*3 EAGEN, O’BRIEN, Before ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX JJ. MANDERINO,
OPINION POMEROY, Justice.
Following trial by jury, appellant Michael Polimeni was found voluntary manslaughter in connection with *4 the shooting death of one Kenneth Patterson. Post-verdict denied, motions were and appellant was sentenced to a term of not less than nor three more than seven years imprison- In ment. this direct appeal, Polimeni raises two issues: the first, a to the challenge of the array petit jury the court of Common Pleas of second, Allegheny County; denial of a on requested charge involuntary manslaughter. We find the second claim to be meritorious and that new trial must be had. Accordingly, we do not reach merits of to the appellant’s of the challenge array petit jury.
I.
that he was denied a fair trial
contends
because
Appellant
charge
jury,
requested,
the trial
declined
judge
The
for
involuntary manslaughter.1
point
the offense of
had not been
appellant
was refused because
charge
of that
for and thus could not
be convicted
properly
indicted
action was in accord with the
offense. The trial court’s
Commonwealth
See,
e.g.,
case law in this Court.
prevailing
Hoffman,
Common-
v.
(1970);
439 Pa.
We note that
the last
confusing
voluntary
defendant’s counsel was
some of the elements of
involuntary manslaughter.
This error
with those
not, however,
requested
instruction taken as a
does
whole was not sufficient to
mention of the
mean that
alert the court to the need to include
charge.
subject
matter in its
See Commonwealth
Sisak,
259 A.2d
*5
We have held that where it recently appears support evidence would a verdict of prospective it is error for the trial court to refuse manslaughter, consolidate for trial an indictment for murder and voluntary and an indictment man- charging involuntary Moore, slaughter. Commonwealth 344 A.2d 850 (1975). Stock, See also Commonwealth v. Mr. Justice opinions by EAGEN of the in Moore
announcing judgments Court and Stock address, did not so, because it was not to do necessary us, i.c., issue whether, now before absent an indictment for on that offense involuntary manslaughter, charge is re- if quired On the properly requested. facts presented cases, those the failure to consolidate indictments was by itself a sufficient ground for new trials.2 We have conclud- ed, however, that the rationale of the Moore and Stock decisions is to the case at equally applicable bar. Moore,
The basis of the ruling set forth in the plurality opinion of Mr. Justice is that Eagen, “ . . . if a jury, credence to a defendant’s giving
version of an encounter could find that defendant guilty
fundamental
involuntary manslaughter,
fairness dic-
consolidation,
tates the
upon
of that indictment
request,
with the murder and voluntary manslaughter indictments
as possible
verdicts.”
The practical consequence, indeed, the of this purpose ruling was to permit a charge In the involuntary manslaughter. Moore, Court, In two members of this Mr. Justice Roberts and the writer, present separately concluded that a defendant is entitled to a charge involuntary manslaughter, requested, irrespective if offense, whether there has been an indictment for that at least where involuntary manslaughter the evidence is of such a nature that would verdict, i.e, supported by be a rational one the evidence. opinion, of the “failure so plurality acquaint
words *6 it from with full of operating knowledge prevents jury a fair having law and defendant from precludes relevant Id. hold, therefore, that of where in a trial a trial.”3 We present a indictment there is from whatever case on murder which would the fact-finder to re- permit evidence source manslaughter, a of a defendant is turn verdict a on the of entitled, to elements that upon charge request, offense.4 States, 205, 1993, 213, 412 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 36 In Keeble v. United following 844, (1973), Supreme Court made L.Ed.2d 850 comment: explicitly have never held that Due Process Clause we “[W]hile of right guarantees the of a defendant to Amendment Fifth offense, jury it is neverthe- instructed on a lesser included have the less . federal act in clear a construction of . that [the preclude raise question] such an instruction would difficult questions.” constitutional jurisdiction general that a in this and elsewhere is trial
4. The
rule
charge concerning
included
unless there
need
an
offense
court
not
basis”
charged
acquitting
of
“rational
for
the defendant
the offense
convicting him of the included offense. See Commonwealth v.
and
Jones,
569,
Pavillard,
(1973);
A.2d
v.
452
308
598
Pa.
571,
(1966).
Law Institute’s
421 Pa.
437
could
that
the result we reach
be
today
It is arguable
the common-law
concept
through application
derived
involun-
offenses5 and a determination
lesser included
charge
regardless
request
on
must
on that offense
the court
any
support such a verdict. See
there is
evidence to
Com
whether
Jones,
563,
457 Pa.
United States
monwealth v.
