Appellant, Paul Perry, appeals from the Order entered by the Court of Common *1260 Pleas of Philadelphia County denying his second petition under the Post Conviction Reliеf Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9541 et seq. 1 The Commonwealth has filed a motion to quash raising the timeliness of the petition. For the following reasons, we decline to quash, but after review of § 9545 of the PCRA, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the second PCRA petition.
The facts and procedural history may be summarized as follows. On July 7, 1977 a jury found Mr. Perry guilty of first-degree murder, possession of an instrument of crime, and criminal conspiracy. Mr. Perry was sentenced to life' imprisonment for the murder, with consecutive terms of two "and one-half (2/é) to five (5) years for the weapons charge and two and one-half (2}£) to ten (10) years for the conspiracy charge. On appeal, this Court. affirmed the judgment of sentencе, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied his subsequent
allocatur
petition.
Commonwealth v. Perry,
On April 22, 1982 Mr. Perry filed his first petition for relief under the provisions of the Post Conviction Hearing Act (PCHA) (subsequently repealed and replaced by the PCRA). The petition was dismissed without a hearing, and this Court affirmed the Order on appeal.
Commonwealth v. Perry,
On December 12, 1996 Mr. Perry filed his second petition under the сurrent provisions of the PCRA. The PCRA court dismissed the petition without a healing by Order dated March 26, 1997. Mr. Perry then filed the instant pro se appeal raising five allegations of error:
1.Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [appellant’s] second pеtition without a hearing or appointment of counsel?
2. Were the issues raised in [appellant’s] PCRA petition of intoxication, inadequate trial preparation of counsel, and prosecutorial misconduct finally litigated or waived?
3. Were the issues of intoxication, inadequate trial preparation, and prоsecuto-rial misconduct of arguable merit?
4. Was trial counsel’s assistance ineffective in failing to address, raise, or preserve the aforesaid issues for аppellate review and were post-trial counsel ineffective for failing to raise their predecessor’s ineffectiveness?
5. Did defendant knowingly waive his right tо file a petition for allowance of appeal from Superior Court’s ruling [that affirmed] the lower court’s order dismissing his first PCHA/PCRA petition without a hearing?
The Commonweаlth subsequently filed a motion to quash the appeal on the basis that the PCRA court was without jurisdiction to entertain the petition when it was untimely filed under the 1995 amendments to the PCRA. 2 We denied this motion without prejudice so the Commonwealth could raise this issue before this panel. Although the Commonwealth correctly asserts that the present petition is governed by the 1995 amendments, having been filed on December 12, 1996, we disagree that quashing the appeal is appropriate. Mr. Perry filed a timely aрpeal from the Order dismissing his second PCRA petition. Moreover, in order to determine if a PCRA petition is timely filed, we must conduct a thorough review under the amendments to § 9545 3 whiсh changed the requirements for when a petition for post-conviction relief must be filed:
(a) Original Jurisdiction-Original jurisdiction over a proceeding under this sub-chaptеr shall be in the court of common pleas. No court shall have authority to *1261 entertain a request for any form of relief in anticipation of the filing of a pеtition under this subchapter.
(b) Time for filing petition.—
(1) Any petition under this subchap-ter, including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final, unlеss the petition alleges and the petitioner proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and hаs been held by that court to apply retroactively.
(2) Any petition invoking an exception provided in paragraph (1) shall be filed within 60 days from the date the clаim could have been presented.
(3) For purposes of this subchapter, a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b) (emphasis added).
Therefore, only after thе PCRA court reviews all three factors and decides that the petition is time-barred will it be divested of its authority to entertain the PCRA petition.
See Commonwealth v. Alcorn,
We now anаlyze the petition at issue. This is Mr. Perry’s second petition seeking post-conviction relief, and it is governed by Section 9545(b)(1). As a result, Mr. Perry was required to file the second PCRA рetition within one year from the date that his judgment became final. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Mr. Perry’s allocatur petition on January 14, 1980. Judgment therefore becamе final on April 13,1980; the expiration of time for seeking a writ of cer-tiorari with the United States Supreme Court. 4 Mr. Perry filed his second PCRA petition on December 12,1996. Accordingly, this petition is untimely filed and is time-barred unless one of the exceptions found in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i) — (iii) applies.
We have reviewed these exceptions and find that none is applicable. Mr. Perry has neither alleged nor proven in his second petition that his delay in filing was caused by the interference of governmental officials. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(l)(i). Next, Mr. Perry does not present any facts in his secоnd petition upon which his claims are predicated, which were unknown to him and could not have been ascertained earlier by exercising due diligence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(l)(ii) is inapplicable. 5 Finally, Mr. *1262 Perry has not alleged in his second petition a violation of a recently recognized constitutional right that was given retroactive еffect. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii).
Having determined that Mr. Perry has failed to raise any claim that will excuse the untimely filing of his second petition, we find that his PCRA petition was time-barred, and the PCRA cоurt lacked jurisdiction to grant relief. As a result, the dismissal of the petition without a hearing was proper.
Order affirmed.
Notes
. Act of November 17, 1995, P.L. 1118 No. 32 (Spec.Sess. No. 1), § 1.
. The Commonwealth raises the timeliness of Mr. Perry’s second PCRA petition for the first time on appeal. We note that the PCRA court did not consider the timeliness of the PCRA petition in its opinion аnd Order denying the petition without a hearing. However, this Court will address this issue
sua sponte
in order to determine if the PCRA court had proper jurisdiction over the petition.
See Commonwealth v. Alcorn,
.This section of the PCRA was interpreted for the first time in
Commonwealth v. Alcorn,
. Rule 13 of the United States Supreme Court Rules provides that "[a] petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of a judgment of a lower state court that is subject to discretionary review by the state cоurt of last resort is timely when filed with the Clerk within 90 days after entry of the order denying discretionary review.” U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 13, 28 U.S.C.A.
. We recognize that Mr. Percy did not address the issue of timeliness in his second PCRA petition or in his appellate brief. However, in his answer to the Commonwealth's motion to quash, he conceded that his second PCRA petition was untimely filed but thаt this untimeliness should be excused under the exception found in § 9545(b)(l)(ii). He argued that in November *1262 1996 he discovered case law that supported a defense of intoxication and within 60 days of the discovery, he filed his second PCRA petition. Even if we were to consider Mr. Perry’s claim, we cannot agree that the discovery of preexisting case law qualifies under this exception.