Appellee Jack A. Rabik was involved in a single car accident on July 23, 1976, in Bradford Township, as a result *458 of which he was issued a citation for reckless driving and a complaint was filed against him for driving while under the influence. Appellee pleaded guilty to the summary offense of reckless driving, paying the fine and costs. On November 3, 1976, appellee waived arraignment on the charge of driving while under the influence, and entered a plea of not guilty. On November 5, 1976, appellee filed a motion to quash, arguing that the offense arose from the same transaction or series of events that resulted in his reckless driving conviction. 1 The lower court held a hearing on December 10, 1976, and issued an order granting appellee’s motion. The Commonwealth brought this appeal from the order granting the motion to quash.
We are presented in this case with a very narrow procedural issue: the Commonwealth argues that appellee failed to enter a special plea
(autrefois
convict) relating to double jeopardy, and that the lower court should not have permitted appellee to raise the defense of former conviction by a pre-trial motion to quash.
2
Dictum in
Commonwealth v. Splain,
The correct procedure to be followed by a defendant in raising a former jeopardy argument was stated by our court in
Commonwealth v. Davis,
Order affirmed.
Notes
. Section 110 of the Crimes Code states: “Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former prosecution under the following circumstances: (1) The former prosecution resulted in . .a conviction . . and the subsequent prosecution is for . . . any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of a single court unless the court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense . . . .”
. We note that the Commonwealth does
not
argue on appeal to our court that case law and § 110 of the Crimes Code did not require dismissal by the lower court of the second prosecution of appellee. See
Commonwealth v. Green,
. Other cases cited by the Commonwealth were decided prior to the effective date of the new Crimes Code, and are therefore not controlling.
