defendant‘s vehicle does not detract from the conclusion that there was probable cause to search [his] . . . apartment.” 462 Mass. at 646.
Finally, Manzueta relies, unavailingly, upon cases establishing that probable cause to believe that an individual is involved in narcotics distribution does not, standing alone, establish probable cause to search the individual‘s home. For example, in perhaps the strongest case for Manzueta, Commonwealth v. Smith, 57 Mass. App. Ct. 907, 908 (2003), the Appeals Court held that evidence that the defendant drove from his home to one of five controlled purchases of drugs and returned to his home from
B. The Occurrence of the Triggering Condition
In a secondary argument, Manzueta contends that the evidence at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress did not establish that the triggering condition had occurred. Specifically, Manzueta contends that the evidence did not establish that he went directly from Alicea‘s home to the apartment at 64 Richardson Street.6 Manzueta argues that there was no testimony from any officer to the effect that, after leaving Alicea‘s home, Manzueta travelled to 64 Richardson Street without any intervening stops. Thus,
Detective Burd testified – without objection – that Trooper Shea followed Manzueta as he drove from Alicea‘s home “directly back to 64 Richardson Street.” Hrng. Test. Because I credit this testimony, it is sufficient to establish the occurrence of the triggering condition, as I have construed it. See Note 4, supra. Moreover, additional evidence corroborates Detective Burd‘s accounts of Trooper Shea‘s surveillance.
The testimony at the hearing established that, at 7:56 p.m. on June 18, 2019, police saw – and photographed – Manzueta entering Alicea‘s residence. He was in Alicea‘s home only briefly before re-emerging, getting back into his car, and driving away. Detective Burd testified that the drive from Alicea‘s residence to 64 Richardson Street – between one eighth and one quarter of a mile – usually required roughly two minutes. Police watching images from a pole camera erected outside 64 Richardson Street confirmed that Manzueta arrived in his car at 64 Richardson Street minutes after
The Commonwealth has thus established that, within a few minutes of leaving Alicea‘s residence, Manzueta had arrived at 64 Richardson Street and placed a call to Alicea. In the call, Manzueta complained to Alicea about the amount of cocaine that he had received, supporting the inference that he had had time to weigh the cocaine. The evidence thus corroborates Detective Burd‘s testimony that Sergeant Shea followed Manzueta as he drove directly from Alicea‘s home to his own residence at 67 Richardson Street. This evidence, in turn, establishes the occurrence of the anticipatory warrant‘s triggering condition.
In response, Manzueta notes that, when police first surveilled him – four days before the issuance of the anticipatory warrant – he stopped after leaving Alicea‘s residence to interact with the driver of, and/or passengers in, a pickup truck before proceeding to 64 Richardson Street. Aff. at 10-11, ¶ 23. Thus, Manzueta contends, police observations four days before the execution of the anticipatory search warrant suggest the very real possibility that, four days later, he might similarly have stopped on his way home from purchasing cocaine at Alicea‘s residence. From this, Manzueta argues
This argument, too, is unpersuasive. For one thing, Detective Burd testified that Sergeant Shea followed Manzueta as he drove directly home from Alicea‘s residence. Second, the timing of events on the day the warrant was executed makes Manzueta‘s hypothetical scenario unlikely. That only fourteen minutes passed between when Manzueta was seen entering Alicea‘s residence and when Manzueta called Alicea – from 64 Richardson Street – to discuss the weight of cocaine sold makes it most unlikely that Manzueta had time to conclude the transaction with Alicea, get back in his car, drive away, conduct a transaction involving the entirety of the drugs that he had just purchased, get back in his car again, drive to 64 Richardson Street, and then call Alicea. Although the evidence concededly does not eliminate this possibility, it makes it highly unlikely. “The test [for probable cause] is probable cause, not certainty.‘” Escalera, 462 Mass. at 646 (emphasis in original), quoting, inter alia, Young, 77 Mass. App. Ct. at 836.
II. The Scope of the Search
Manzueta‘s argument that police exceeded the scope of the warrant when they searched his windbreaker jacket as part of the search of his home is cursory and requires only brief analysis. “The permissible intensity of a search is determined by the description of the items to be seized.” Commonwealth v. Wills, 398 Mass. 768, 775 (1986). “The size of the object or objects sought affects the appropriate scope of the search.” Id.
Manzueta seeks to put the burden on the police to demonstrate specifically why they thought that the windbreaker might contain cocaine in the amounts he allegedly discussed with Alicea in the wiretapped conversations. The cases, however, make clear that, if an object sought could reasonably be found in a container, the police are justified in searching the container. See, e.g., Wills, 398 Mass. at 775; Hawkins, 361 Mass. 387. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that 222 grams of cocaine could not be contained in a windbreaker. Indeed, that the police, in fact, found the cocaine in the windbreaker is conclusive evidence that it could. Put simply, nothing about this case suggests that police were anything but warranted in concluding that they might find drugs – or a cellular telephone – in the pockets of a windbreaker, as, indeed, they did. There is, therefore, no basis to conclude that the scope of the search exceeded what was permissible pursuant to the search warrant.
III. The Search of Manzueta‘s Person and his Statements
Manzueta‘s argument for the suppression of items seized from his person and his statements is based entirely on his claim that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree – the purportedly impermissible search of 64 Richardson Street, Apartment 17. Because I conclude that the search of the residence was conducted pursuant to an anticipatory search warrant that established the requisite probable cause, see Section I, supra, I
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant‘s Motion to Suppress Warrantless Search and Seizure, Motion to Suppress Warrantless Search of 64 Richardson Street Apartment 17 Residence, and Motion to Suppress Evidence from an Invalid Search Warrant are all DENIED.
/s/David A. Deakin
Associate Justice
Date: December 6, 2022