COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. David R. PACKER, Appellee.
798 A.2d 192
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
May 31, 2002
Argued Oct. 16, 2001.
teed by
Justice NEWMAN joins this dissenting opinion.
Ronald T. Williamson, Norristown, D. Michael Fisher, William H. Ryan, Robert A. Graci, Harrisburg, for Com.
Christian A. Fisanick, Ebensburg, for Pennsylvania District Attorneys Ass‘n, amicus curiae.
Louise S. Thompson, Conshohocken, for Dept. of Environmental Protection, amicus curiae.
Hugh J. Bracken, Media, for David R. Packer.
Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.
Justice NEWMAN.
The Commonwealth appeals an Order of the Commonwealth Court, which reversed the conviction of Appellee David R. Packer (Packer), pursuant to the Solid Waste Management Act (SWMA).1 We granted review to consider the conclusion of the Commonwealth Court, which held that an employee may not be criminally charged with violating section 610(1) of the SWMA,
§ 6018.610 Unlawful conduct
It shall be unlawful for any person or municipality to:
(1) Dump or deposit, or permit the dumping or depositing, of any solid waste onto the surface of the ground or underground or into the waters of the Commonwealth, by any means, unless a permit for the dumping of such solid wastes has been obtained from the department ....
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Packer worked as a laborer, equipment operator, and truck driver for Glenn Holmes (Holmes) and the United States Environmental Service Corp.2 Holmes owned property on Anderson Road (Anderson Road property) in East Coventry Township, Chester County. Prior owners had operated the Anderson Road property as an automobile junkyard before Holmes acquired it.
On October 15, 1993, George Strutynski (Strutynski), an excavator employed by East Coventry Township (Township), observed Packer operating a track hoe and burying tires in the northwest corner of the Anderson Road property. Stru-
tynski reported this conduct to the police and the Township secretary. After this report was made, the Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General conducted a search at the northwest corner of the Anderson Road property and discovered that tires had been buried six to eight feet deep into the ground. The Department of Environmental Resources3
At the criminal jury trial, Strutynski testified that he had observed a track hoe next to an excavated trench on the Anderson Road property. According to Strutynski‘s estimation, eighty to one hundred feet of the trench had been covered with dirt and a hole about twenty-five feet long and twenty feet deep remained. Strutynski stated that he had observed tires protruding from the sides of the excavated hole and he saw clean tires at the bottom of the hole. Strutynski further testified that he watched Packer cover the clean tires at the bottom of the hole with dirt. Finally, as an expert in excavation,4 Strutynski offered his opinion that Packer was burying tires on the Anderson Road property.
The Commonwealth also offered the testimony of Holmes’ brother, Craig Holmes (Craig), regarding an incident that took place in 1993, when he had assisted his brother in cleaning the Anderson Road property. Craig testified that he and his brother loaded tires from the Anderson Road property into trailers. According to Craig, at the end of one particular week, ten to fifteen trailers had been filled with tires and only one and a half trailers remained empty. Craig stated that a six to ten-foot pile of tires remained, waiting to be put into the
trailers. When Craig returned to the Anderson Road property after the weekend, he testified that he had observed that three quarters of the tires were missing, yet the one and a half trailers remained empty. Later, while operating a bulldozer on the Anderson Road property, Craig stated that he became submerged in mud and clay and had to dig six feet to extricate the bulldozer. Craig testified that when he asked his brother and Packer why his bulldozer sank, one of them had responded, “you mean you don‘t know that the tires were buried there.” (N.T. 11/23/98, p. 102). Craig stated that Holmes or Packer had explained that they had used a track hoe to dig a twenty-foot hole, filled the hole with tires, and covered the hole with approximately five to eight feet of dirt. (N.T. 11/23/98, pp. 102–105).
Packer testified on his own behalf. He indicated that before 1993, Holmes hired him as a subcontractor on a per job basis and, in 1993, Packer became a full-time employee of Holmes. Packer testified that on the day that Strutynski observed him using the track hoe on the Anderson Road property, Packer was using the equipment to remove tires from their rims. Packer stated that while in the process of this project, he discovered that tires were buried underground and he informed Holmes of his discovery. According to Packer, Holmes told him to follow the tires. Packer explained that he was digging tires out of the ground when Strutynski confronted him and accused him of burying tires. In addition, Packer testified that while removing tires from the hole, he accidentally knocked some tires back into the hole with the track hoe.
