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Commonwealth v. Perry
442 A.2d 808
Pa. Super. Ct.
1982
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*1 connected closely are not so rights owner, Mellinger’s Mellinger Even if is indispensable party. an he would be does company the real estate owner, against a verdict cannot accept we rights. impair Mellinger’s a necessary is Mellinger determination lower court’s party. and indispensable deficiencies in the com- examine the other

We need not since opinion, discusses in its the lower court which plaint, with before us. We sympathize are not properly these issues since reviewing complaint difficulty court’s the lower of counsel. On without benefit Appellant by it was drawn of advisability wish to consider the remand, may Appellant are rights protected. that his counsel to assure retaining reasons, sustaining we reverse the order foregoing For the the case for further and remand objections the preliminary opinion. not in conflict with this proceedings Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH PERRY, Appellant. Robert Pennsylvania. Superior Court March 1979. Submitted Filed March 1982. Appeal for Allowance of Denied June

Petition *2 Packel, Chief, John W. Assistant Appeals, Public Defend- er, for Philadelphia, appellant. Henson,

Eric B. Assistant District Attorney, Philadelphia, Commonwealth, appellee. CERCONE, J., Before P. and HOFFMAN, WATKINS and JJ.

WATKINS, Judge: from the of Com- ease comes to us on Court appeal

This involves defendant’s and Philadelphia County, mon Pleas him should have been dis- charges against that the claim failed to demonstrate missed because the defendant to trial at diligence” bringing “due to extend the held on the Commonwealth’s for trial. time charged was arrested and with burglary

The defendant of crime on 1977. He July and instruments possessing 10, 1977 after a of said crimes on February was convicted He then took this appeal. trial. non-jury to Rule run date of 180 days pursuant The mechanical Procedure was January 1100of the Pa.Rules of Criminal the time for trial Sunday Because that date fell *3 23, 1978. Rule 1100 January extended to Monday, was 26, 1977the case was listed Crim.Pro. On October Pa.Rules failed to on time for the appear for trial. The defendant 23, was On 1978 the passed. January trial and the case Petition for an Extension of filed a timely in to the defendant to trial. The defend- bring Time which and filed a motion to dismiss the ant answered said A was held thereon on charges. hearing February after which the court an extension of time to the granted 10, commenced on February Commonwealth. Trial after defendant’s arrest. day which was the 199th The court below found that the Commonwealth had exer- in to the defendant to diligence attempting bring cised due on proceed trial. The Commonwealth was ready 14, 1977,November 1977and December October reached on of those dates. The any but the case was not the defendant’s tardiness in appearing court also found that 26,1977 resulted in a 22 which day delay for trial on October Deducting the defendant. the 22 day is attributable to defendant from the 199 the by days brings caused the delay Thus, if the within the 180 limit. even day the Rule diligence” failed to “due at prove within the appropriate the defendant was tried time if the 22 was from period days properly deducted the “run time”.

The defendant was late on October 1977 because he However, had been detained at a district hearing. the case 17,1977. was then re-listed trial on November the “unavailability” defendant’s on October 1977 resulted in delay. the The of unavailability the defendant excludes the occasioned from delay thereby the of the rule. running Millhouse, 470 Pa. 368 A.2d 1273 (1977). 1100(d)(1) Section of the requires rule the exclusion of the of from the period delay resulting unavailability of the defendant or his counsel. Commonwealth v. Morgan, The court below found that the on defendant’s October unavailability re sulted in a 22 Unlike the day delay. situation in Morgan, the of the defendant in our unavailability case did result in schedule delaying proceedings. The defendant us would have hold that defendant’s unavailability Octo ber most, 1977resulted in a one only day delay, at which is attributable to the defendant. The argues defendant Rule 1100(d)(1) that the provides only delay which can be attributed to the defendant is the period actual of time that he was unavailable. We do not agree. The Rule specifically excludes from the time” period “run “such at delay any stage of as from proceedings (1) results : the unavaila or bility of defendant his attorney.”1 (Emphasis ours) It is obvious that many defendant, cases the his by unavailability, can occasion a which greater is much *4 than actual his time of unavailability. The Rule charges to this the defendant.

