On Jаnuary 17,1997, appellant, William R. Philipp, pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol 1 and disregarding a yield sign. 2 At that time, he was sentenced to two years of intermediate punishment. Less than two months later, appellant, in an apparent state of intoxication, refused to submit to scheduled breаth and urine tests. Both appellant’s intoxication and refusal to submit to the tests constitute violations of the conditions of his intermediate рunishment sentence.
Following a May 23, 1997 hearing, the court revoked appellant’s participation in the Intermediate Punishment Program аnd on June 26, 1997, appellant was sentenced to one (1) to two (2) years’ incarceration for his DUI conviction. This appeal followed.
Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the sentencing *921 guidelines, imposing an unreasonable sentence outside the guidelines and failing to set forth an adequate explanation for the sentence on the record.
“Sentencing is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless it is outside the statutory limits or manifestly excessive so as to inflict too severe a punishment.”
Commonwealth v. Phillips,
In 1990, Pennsylvania enacted provisions establishing intermediate punishment as a sentencing alternative. The legislature’s intent was:
to give judges another sеntencing option which would lie between probation and incarceration with respect to sentencing severity;
to provide a more appropriate form of punishmenVtreatment for certain types of non-violent offenders;
to make the offender more accountable to the community; and
to help reduce the county jail overcrowding problem while maintaining public safety.
Sentencing in Pennsylvania 1990: 1990-1991 Annual Report of The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, p. 8.
An intermediate punishment sentence imposed pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9763, Sentence of Intermediate Punishment, may be revoked where the specific conditiоns of the sentence have been violated. “Upon revocation, the sentencing alternatives available to the court shall be the same as the alternatives available at the time of initial sentencing.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9773, Modification or revocation of intermediate punishment sentence, (b) Revocation. This rule of re-sentencing is analogous to that set forth for re-sentencing following revocаtion of probation. “Upon revocation of probation a sentencing court possesses the same sentencing alternаtives that it had at the time of initial sentencing.”
Commonwealth v. Byrd,
Appellant relies upon the following provision of the sentencing guidelines and аrgues, as intermediate punishment is absent from the language, the guidelines apply in this case. “The sentencing guidelines do not apply to sеntences imposed as a result of probation or parole revocation, accelerated rehabilitative dispоsition, disposition in lieu of trial, direct or indirect contempt of court, nor violations of protection from abuse orders.” 204 Pa.Code § 303.1 Sentencing Guideline Standards (b). We find the similarities between revocations of probation, parole and ARD and revocation of intermediate punishment sufficient to conclude the sentencing guidelines do not apply to sentences imposed as a result of intermеdiate punishment revocation. In further support of our determination, we point out that section 303.1 was revised and said revisions came into effect thirteen (13) days prior to appellant’s sentence. Effective June 13, 1997, 204 Pa. Code § 303.1(b) provides as follows:
(b) The sentencing guidelines do not apply to sentences imposed as a result of the following: accelerated rehabilitative disposition; dispоsition in lieu of trial; direct or indirect contempt of court; violations of protection from abuse orders; revocation of probation, intermediate punishment or parole.
(Emphasis added.) Based upon the foregoing, it is clear the guidelines were not intended to and do not apply to appellant’s sentence. Appellаnt’s arguments of their *922 misapplication are, therefore, without merit. Sentencing alternatives such as intermediate punishment exist to enаble judges to impose the guideline sentence reflective of the rehabilitative needs of certain non-violent offenders while mаintaining public safety. Intermediate punishment is not, however, the solution for all substance abuse offenders. Appellant received thе benefit of the guidelines at his initial sentencing and through his own actions has demonstrated he needs a sentence more stringent than that prоvided in the guidelines.
The remaining issue for our review is whether the sentencing court abused its discretion in imposing the 1 to 2 year term of imprisonment without adequate emanation therefor. The sentencing court obviously need not explain deviation from the guidelines where they do not apply. However, the court is required pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1409(C)(2), supra, to state on the record the reasons for the sentence imposed. Aсcordingly, the court explained on the record that it had considered the following factors prior to imposing sentence:
• the pre-sentence investigation report;
• appellant’s educational, family and work history;
• statеments made on appellant’s behalf by appellant’s family, counsel and appellant himself; and
• appellant’s alcohol abuse history.
(S.T., 6/26/97, pp. 13-15.) This was appellant’s fourth DUI offense and as such is upgraded from a second degree misdemeanor to a first degree misdemeanor. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, supra, (e) Penalty. Appellant’s offense has a statutory limit of five years as a first degree misdemeanor. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(1) Sentence of imprisonment for misdemeanors. As appellant’s 1 to 2 year term of imprisonment is clearly within this statutoiy limit, there was no erroneous imposition of sentence. Appellant’s sеntence reflects the nature of the offense committed, his proclivity towards alcohol abuse, his refusal to seek the necessary treatment and the needs of society.
Upon review of the June 26, 1997 sentencing transcripts, it is apparent the court acted within its disсretion in assessing the relevant factors and fashioned its sentence based upon the relevant evidence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Notes
. 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(1).
. Id., § 3323(c).
.
See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 184 Procedure оn charge of violation of conditions.
Commonwealth v. Becker,