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Packer and Holmes guilty of violating section
The Commonwealth Court affirmed the conviction of Holmes, but reversed the conviction of Packer. See Commonwealth v. Packer, 754 A.2d 44 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000). The court concluded that our legislature did not intend for section 610(1) to impose criminal liability on “mere employees.” Id. at 48-49. In its analysis, the court reasoned that section 610(1) requires the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person, who had a duty to obtain a permit, dumped or deposited solid waste without obtaining that permit. Id. The court held that Packer, as an employee, had no duty to obtain a permit, and therefore reversed his conviction under section 610(1). Id.
DISCUSSION
The Commonwealth has previously prosecuted employees for violating provisions of our waste management statutes. See generally Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 634 A.2d 1109 (1993) (employee convicted of violating
We begin our analysis by examining the language of section 610(1) because, where the intent of the legislature is clear from the plain meaning of the statute, courts need not pursue statutory interpretation.
language of the statute is ambiguous does statutory construction become necessary.
The SWMA regulates various kinds of waste management activities, including the disposal of several types of waste.
[a]ny individual, partnership, corporation, association, institution, cooperative enterprise, municipal authority, Federal Government or agency, State institution and agency (includ-
ing, but not limited to, the Department of General Services and the State Public School Buildings Authority), or any other legal entity whatsoever which is recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties. In any provisions of this act prescribing a fine, imprisonment or penalty, or any combination of the foregoing, the term “person” shall include the officers and directors of any corporation or other legal entity having officers and directors.
In construing the above language, the Commonwealth Court concluded that an employee could be convicted pursuant to section 610(1) only if that individual was the person responsible for obtaining a permit from the DEP. The court reasoned:
“Person” is defined as any “individual ... or any other legal entity ... recognized by law as the subject of rights and duties.” Section 103 of the SWMA,
35 P.S. 6018.103 . Thus, to convict a person for violating section 610(1), the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person who had a duty to obtain a permit dumped or deposited solid waste without obtaining a permit.
Contrary to the interpretation by the Commonwealth Court, the plain language of section 610(1) and the definition of “person” in the SWMA do not limit liability to only those responsible for obtaining a permit. Section 610(1) imposes criminal responsibility upon “any person” dumping or depositing solid waste when a permit for such conduct had not been obtained. Nowhere in the plain language of section 610(1) does the legislature limit the classification of “any person” to only those who had the duty to obtain a permit. In addition, the definition of “person” in the SWMA does not limit liability to those with a duty to obtain a permit. In examining the definition of “person” in section 103, it is clear that the “rights and duties” portion of the definition attaches to the “any other legal entity” segment that immediately precedes it. The Commonwealth Court concluded that the “rights and duties” language modified “any individual,” and
therefore narrowed the reach of section 610(1) to only those persons with a duty to obtain a permit. The Commonwealth Court reached its result only by omitting ten separate entities that are divided
Following an examination of the entire SWMA, we conclude that the General Assembly did not intend to limit liability under section 610(1) to only those individuals who have the duty to obtain a permit for dumping solid waste. In other provisions of the SWMA, the General Assembly prohibited conduct of persons particularly charged with obtaining permits from the DEP. See
ing, denying, renewing, modifying, revoking and suspending of permits and licenses, the General Assembly differentiates between persons, municipalities, partners, associates, officers, parent corporations, subsidiary corporations, contractors, subcontractors, and agents.
Imposing liability upon all individuals pursuant to section 610(1), and not simply those with the duty to obtain a permit, is consistent with the purposes of the SWMA. The General Assembly enacted the SWMA in part to “protect the public health, safety and welfare from the short and long term dangers of transportation, processing, treatment, storage, and disposal of all wastes” and “to implement
In its Opinion, the Commonwealth Court expressed concern over the reach of section 610(1) as applied to employees. The Commonwealth Court stated:
We note that the General Assembly does not intend a result that is unreasonable or absurd. Section 1922 of the Statutory Construction Act,
1 Pa.C.S. § 1922 . However, if we interpreted section 610(1) as applying to “mere employees,” unreasonable and absurd results would occur. All employees in this Commonwealth would risk criminal sanction when handling solid waste if their employers failed to obtain necessary permits. Moreover, because the SWMA imposes absolute criminal liability, see Section 606(i) of the SWMA,35 P.S. § 6018.606(i) and Baumgardner Oil Co., it would be no defense to employees that their employers explicitly told them that the necessary permits had been obtained.
Reading section 610(1) to apply to employees does not produce absurd results, but punishes all that are involved in the unpermitted dumping of solid waste. The SWMA imposes strict liability on offenders.