Since court below correctly attributed the 22 day delay to the defendant and because the case was tried on the 199th hold day, we that the court below did not err in dismissing the defendant’s to petition dismiss the charges.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

HOFFMAN, J., a opinion. files dissenting 1100(d)(1). 1. Pa.Rules Crim.Pro. dissenting:

HOFFMAN, Judge, court erred in granting the lower that contends Appellant pursuant for extension of time petition the Commonwealth’s and, would accordingly, I 1100(c). agree Pa.R.Crim.P. to dis- appellant and order of sentence the judgment reverse charged. filed a criminal 1977, the Commonwealth 26,

On July him with burglary charging against appellant, complaint to pursuant of crime. instruments possessing and com trial should have 1100(a)(2), appellant’s Pa.R.Crim.P. on 23,1978.1 listing At a scheduled trial January menced by and a bench 1977, appear, failed to 26, appellant October when warrant was withdrawn The warrant was issued. was Appellant’s later that day. appellant appeared 7, The case was not 1977. for November then relisted 14, continued until December and was reached on that date reached, and date, case was again 1977. On filed the Commonwealth January subsequently, to Pa.R.Crim.P. pursuant of time for extension petition a that it alleged In its 1100(c). petition, sched previously on the three prepared proceed had been alleged the Commonwealth Additionally, uled trial dates. will be the Commonwealth diligence, due “[djespite original before the run date.” the [appellant] unable try answer to the Com filed both an appellant Subsequently, he denied the material aver in which petition, monwealth’s charges dismissal of the ments, pursuant and a the extension on Febru 1100(f). At to Pa.R.Crim.P. no evidence 3, 1978, presented the Commonwealth ary noted the hearing judge merely The petition. of its support and December of October November continuances of due dili concluded, support finding “That would a and Commonwealth, having the Petition on the of the gence part an extension hearing judge granted filed.” The been timely January computing period, the 180th 1. In the Rule 1100 Jones, Sunday. day, v. is omitted because it was 211, 214, (1977); (1979); Thomas, § Pa.C.S. *5 364

until February 1978. Appellant’s nonjury com- menced on February 1978, and he was convicted on the above-stated charges. denial Following of post-verdict mo- tions and imposition sentence, appellant took this appeal.

Rule 1100(a)(2)requires the Commonwealth to commence trial within 180 days of the filing of the complaint unless any period of delay beyond 180 days is excludable pursuant 1100(d) Rule or the run date is properly extended by court order pursuant to Rule 1100(c). The Commonwealth argues, and the agrees, that majority even if the extension in this case were improperly granted, appellant was tried within the Rule 1100period because it is entitled to exclude twenty- two Rule days. 1100(d)(1)states in part: “In determining the period for trial, commencement of there shall be exclud able therefrom such period delay at any of the stage proceedings as results from: ... the unavailability of the defendant . ...”2 The Commonwealth argues that al though appellant was unavailable part of the on day 26, 1977, October his failure to appear at the scheduled trial listing that date caused his trial to be until delayed November asserts, Commonwealth that twen ty-two day period should be excluded under Rule 1100(d)(1) because that delay from” appellant’s unavailabili “resulted] ty-

In Commonwealth v. Morgan, 484 Pa. (1979),our Supreme Court rejected the contention which the case, raises here. In that the defendant did not appear on the date, scheduled trial and the trial was rescheduled to a date forty-nine days later. The Common- wealth sought to exclude under Rule 1100(d)(1)the entire forty-nine day period on the ground that defendant’s una- vailability on the scheduled trial date prevented the com- mencement of trial within the Rule 1100 period. In reject- 2. The Commonwealth proving by has the preponderance burden of of the evidence that it is 1100(d). entitled to an exclusion under Rule Mitchell, 553, 564, v. 372 A.2d (1977); Williams, (1981); Clark, *6 the ing argument, Commonwealth’s the Supreme Court not calendar, ed that the court not defendant’s unavailability, had the Commonwealth prevented from defend scheduling ant’s trial within the Rule 1100 period. Because the Court had held that previously scheduling difficulties do not pro vide a basis for an exclusion under Rule 1100(d)(1),Common Shelton, 8, wealth v. 469 Pa. 364 (1976), A.2d 694 Commonwealth was not entitled to exclude the forty-nine As an day period.3 decision, alternative for ground its Court held finding that “a of unavailability causing delay requires the Commonwealth to exercise due diligence avoidance of that 484 delay,” 127, 976, Pa. at 398 A.2d at which the Commonwealth had failed to do.4 See also Com Cohen, 349, 356, monwealth v. 481 Pa. 1331 (1978) (“[A] defendant bail who fails to at a appear court proceeding, of which he has been notified, properly is una vailable from the time of that proceeding until he is subse or until quently apprehended he voluntarily surrenders him self.”).