Johnson,
denied,
(3d
1974),
tary
has
Voluntary manslaughter
murder.6
included offense of
else-
authority
in
Pennsylvania,7
regarded
been so
long
con-
that,
the proposition
properly
support
where would
is also a lesser included
sidered,
not, however,
wheth-
We need
consider
offense of murder.8
in
should be changed,
law rule
Pennsylvania
er the common
in the case at bar
holding
our
opinion
for we are of
Code, 18
Pennsylvania
the new
Crimes
Pa.C.S.
is required by
Michigan, Vol. 1975 Detroit
George,
Included
Lesser
Offenses
Barnett,
(1975);
College
J.
The Lesser-included
Law Review 35
Practitioners,
Analysis
Day
5 Conn.
A Present
Offense Doctrine:
Note,
The Doctrine of Lesser Included Offenses
L.Rev.
Kansas,
Note,
Lesser Included
Washburn L. Journal
Equal
Application
to the Prosecution and
Standards
Offenses:
Situations, 4 Toledo Law Review
Included Offense
in Lesser
Defense
1.07(4),
supra, provides that one
note
6. The Model Penal Code §
when
included in another
offense is
by proof
all the facts
“(a)
of the same or less than
established
it is
charged; or
the offense
required
the commission of
to establish
attempt
to commit the offense
(b)
or solicitation
it consists of an
therein; or
otherwise included
charged
an offense
or to commit
charged only
respect
that a less
(c)
from the offense
it differs
property
injury
person,
or
injury
same
risk of
to the
serious
culpability suffices to establish its
public
a lesser kind of
interest or
commission.”
Assembly, although adopting portions of
We note that
General
Code,
incorporate
did not
Penal
into
Crimes
the Model
Code
not, however,
1.07(4)
We do
consider this a
of the Model Code.
disapprobation
the doc-
the Model
formulation of
mark of
Code
offenses.
trine of lesser-included
*8
563,
(1974);
Jones,
See,
142
e.g.,
Pa.
319 A.2d
Commonwealth v.
457
7.
201,
(1973);
Bailey,
Pa.
439 101 et which effect at was in the time of the seq.,9 § the crimes involved. commission of here This case one being Code,10 of first under the it is impression necessary consider the structure of that legislation the definitions therein which we must be by guided. contained 25,
The
Code in
Crimes
the first
time in
Chapter
establishes an offense known
Pennsylvania,
as “criminal
homicide”. A
is
of this crime
person
“if he intention-
ally,
recklessly
causes the death of
knowingly,
negligently
another
being.”
human
18 Pa.C.S.
The
2501(a).
Code
§
then states
“[cjriminal
homicide
as mur-
classified
[is]
der,
manslaughter, or
voluntary
involuntary manslaughter.”
Ibid.
2501(b). (Emphasis
Murder is
turn
supplied.)
§
divided into three
murder of
categories:
degree,
the first
murder
second
of the
and murder
degree,
of
third
2502.11
of
degree.
Ibid.
Murder
the first
and of
degree
§
the second
under the Crimes Code
corre-
degree
together
law;
to murder
the first
under
spond
degree
prior
new murder
the first
is
of
an
degree
intentional killing,
while the new murder of
degree
the second
is felony-murder.
Murder of
third degree
comprised
“all other kinds
of murder”
1977-1978),
18 Pa.C.S.
2502(c) (Supp.
thus
§
taking the
the former murder in
place
the second degree,
which the
Code
in the
Penal
described
same words.12 The
1972,
6, 1972,
9. Act No. 334 of
enacted December
and effective six
thereafter,
1974,
by
26,
months
as
Act
amended
of March
P.L.
213,
4,
(Supp. 1977-78).
No. 46
18 Pa.C.S.
§
2502
§
Moore,
317,
10.
(1975),
Cf. Commonwealth v.
344
850
A.2d
supra,
Stock,
547,
and Commonwealth v.
A.2d
654
(1975), supra,
Code,
both of which arose under the Penal
ofAct
June
24, 1939,
872,
701,
amended,
Pa.C.S.A.App.
P.L.
as
§
§
predecessor
statute
the Crimes Code.
degree
This further subdivision of murder so as to create a third
by
that offense
added to
Code
Crimes
Act of March
1977-78).
P.L.
No. 46
(Supp.
§
§
Pa.C.S.
24, 1939,
amended,
12. Act of June
P.L. 872
18 Pa.C.S.A.
App.
§ 4701.
definition of this classification of criminal homi-
Code, therefore,
cide under the
like
Crimes
definition murder
degree
Code,
in the second
under the former Penal
is to be derived
Drum,
from the common law. See Commonwealth v.
remaining
species
also are
manslaughter.