Finally, Packer asserts that section 610(1) is unconstitutional. Packer maintains that an omission may be a criminal offense only if the law imposes a duty to act on the person charged and cites to
There is a strong presumption in the law that legislative enactments do
Moreover, there is a heavy burden of persuasion upon one who challenges the constitutionality of a statute. While penal statutes are to be strictly construed, the courts are not required to give the words of a criminal statute their narrowest meaning or disregard the evident legislative intent of the statute. A statute, therefore, will only be found unconstitutional if it “clearly, palpably and plainly” violates the constitution. Commonwealth v. Barud, 545 Pa. 297, 681 A.2d 162, 165 (1996) (citations omitted).
“[A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law.” Commonwealth v. Heinbaugh, 467 Pa. 1, 354 A.2d 244, 246 (1976) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926)). See also Commonwealth v. Cotto, 562 Pa. 32, 753 A.2d 217, 220 (2000). A penal statute must give reasonable notice to a person of
what is proscribed. Barud, 681 A.2d at 165; Commonwealth v. Boyle, 533 Pa. 360, 625 A.2d 616, 620-21 (1993). “The fact that [the legislature] might without difficulty have chosen ‘clear and more precise language’ equally capable of achieving the end which it sought does not mean that the statute which it in fact drafted is unconstitutionally vague.” Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d at 246 (quoting United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975)). See also Commonwealth v. Burt, 490 Pa. 173, 415 A.2d 89, 92 (1980). In addition, “[i]t is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand.” Heinbaugh, 354 A.2d at 245 (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975)). See also Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 489 Pa. 254, 414 A.2d 54, 56 (1980), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 894, 101 S.Ct. 259, 66 L.Ed.2d 124 (1980); Waste Conversion, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 130 Pa.Cmwlth. 443, 568 A.2d 738, 741 (1990), pet. for allowance of appeal denied, 525 Pa. 621, 577 A.2d 892 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 898, 111 S.Ct. 253, 112 L.Ed.2d 211 (1990).
Examining section 610(1) in light of the facts of the present case, we conclude that the provision comports with due process. The SWMA contains standards definite enough to inform a person of what he or she can and cannot do. See Parker White Metal Co., 515 A.2d at 1368; Baumgardner Oil Co., 606 A.2d at 623.9 Packer, as an equipment operator and truck driver for an environmental corporation, could reasonably know that dumping tires without a permit is not permissible. Instead of cleaning up the Anderson Road property
loading tires onto available empty trailers, Packer dug a trench and buried the tires. Packer was not punished for failing to obtain a permit, but the affirmative act of dumping solid waste when a permit had not been obtained. The plain language of section 610(1) holds all persons responsible for dumping solid waste without a permit and is not unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we hold that section 610(1) of the SWMA imposes criminal liability on employees. In addition, we conclude that the section does not violate the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, the Order of the Commonwealth Court vacating the conviction of Packer is reversed.
Former Chief Justice FLAHERTY did not participate in the decision of this case.
Justice SAYLOR files a concurring and dissenting opinion.
Justice NIGRO concurs in the result.
Justice SAYLOR, concurring and dissenting.
I join in the majority‘s holding that Section 610(1) of the SWMA embodies an absolute liability offense that, by its terms, is intended to apply to all persons, including individual employees. See
of the SWMA is a third-degree misdemeanor and carries potential penalties of up to one year in prison and a fine of at least $1,000 and up to $25,000 per day for each violation. See
Recently, in a concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Samuels, 566 Pa. 109, 778 A.2d 638 (2001), I discussed considerations attendant to the designation of a crime as a strict or absolute liability offense consistent with the due process precepts. See Samuels, 566 Pa. at 113-50, 778 A.2d at 641-62 (Saylor, J., concurring). In attempting to evaluate such principles against the circumstances of the present case, however, a full review is hindered by the absence from the original record of the trial court‘s jury charge.1 The trial court‘s instructions to the jurors are particularly important in the present context, since, for example, some courts have ameliorated constitutional concerns in relation to strict liability offenses in their jury charges by permitting jurors to consider various forms and degrees of affirmative defenses. See, e.g., State v. Holte, 631 N.W.2d 595, 598 (N.D.2001) (“We ... have permitted an affirmative defense to a strict liability offense as ‘a logical accommodation which recognizes the reasons for both the legislative designation of the crimes as strict liability offenses and the constitutional interests of the accused.’ “).2
145-46, 778 A.2d at 661-62 (Saylor, J., concurring), I view it as critical for these questions to be decided based upon a full and complete appellate presentation.
Appellee was the appellant in the Commonwealth Court and therefore charged with the obligation of presenting an adequate record to the appellate courts,3 see