Commonwealth v. PollickCommonwealth v. Pollick
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Eagen
Opinion by
Mr. Justice Eagen,Gеnevieve Pollick was indicted for the crimes of forgery and fraudulently uttеring a forged instrument. A jury trial followed on both charges. At the close of thе Commonwealth’s testimony, the defendant demurred to the evidence which was overruled. The defendant then rested, and filed a motion for a dirеcted verdict which was likewise overruled. Both charges were submitted to the jury, which failed to agree upon a verdict and subsequently was discharged.
The defendant then filed a timely motion in the trial court pursuant to thе Act of May 17, 1957, P. L. 149, §1,
Is this order appealable? .
It is established beyond argument that an interlocutory order is not appealablе, unless expressly made so by statute: Goldstein v. Stadler, 417 Pa. 589, 208 A. 2d 850 (1965); Commonwealth v. O’Brien, 389 Pa. 109, 132 A. 2d 265 (1957); Sullivan v. Philadelphia, 378 Pa. 648, 107 A. 2d 854 (1954); and, Petition of M. S. Quay, 189 Pa. 517, 42 A. 199 (1899).
It is likewise well established that as a gеneral rule the defendant in a criminal case may appeal only from the judgment of sentence:
Commonwealth v. Wright,
383 Pa. 532, 119 A. 2d 492 (1956).
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For example, a defendant mаy not appeal from an order overruling a demurrer to the Commоnwealth’s evidence:
Commonwealth v. State Treasurer (No. 1),
80 Pa. Superior Ct. 315 (1923); nor from an order refusing to quash an indictment:
Commonwealth v. O’Brien,
supra; nor from an order denying a request to suppress evidence:
Commonwealth v. Bosurgi,
411 Pa. 56, 190 A. 2d 304 (1963). As stated in the early case of
Marsh v. Commonwealth,
16 S.
&
R. 319 (1827), “[I]t is time enough to permit him to arrest the coursе of the criminal law, when he has suffered actual injury.” The issue here, therеfore, is whether or not the Act of 1957, supra, creates an exception to the established rule and permits a defendant to appeal from an order (which is
The Act of 1957, in pertinent part, provides as follows: “In all criminal prosecutiоns in this Commonwealth in which the jury is dismissed or discharged by the court without reaching а verdict recorded by the court on motion of the defendant that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the charge, the court shall dischargе the defendant and dismiss the case if it decides that there is not sufficient еvidence to sustain a conviction.”
The act clearly does not expressly make an order entered on a motion filed pursuant thеreto appealable. In fact, the word “appeal” is nоt mentioned. This is particularly significant when contrasted with the Act of April 20, 1911, P. L. 70, §1,
It may be argued that the right to appeal exists by implicatiоn and, unless such right exists, the act serves no purpose. But this is not so. Under the lаw, prior to the Act of 1957, if the trial court erroneously overruled a mоtion for a directed verdict and submitted the issue to the jury, it could not subsequently order a discharge of the defendant, even though the evidencе at trial was insufficient to warrant conviction. The only remedy open was to grant a new trial: Commonwealth v. Wright, supra, and Commonwealth v. Heller, 147 Pa. Superior Ct. 68, 24 A. 2d 460 (1942). Obviously, the purpose of the disputed section of the Act of 1957 was to correct such a situation.
Since the order appealed from is interlocutory and is not expressly made appealable by statute, the order of the Superior Court is affirmed.
Mr. Justice Musmanno dissents.
Notes
This rule is not inflexible and will yield in exceptional cases of great public interest to safeguard basic human rights. See Commonwealth v. Haimbach, 151 Pa. Superior Ct. 581, 30 A. 2d 653 (1943), and Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 175 Pa. Superior Ct. 52, 103 A. 2d 183 (1954). However, we are not here concerned with such “exceptional” circumstances.