260 Pa. 587 | Pa. | 1918
Opinion by
The defendant, Dominic Principatti, appeals from a judgment sentencing him to be electrocuted for committing murder of the first degree.
The evidence presents, inter alia, the following facts: Principatti and the deceased, one Tony Amodeo, had, for about eight months, lived in the same boarding house; on Sunday evening, February 18, 1917, the defendant and several others were assembled in the dining room of this abode, when, a little after seven o’clock, Amodeo walked in and remarked to one Joe Spitaro, “I want to say something to you,” at the same time beckoning him to follow; the two walked out into the yard and stopped eight feet from the kitchen door; they had been standing thus about two minutes, the noise from a passing train rendering conversation impossible, when Principatti appeared, and, without uttering a word, shot Amodeo; then, in quick order, a second shot was fired, both bulléis entering the head of the victim, who died at once; shortly after this, when the body of the deceased was examined, a stiletto was found fastened to a belt-hook under his clothes, three loaded cartridges were discovered in his trouser pockets, a razor in an inside coat
Spitaro-, the only eyewitness to the alleged crime, said that, before the shooting took place, Amodeo had his hands in his overcoat pockets; but', when asked the question, “Did you see anything in his hands?” he replied, “No, sir, it was too dark.” When Principatti took the stand in his own defense, he stated that, four or five minutes after Amodeo had departed with Spitaro-, he, the defendant, left the room for the purpose of going to the toilet in the back yard; that, as soon as the kitchen door closed behind him, he saw Spitaro and Amodeo- standing together, the latter with both hands in his overcoat pockets; that, “when he [Amodeo] seen me, he pulled his hand up this way [indicating], and I seen his revolver”; then the witness immediately added, “When I seen that [Amodeo’s revolver], I pulled my revolver out and shot.” In answer to the next question, accused said he was “so scared,” when he fired the first shot, that “a minute or two- minutes afterwards” he fired a second.
The foregoing references to the testimony and brief review of the material facts are sufficient to enable one to understand clearly the several matters before us for determination.
We gather, from offers of proof, requests for charge and other such matter upon the record, that the defense the accused endeavored to- stand upon, but which, owing to a series of adverse rulings, was not fully developed, is as follows: That Amodeo had conversed with defendant on Friday, February 9, 1917, nine days prior to the
Fragments of this defense were permitted in evidence; but, in the main, accused was not given an opportunity properly to present his side of the case. His counsel repeatedly endeavored, by formal offers and specific questioning, to introduce the fact that Principatti was “afraid” of Amodeo, “frightened” and “scared” because of the latter’s threat to kill him, together with the detailed circumstances attending this threat; he also
As to the right to present evidence concerning the alleged threats by the deceased and their effect upon defendant, see Wharton on Homicide, 2d ed., secs. 610-11; Henry on Pennsylvania Trial Evidence, p. 33; 21 Cyc. 893, par. “e”; Underhill on Criminal Evidence, sec. 326; Com. v. Garanchoskie, 251 Pa. 247, 253; Com. v. Curcio, 216 Pa. 380; and Com. v. Keller, 191 Pa. 122, 132. On the defendant’s right to prove his state of mind, either by his own or other competent testimony, see Com. v. Wooley, 259 Pa. 249, 251; 21 Cyc. 889, par. “b”; and opinion by Rice, P. J., in Com. v. Hazlett, 14 Pa. Superior Ct. 352, 369.
So far as defendant’s offers relating to> the “Black Hand Society” and Amodeo’s connection therewith are concerned, in Com. v. Varano, 258 Pa. 442, 446, we recently said that, when sufficient reason exists therefor, an inquiry such as here attempted is permissible; and in Commonwealth v. Curcio, 216 Pa. 380, a case somewhat like the one at bar, we granted a new trial because
Since the district attorney, apparently in the hearing of the jury, repeatedly objected to defendant’s offers to prove that he was afraid of the deceased, placing his objections upon the express ground that, the two men were sleeping and eating in the same house from the time of the alleged threat to the date of the killing, the accused was entitled to an opportunity to show that, notwithstanding he had a common abode with Amodeo, the night the shooting took place was, in fact, the first chance the latter had to do him harm: see 21 Cyc. 954, par. “d.”
When we come to consider defendant’s endeavor, whether honest or otherwise, to secure the protection of the law, it appears that, during the course of the trial, the district attorney more than once stated, apparently in the hearing of the jury, that, if threats were made against the accused, instead of undertaking to secure his own safety, he should have gone to a proper officer of the law for protection; therefore, the prisoner had the right to show that he endeavored to do that very thing, and this even though, by mistake, he applied to the wrong official.
Finally, in connection with the several matters under immediate consideration, albeit the alleged threats by Amodeo against the defendant were made at least nine days before the killing, that fact, under the circumstances of this case, does not destroy their relevancy on the ground of remoteness: Com. v. Salyards, 158 Pa. 501; 21 Cyc. 892, par. V.