They
and
terms as in
Code in the same basic
defined in
Crimes
2503, 2504.
law.13 18 Pa.C.S.
prior
§§
of
25 of the
Chapter
We think that
the structure
such
the above cited sections
is
appear
Crimes Code in which
offense,
that of criminal
homicide
major
as to create one
homicide,
homicide,
namely,
the several
of
types
and
voluntary
the three named
and
degrees
murder of
of
any
constituent
subsidiary
are
involuntary manslaughter
offense. All
of
single major
grades
offenses within
thus have been made lesser
included of
unlawful killing
criminal
fenses of the overall crime of
homicide.14
the classifications are
a function
largely
differences between
clear
the state of mind of the
This becomes
perpetrator.
culpability purposes
when one examines the ranking
Palmer,
282,
(1868).
292
v.
448 Pa.
A.2d
See also Commonwealth
210,
(1972);
Tyrrell,
v.
405
Like murder
un intentional
killing.
is an
See Commonwealth
slaughter
Jones,
What is more
for our
is the fact that under the
present
important
purposes
Crimes Code it is a
which
a state of mind
killing
requires
is in effect
on the
scale
simply gradation
ascending
which
malice. The state of mind
culpability culminating
which characterizes
is not mali
involuntary manslaughter
cious;
it is referred to as “criminal
and is
negligence”
acts,
unlawful,
whether lawful or
done in a
evidenced by
manner as those terms are
negligent”
“reckless or grossly
2504;
defined.
see also n.
supra;
See
Pa.C.S. §
*11
Jones,
569, 578-79,
v.
'We thus to that because ture has classified manslaugh both murder and involuntary homicide, ter as subdivisions of the offense of criminal major a defendant who has been with murder is entitled charged have the the elements of to instructed on request jury at least where evidence is manslaughter involuntary at his trial on which a verdict of that less serious presented offense could be based.18 rationally types manslaughter
The Crimes Code definitions of the two
of
are
substantially
prior
the same as under
law. See
Moore,
supra,
(concurring
at
n.
344 A.2d at
n. 15
ROBERTS, J.).
opinion of
judge may
sponte
18. Whether the trial
so instruct
sua
is not
States,
compare
now before us. See and
Walker v. United
Herron,
U.S.App.D.C.
II. It remains to determine whether from evidence in this case a conclude that Michael jury might rationally manslaughter. of As noted guilty involuntary Polimeni above, the Crimes definition of involuntary manslaugh Code ter is of our law: substantially declaratory previous
“A person when a direct result of of a lawful action in doing or negligent manner, reckless or the of a grossly doing manner, lawful act in a reckless grossly negligent he causes the death another person.” Pa.C.S.A. 2504(a) (1973). § 302(b)(3) also 18 and 302(b)(4) (1973),
See Pa.C.S.A. supra n. where the Code defines reckless negligent con- duct. the evidence most favorable Viewing light to we then appellant19 must determine whether the jury find could defendant’s actions to have been unintentional “reckless or grossly negligent” but within meaning of the Code provisions. evidence at trial showed the following sequence events:20 August 22, 1973,
On
evening
Polimeni,
Michael
invited one
appellant,
Nicky
and one
Dellaquilla
William
brother,
Grande
the house
shared
appellant
with his
Peter
Polimeni. The
for the
purpose
was to
proposed meeting
discuss some
and a
missing
bottle
pills
pill
belonging
*12
Polimeni which he believed
had stolen. When
Dellaquilla
and
arrived
Dellaquilla
Grande
at
home at
appellant’s
about
m.,
p.
11:30
there
with
were
them four other men: David
Dowling, John
Frederick
Dyer,
Kostanich and Kenneth Pat-
others,
terson.
at
the
Surprised
seeing
went
appellant
into
alone,
bedroom
his
removed a loaded .38 caliber
from
pistol
the safe there and
the
in his
trouser
placed
gun
back
pocket.
State,
(Mo.1961);
(Okl.Cr.App.
Tarter
359 P.2d
1961);
Nodine,
State v.
