Commonwealth v. QuinnCommonwealth v. Quinn
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- Before:
- Rowley
Lead Opinion
This is an appeal from a judgment of sentence. Roy Lee Quinn was found guilty of driving with an expired operator’s license pursuant to
On appeal, Quinn asserts that imposition of sentence by the trial court violated the statute of limitations contained in
The argument advanced by Quinn requires a close examination of the procedural history of this case. On May 10, 1987, Quinn was cited for violating
In Commonwealth v. Jannenga, 335 Pa.Super. 77, 81, 483 A.2d 963, 965 (1984), this Court held that
Subsequently, this Court was faced with a procedural history similar to the case sub judice. Commonwealth v. Stover, 372 Pa.Super. 35, 538 A.2d 1336, alloc. denied, 520 Pa. 604, 553 A.2d 967 (1988). Stover had failed to appeal from the initial determination and later petitioned for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. Id., 372 Pa.Superior Ct. at 37, 538 A.2d at 1337. The Stover Court did not determine the effect of the nunc pro tunc appeal, as Stover was not sentenced until more than two years after trial de novo in the court of common pleas and the limitation issue was waived due to failure to raise it in the trial court. Id., 372 Pa.Superior Ct. at 38-40, 538 A.2d at 1338-1339. Therefore, Stover does not address the precise issue before us today.
Recently, this Court held Jannenga to be controlling precedent where no portion of the delay is attributable to the accused. Commonwealth v. Markley, 375 Pa.Super. 231, 234, 544 A.2d 72, 74 (1988). Like Jannenga, Markley presented a case where the accused was in no way responsible for the delay. Id. (Del Sole, J., concurring).
*490We find both Jannenga and Markley distinguishable. Unlike those cases, Quinn was solely responsible for a delay of five months in these proceedings due to his failure to file a timely appeal to the court of common pleas. We will not attribute to the legislature an intent that an accused be allowed to take advantage of a delay he has caused. See,
To adopt the interpretation urged by Quinn would ultimately work to the disadvantage of those accused of summary motor vehicle offenses. Any court would be wary of granting a petition to appeal nunc pro tunc if such appeals would lead to a possible bar of the proceedings. Thus, those deserving of a chance to file late appeals might be denied a hearing on the merits of their case. Further, Quinn’s position also opens the door to an accused deliberately delaying a proceeding in order to obtain the benefit of the statutory bar. We will not so encourage dilatory tactics.
We are aware that Quinn contests the trial court’s findings that he. was responsible for certain portions of the delay following the grant of his petition to appeal nunc pro tunc. We need not resolve this question, as Quinn is solely responsible for the failure to timely appeal the decision of the district justice to the court of common pleas. This five-month delay, attributable entirely to Quinn’s actions, tolls the statute for a period sufficient to prevent the statutory bar.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Dissenting statement by POPOVICH, J.Notes
. That section provides as follows:
§ 5553 . Summary Offenses Involving Vehicles
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(e) Disposition of proceedings within two years.—No proceedings shall be held or action taken pursuant to a summary offense under Title 75 subsequent to two years after the commission of the offense.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority. I would vacate the judgment of sentence since appellant was sentenced on May 31, 1990, over two years after he was originally cited under
Penal statutes, outside of the Crimes Code,1 are to be strictly construed.
In sum, I would vacate the judgment of sentence since it was entered more than two years after appellant was cited under Title 75. If the legislature finds this result “absurd”, it is within its exclusive province, not ours, to correct the perceived problem.
. See Commonwealth v. Lurie, 524 Pa. 56, 63, 569 A.2d 329, 332 (1990);