I conclude that the twenty-two day period from October 1977 to November 1977 is not excludable under Rule If 1100(d)(1). scheduling difficulties prevented appellant’s trial from being listed before November is delay not excludable under Rule 1100(d)(1). event, In I note any the record contains no explanation for the in resched- delay uling appellant’s trial. It therefore cannot be said that the due diligence in the avoidance “exercise[d] of that delay.” Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra, 484 Pa. at 127, 398 A.2d at 976. Accordingly, because only one is day excludable under Rule 1100(d)(1), appellant must be dis- unless charged the lower court properly granted the Com- monwealth’s extension petition. Accord, Manley, Pa.Superior 282 Ct. 422 (1980); Goodman, A.2d 1340 (1978). Chapman, But see Commonwealth v. A.2d 352 diligence

4. The Court stated that due “[t]he involved in this case obligation refers to [the to make an effort Commonwealth’s] quickly Id., permit.” the trial as reschedule as the circumstances n.5, Pa. at 398 A.2d at 976 n.5. 1100(c) Rule states that a trial court extend the time may for commencement of trial if trial cannot be com “only menced within the due prescribed period despite diligence by our Additionally, Supreme the Commonwealth.” Court has mandated that an extension be may granted “only upon record . . . certification that trial is showing: scheduled business; the earliest date consistent with the court’s pro that if the is due to the delay vided court’s inability try prescribed period, the defendant within the the record must also show the causes of the court and the reasons delay why cannot be avoided.” Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 1349 (1976). “The Common *7 burden, evidence, wealth has the aby preponderance of the it has met the showing requirements 1100(c).” Rule Ehredt, 485 Pa. 360 reviewing hearing court’s that the ruling “[I]n burden, Commonwealth has met its we. consider the only evidence the presented Commonwealth and so much by as, in fairly evidence read the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted.” Id.

I conclude that the Commonwealth failed to establish that it exercised due in to diligencé attempting bring to appellant trial within 1100 above, the Rule As stated period. the Commonwealth in its extension petition cited the merely three occasions on which the case had not been tried and that it had exercised alleged due At diligence. the “hear- ing” on the the petition, no evi- presented dence, and the hearing judge based his apparently finding of diligence due solely upon his review of the docket entry notes. This record falls far short of the satisfying Common- wealth’s burden of its due proving diligence aby preponder- ance of the evidence. The record does not “show certainly the causes of the court and the delay reasons the why cannot be avoided.” Commonwealth v. 469 Mayfield, supra, Pa. at 364 A.2d at 1349. Levitt, See Commonwealth v. Ct. Pa.Superior (1981) (Common- wealth not entitled to extension where it failed to show that was unavoidable that judicial delay case could and not have been scheduled trial ahead of other cases which did not have similar Rule 1100 Commonwealth v. problems); Mines, (1980) (Com- 422 A.2d 876 monwealth not entitled to extension where it merely alleged in its extension that it was twice ready proceed trial, entries showed was and docket that case twice contin- request); ued at defendant’s Berry, (1979) (Commonwealth entitled to extension where of due was only proof diligence statement that case could not be reached hearing judge’s Moreover, available). because no trial rooms were even jury assuming, arguendo, proven Commonwealth had that, its due it was unable to despite diligence, try appellant 14,1977, on or before December the date of the last continu- ance, the did not allege, prove, much less it had exercised due diligence attempting to com- mence trial between December 14 and the end of the Rule Because Rule period. 1100(c) states that an expressly may granted extension be if trial cannot be com- “only menced within the due prescribed period despite diligence by (emphasis added), Commonwealth” the hearing judge erred in the Commonwealth an granting extension. See *8 v. Gilberthorp, Ct. Pa.Superior (1981) (Commonwealth A.2d 527 not entitled to extension gave where it no reason for failing bring defendant the five month between during period preliminary date); Coleman, and run (1980) (Commonwealth entitled to extension where it could have listed case for trial last six of Rule 1100 during days period); Commonwealth v. Weber, 390 A.2d 206 (1978) (Com- monwealth not entitled to show, extension where it did not alia, why inter the case was not listed for trial during final period). two weeks of Rule 1100 I Accordingly, would judgment reverse the of sentence and order appellant dis- charged.

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Perry
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Mar 12, 1982
Citation: 442 A.2d 808
Docket Number: 1354
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
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