COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA v. DANZELL PANNELL
Record No. 011570
Supreme Court of Virginia
April 19, 2002
263 Va. 497
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant.
JUSTICE LACY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the use of the term “original proceedings” formerly contained in
In 1997, Danzell Pannell pled guilty to a charge of unauthorized use of an automobile in the City of Alexandria Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court and was placed on probation. Two years later, in 1999, the juvenile court found that Pannell had violated the conditions of his probation and revoked his probation. Pannell appealed the juvenile court judgment to the circuit court, arguing that former
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, en banc, reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that former
In 1999,
Proceedings to revoke or modify probation, protective supervision or parole shall be governed by the procedures, safeguards, rights and duties applicable to the original proceedings.
Relying on the dictionary or ordinary meaning of the phrase “original proceedings,” the Court of Appeals concluded that the phrase “referred to the ‘origin or beginning’ of the relevant prosecution, clearly the adjudicatory phase.” Pannell, 34 Va. App. at 294, 540 S.E.2d at 531. The Court of Appeals, however, construed the phrase “original proceedings” out of context.
None of Pannell‘s alternative arguments offered in support of the result reached by the Court of Appeals are persuasive. There is no constitutional requirement that a court apply a reasonable doubt standard or exclude hearsay evidence in an adult probation revocation proceeding, Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 789 (1973) (applying the due process protections established in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), to probation revocation proceedings), nor are such standards required in juvenile proceedings. While Pannell argues that imposing such due process protections in the juvenile context would have been reasonable, it is equally reasonable to assume that the General Assembly intended that such protections were not required in juvenile probation revocation proceedings just as they were not required in adult probation revocation proceedings. Finally, the General Assembly‘s elimination of the sentence at issue as part of the 2001 amendments to
For the above reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals will be reversed and the judgment of the circuit court reinstated.
Reversed and reinstated.