198 Or.
you? just my getting A. I felt like head was heavier and heavier and I was like, getting light just getting headed and I was scared and start [sic] shooting.” N.T. 299. just pulled A. know what “Q. Consciously? Did you it out kind of in the part consciously point of his [******] ****** I kind body I was pulled direction the aiming it weapon out, our at or aimed—didn’t at Patterson? bodies anything.” were, really so I didn’t N.T. 300. aim, “Q. your itWas intention to kill him? A. No sir. Q. your What intention? him A. Get off N.T. 300 01. me.” part On Polimeni cross-examination testified as follows: “Q. elapsed How much time between the first and second shots? what, A. I shot I After shot the first didn’t know if I him or hit I and him, trying push was still to I was hesitant on the second shot what, I if I hit him or pretty because didn’t know but he still seemed know, strong getting, you out, going I like just and was still like and I trigger pressing after started that. the wrecking worry from A. I wasn’t actually Patterson Q. A. Yes started “Q. You meeting Were guess prosecution about aiming sir.” N.T. 340. grabbed appellant knew above of a car had been scream, you aiming so, in Polimeni’s house was to it, for a you I God pulled [******] belonging version pulled were felled. specific part will take following particulars: at it out and he was in aiming Kenneth Patterson? and said of what gun care at him? one and fired occurred that Klingensmith; only body it”; “Take it discuss five nonetheless, anything. general vicinity. alleged purpose times, easy man, evening Patterson never stealing twice after appellant differed don’t I *14 alternative is The third 302(b)(3). 18 Pa.C.S. 2504(a); § that he knew admission sure, weakened, by appellant’s to be victim, but this came at the the aiming gun he was ver- conflicting had given after appellant cross-examination it”; . didn’t “. . aiming if I was know (“I sions don’t direction out kind of aim, gun] just pulled really [the his I body what part know were, so I didn’t our bodies and the ambiguity Despite at or anything.”) was aiming have con- could jury statements of these ambivalence of reck- was in the category conduct that Polimeni’s cluded inten- rather than of manslaughter) (involuntary lessness result- sudden and intense passion either under killing tional in the unrea- Patterson or by provocation from serious ing (voluntary be justified that the would killing sonable belief manslaughter). of the conflicting interpretations of these
The resolution
course, has
which,
authority
facts is for
jury,
of a witness’
Com-
all,
testimony.
of or none
part
believe
Judgment remanded new trial.
JONES, J., former C. did not participate decision this case.
ROBERTS, J., which opinion filed concurring J., O’BRIEN, joins.
MANDERINO, J., a opinion. filed concurring NIX, J., dissenting filed a opinion.
ROBERTS, Justice, concurring. Garcia, in
For the reasons stated (1976) opinion), A.2d 1199 I believe (plurality upon charge that a defendant is entitled to a on request in for criminal manslaughter every prosecution involuntary Code, the homicide under Crimes 18 Pa.C.S.A. 2501 (1973). I agree appellant therefore with the that is entitled majority to a new trial.
O’BRIEN, J., opinion. in this joins concurring MANDERINO, Justice, concurring.
I with the agree that is to a majority appellant entitled new trial because one accused of criminal enti- homicide is tled to an instruction on if re- involuntary manslaughter, quested, whether or not there is “rational basis” in the any mind of the trial for such a judge verdict.
To to refuse hold that it is error not to on instruct even in involuntary manslaughter, a case where is there no “rational basis” which the upon could return jury such a verdict the sets for the stage same issue which confronted this Court previously concerning voluntary manslaughter. problem the voluntary manslaughter began area when a jury returned a verdict of voluntary manslaughter even there had been though no as to charge voluntary with the issue We were then confronted
manslaughter. (for verdict manslaughter to the accept voluntary whether or the accept not been a refuse to charge) which there had voluntary verdict as valid. If the voluntary manslaughter Court, had accepted, verdict not been manslaughter had a acquittal have to enter verdict of necessity, would man- voluntary verdict of overruling jury’s man- voluntary refused to ignore This Court slaughter. it circumstances, held that under such verdict slaughter to such a jury of the return authority was within on not been instructed verdict, had though jury even voluntary manslaughter. involuntary when return verdict of jurors
What happens charged have not though even been manslaughter, they that they their wisdom believe crime, because in the This Court involved case? degree guilt lesser decide, did the voluntary then as it once will have area, man- accept whether to valid, not though verdict even slaughter crime, jury’s or refuse to accept on the charged a verdict of acquittal. verdict and enter in a case involves The proper justice given frequently justices I do not understand why judges close questions. *16 rather than can best resolve juries, they, assume that should eliminate artificial limitations close We questions. The be on invol- should jury charged a deliberations. jury’s all If in cases of criminal homicide. untary manslaughter ais involuntary manslaughter its wisdom a decides that jury verdict. not disturb that verdict, judge a should proper fear will return juries irrationally There is reason to no verdict in cases where there manslaughter an involuntary verdict. jury may, kind for such a no basis of any however, disagree superior reasoning compassion, out of with the verdict of judge bring trial no in the though even there is “rational basis” court’s mind for such verdict. cases,
In I the wisdom twelve prefer persons such close justice The ultimate of a judge. given to that a single of a than of a the prerogative is more properly case judge. Justice,
NIX, dissenting. dissent in for the reasons set forth Com- my I dissent Oct. (filed 449, 378 A.2d Garcia, 474 monwealth v. 7, 1977). Pennsylvania
COMMONWEALTH GARCIA, Appellant. Bennie Pennsylvania. Supreme Court Argued Nov. 1976.
Decided Oct.