Perhaps some of the rulings assigned as error were partly cured by the subsequent admission of testimony originally refused; but the result of these rulings was unduly and prejudicially to hamper the presentation of the defense; and, so far as we are able to see, this was due to a failure fully to keep in mind certain applicable rules of law, particularly those dealing with the subject
In the case at bar, the trial judge, when ruling upon offers of evidence, seems to have entirely overlooked the fact that these offers, ex necessitate, brought into the case the element of manslaughter through fear. Apparently, the trial was conducted upon the theory that the deceased was not accused by the defendant of any actual menacing action at the time of or immediately before the killing, hence the latter’s alleged fear rested upon no sufficient foundation; but'this ignored the testimony of defendant that, when he came out of the kitchen door, just before the shooting, Amodeo turned toward him, at the same moment drawing a revolver which he, the prisoner, saw in the hands of the deceased. This fact, by itself, would not be sufficient to show a pro
As a witness for himself, the defendant testified he knew the reputation of Amodeo- to be that of a dangerous man, and, at the time of and prior to the killing, he feared the latter because he believed such reputation to reflect his real character. When certain other persons were called by defendant to prove the character of Amodeo, the trial judge refused their testimony on the ground that these particular-witnesses had no personal acquaintance with the deceased; this was error; It ir; not necessary to know one personally in order to have sufficient acquaintance with his reputation to give testimony concerning it; and this is so whenever one’s character or reputation is properly at issue. Here, the reputation of the man killed by defendant was in question, for Principatti claimed that, because of the threats against his life made by Amodeo, when, immediately before the killing, he saw the pistol in the latter’s hand, this, coupled with his knowledge of the reputation of the deceased as a “Black Hander” and dangerous man, raised a fear in defendant’s mind, which influenced him to shoot at once for his own protection (21 Cyc. 889, par. “c,” and p. 956, par. II; Underhill on Criminal Evidence, p. 386, sec.
An Italian was produced by the defendant and the offer made to show that this witness had been told by Amodeo that he, the latter, had been sent to kill Principatti and would do it at his first opportunity; further, that the witness had communicated these facts to the defendant. This man, however, refused to testify unless all other Italians were removed from the room, claiming he was afraid vengeance would be visited upon him if his testimony were heard by them. Upon objection from the district attorney, the trial judge said: “The court is of opinion that it does not have the power to grant the application; therefore, the objection to so doing is sustained.” A request of this character is.within the discretion of the trial judge, and had the court below, in the exercise of its discretion, refused the one at bar, we would be loath to characterize such a ruling as reversible error; but, clearly, in the present instance the judge was wrong in ruling that he had no power to grant the application: "Archbold’s Criminal Practice and Pleading (8th ed.), vol. I, p. 539, n. 1; Bishop’s New Criminal Procedure, vol. I, secs. 1188-90; 12 Cyc. 546.
Several of the assignments criticise the charge upon the ground that it either omits all reference to, or contains no sufficient instructions upon, the various important matters which came before the jury at trial. We shall briefly refer to such of these as we deem material. The trial judge said nothing about the threats which Amodeo is alleged to have made against the defendant, or their possible effect upon the mind of the latter; further, he did n'ot, in his general charge, sufficiently refer to or discuss the evidence as to the dangerous character of the deceased, nor did he point out its bearing upon the defense set up by the accused. Although these omissions are possibly corrected by the affirmance of certain of the latter’s requests, at the next trial all such material matters should be specifically referred to in the body of the charge; moreover, at that time, the trial judge should be careful not only to state all appropriate rules of law, but to point out their relevancy with sufficient explicitness to enable the jury intelligently to apply the law to the facts as it may find the látter to be:
It appears that Principatti’s face is badly scarred on both sides, and that these ugly blemishes are plainly visible. Counsel for defendant, fearing that, through a misunderstanding as to the source of his client’s disfigurement, the jury might become prejudiced against the latter, offered to show that this came about through no fault of his own. To enter upon such an investigation might lead to- collateral issues that would seriously confuse a trial; hence, we cannot say error was committed in the refusal of the present offer.
The accused tendered in evidence an anonymous letter received by him on May 1,1916, almost a year before the killing, which he claimed to be a “Black Hand” communication. We have read the epistle in question, and, considering its remoteness from the day of the crime and the lack of any evidence to- connect the deceased therewith, we cannot say that its exclusion was error.
The fact that Principatti surrendered himself and gave up his pistol to an officer of the law within an hour after the shooting, was put in evidence; but the trial
There are twenty-nine assignments, covering more than thirty printed pages; we do not deem it necessary to refer specifically to each of these, but have sufficiently reviewed those of importance. Many of them, standing alone, do not show reversible error; but several do, and, together, they present a clear case of mistrial. Were the matters of complaint all of a minor character, we would be disinclined, considering the evidence against the accused, to set aside the present judgment; but so much harmful error is called to our attention that, if the right to due and lawful trial is to be main-' tained, we must reverse.
The defendant may not be able to substantiate his various offers of proof, or the jurors may disbelieve the testimony with reference thereto, if produced, or, if believed, they may not draw the inferences or conclusions therefrom that he contends for — in fact, they may entirely discredit his version of Amodeo’s actions immediately before the shooting, as, possibly, the jurors did at the last trial; but, nevertheless, the defendant is entitled to have his testimony as to what took place on that occasion, together with the relevant evidence covered by the various offers which we have discussed, received and properly submitted to a jury for its deliberate consideration, particularly on the issue as to whether, at the time of the killing, he acted with malicious deliberation or under other mental influences which might operate either to relieve him from the charge of murder or reduce the offense to voluntary manslaughter.
Finally, since this case must be tried again, it may not be amiss to suggest that, when witnesses, by the action of their hands or otherwise, undertake to indicate time, space, distance or anything else, as several appear to have done at the last trial, counsel eliciting the evidence in question should be careful to have an intelligible ex
All assignments that show rulings or instructions conflicting with the views here expressed, together with the twenty-ninth, which complains of the sentence, are sustained. The judgment is reversed with a venire facias de novo.