Commonwealth v. ParrottaCommonwealth v. Parrotta
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Wilkins
The defendant was convicted of violation of
1. The defendant excepted both to the denial of his motion and to the allowance of the amendment. He contended that there was a variance because the indictment charged receiving in Groton in the county of Middlesex whereas the proof showed receiving in Chelsea in the county of Suffolk. No error is presented. We agree with the defendant and not with the Commonwealth to the extent that the indictment alleged Groton as the place of receiving and not as the place of the stealing. Nevertheless an allegation of the place of stealing was not essential to the crime charged. “It is well settled that, in an indictment for the substantive offence of receiving, it is not necessary to state the place of the larceny. . . . The forms of indictment for this offence in common use do not state the place of the larceny.” Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 136 Mass. 170. Wharton’s Criminal Procedure (10th ed.) § 1171. See
The defendant argues that the original indictment gave him notice that he was charged with having committed a crime within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, in this case the Superior Court sitting in Middlesex County, and that when proof was made, he was in fact charged with having committed a crime in Suffolk County. He relies on
The Superior Court has “original jurisdiction of all crimes.”
Even if the defendant be regarded as having raised the question of jurisdiction by his exception to the denial of his motion to direct a verdict by reason of a variance or by his exception to the allowance of the amendment, he has no valid objection on this ground. Whatever limitation there may have been to the territorial jurisdiction of the court in the trial and prosecution of the crime of receiving stolen *311goods under
It remains to be considered whether the defendant was prejudiced within the meaning of
2. Another exception of the defendant relates to the admission of certain testimony of one Martocci, called as a witness for the Commonwealth. After testifying that he was a shipper for Crane, Tone and Baldwin, wholesale liquor dealers in Worcester, and that he had a record of a shipment with him, but did not remember it, he was asked, “Do you find on the record that a shipment of liquor was made to Boots and Saddles, Incorporated, on August 4, 1943?” Subject to the defendant’s exception he answered, “Yes.” He was then asked, “Do you find on the record that eleven cases of liquor were shipped to Boots and Saddles on that date, ten cases of Libre rum and one case of Old Crow?” The defendant again excepted, and the witness answered, “Yes.” This was not a technically correct method of refreshing recollection. Commonwealth v. Perry, 248 Mass. 19, 29-30. Commonwealth v. Osman, 289 Mass. 388, 390. It introduced in evidence the contents of the record and not the recollection of the witness. On cross-examination, however, Martocci testified, “This invoice tells me the date of shipment and to whom made; it makes me sure I made the shipment; I have a clear recollection; I know I made it.” This new testimony elicited by the defendant rendered the ruling harmless. The original ruling had not become the law of the trial, as contended by the defendant, and did not preclude the admission of other competent evidence of the facts even on cross-examination of the same witness. Moreover, much of this evidence had already been admitted without objection. One Hanifan, the proprietor of Boots and Saddles, Incorporated, testified that “he had purchased in August, 1943, from the firm of Crane, Tone & Baldwin, wholesale liquor dealers in Worcester, ten cartons of rum and one carton of Overholt.” This *313exception must be overruled. Commonwealth v. Capalbo, 308 Mass. 376, 383. Commonwealth v. Mannos, 311 Mass. 94, 115. Abele v. Dietz, 312 Mass. 685, 690-691. See Ryder v. Board of Health of Lexington, 273 Mass. 177, 179; Bendett v. Bendett, 315 Mass. 59, 65.
3. The defendant excepted to the admission in evidence of an empty Libre rum carton bearing the marking “B. S.” in crayon which was found by the police on the premises of Alpine Lodge. There was evidence that on that day there were several cartons marked “Libre rum” and one empty carton marked “Boots and Saddles” in the cellar. The proprietor of Boots and Saddles, Incorporated, had testified that the rum he had purchased from Crane, Tone and Baldwin was marked in crayon “B. S.” The shipper from Crane, Tone and Baldwin, during whose testimony the carton was admitted in evidence, testified that sometimes on shipments to Boots and Saddles, Incorporated, the cartons were marked “B. S.”; that he could not say who wrote “B. S.” on this particular carton; and that he would not know by looking at it that it came from his place of business. There was no error in admitting the carton. The lack of positive identification affects not the competency but the weight of the evidence, and the issue of identity was for the considera-, tion of the jury. Commonwealth v. State, 11 Gray, 60, 64. Commonwealth v. Mullen, 150 Mass. 394, 398. State v. Small, 78 N. H. 525, 529. McKibben v. State, 187 Ga. 651. Wharton’s Criminal Evidence (11th ed.) 762.
4. The defendant’s one request for a ruling which was denied was in effect for a directed verdict of not guilty. This could be done only by motion. Rule 71 of the Superior Court (1932). Commonwealth v. Velleco, 272 Mass. 94, 99. Commonwealth v. Coshnear, 289 Mass. 516, 528. Commonwealth v. McMenimon, 295 Mass. 467, 471. In any event on the merits no error was shown. See Commonwealth v. Kronick, 196 Mass. 286; Commonwealth v. Peopcik, 251 Mass. 369; Commonwealth v. Grossman, 261 Mass. 68.
Exceptions overruled.
Notes
This statute was effective on October 1, 1943. —• Reporter.
See