Wе allowed the Commonwealth’s application for direct appellate review in connection with the defendant’s appeal from her convictions after a jury trial on two indictments charging trafficking in cocaine, G. L. c. 94C, § 32E (b).
Based on the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the Commonwealth, the jury could have found the following facts. In February, 1993, Sergeant Kenneth LeGrice of the Brockton police, an experienced narcotics investigator, became involved in an undercover investigation that involved the defendant and an Hispanic man later identified as Braudilio Martinez. On February 3, 1993, Sergeant LeGrice bought four bags of cocaine from the defendant and Martinez for $150. On February 6, 1993, Sergeant LeGrice made a second purchase of cocaine from the defendant for $150. These transactions were followed by two additiоnal purchases of cocaine by Sergeant LeGrice, on February 12 and 13, 1993. On both occasions, the defendant and Martinez jointly participated in the sale.
Just after 10 p.m. on February 19, 1993, Sergeant LeGrice made contact by telephone with the defendant and asked to purchase three “eight-balls” of cocaine. (The term “eight-ball” is street vernacular for one-eighth of an ounce of cocaine, or approximately 3.5 grams). After negotiation, a price of $450 was agreed on, with the defendant indicating to Sergeant LeGrice that she would throw in a free $40 bag of cocaine (commonly referred to in street vernacular as a “forty,” and weighing about one gram).*
On February 24, 1993, Sergeant LeGrice made a sixth purchase of cocaine from the defendant when he bought directly from her an “eight-ball” for $160. The investigation was brought to a close on February 26, 1993, when the defendant agreed to sell Sergeant LeGrice six “eight-balls” of cocaine for $920. At the delivery point for this sale, the defendant, accompanied by Martinez and another Hispanic woman, handed Sergeant LeGrice, in exchange for the $920, seven bags of cocaine, totalling 28.54 grams. (Sergeant LeGrice was told that the seventh bag, which was an extra bag beyond the bargained-for six, was “a freе forty ... for you”). The defendant, Martinez, and the other. Hispanic woman who accompanied them were arrested shortly after the sale in keeping with prearranged plans by the police. This sale, the seventh in the continuing series of transactions between the defendant, Martinez, and Sergeant LeGrice, became the subject of the seсond trafficking indictment (no. 93936).
1. As has been mentioned, the charge of trafficking that arose out of the sale on February 19, was tried on the theory that the defendant jointly participated in the transaction. The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty on all seven charges being considered by the jury, asserting in the motion, in general terms, that the Commonwealth’s еvidence was insufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the elements of each offense had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The motion was denied. The defendant now argues that the motion should have been granted on this trafficking charge because the test for joint participation requires, among other factоrs, that each participating defendant be present at the scene. In keeping with this theme, the defendant argues in her brief as follows: “Since no evidence was presented that the defendant was present at the scene when Junior sold four bags [of cocaine] to [Sergeant] LeGrice, there could be no joint venture. Since there is no joint venture, there is no other theory whereby the Commonwealth could charge the defendant with trafficking.”
The second theory of accomplice liability had its inception in the four early common law classifiсations that defined par
Consistent with thе action taken by most States, Massachusetts has corrected these problems by means of legislation, specifically by G. L. c. 274, § 2, which makes a joint participant in the commission of a felony hable to the same extent as the principal felon, and by G. L. c. 274, § 3, which removes the impediments described in note 5, supra. See Commonwealth v. Benjamin,
A practical effect of our statutory changes is to hold the criminal actor who participates in a felony liable as a principal without regard to whether the felony is completed or committed by another.
What has been set forth is settled criminal law, but, as we shall discuss momentarily, one part оf the instruction on joint participation on the February 19 trafficking charge was not correct. A judge need charge on the defendant’s presence at the scene of a crime in a prosecution proceeding on a joint participation theory only to the extent that the factor has legal significance. As to the February 19 trafficking charge, the factor could have been omitted altogether, or referred to briefly to let the jury know that the defendant’s presence at the consummation of the sale was unnecessary to convict her as a principal so long as the jury found that she had actually associated herself with the criminal venture and assisted in
We now return to the February 19 trafficking charge. The judge instructed the jury that, to be convicted on this charge as a joint participant, the defendant had to be present at the drug sale. The instruction has led to the dеfendant’s argument that the judge’s mention of the presence factor requires reversal. We do not agree. The indictment charges trafficking in general terms,
2. The defendant’s two remaining arguments lack substantial merit, (a) The chain of custody as to the cocaine purchased on February 19 and 26, was established at trial by Sergeant LeGrice. Sergeant LeGrice also was properly allowed to testify to identifying marks that were placed in his presence on the various bags of cocaine by the deteсtives who were in charge of cataloging them, and he testified that the bags contained the cocaine he had purchased. See P.J. Liacos, Massachusetts Evidence § 11.3, at 657 (6th ed. 1994). Any argument that the defendant may have had with Sergeant LeGrice’s authentication testimony concerned the “weight and credibility of the evidence, a matter wholly within thе province of the jury.” Commonwealth v. Martino,
(b) The defendant’s argument with respect to “sentencing entrapment” is foreclosed by the discussion in Commonwealth v. Garcia,
The judgments of conviction on indictment nos. 93934 and 93936 are affirmed.
So ordered.
Notes
One indictment charged the defendant with trafficking in cocaine having a net weight between fourteen and twenty-eight grams, while the other
The jury also convicted the defendant on five other indictments charging the distribution of cocaine. The judge set aside the verdicts on these indictments because she had mistakenly instructed the jury on possession with intent to distribute cocaine rather than distribution, as had been charged. The defendant subsequently entered guilty pleas on these five additional indictments.
According to the evidence, the defendant also consulted with another person in the background during the telephone conversation, who agreed to the price and the “free forty.”
We are not concerned in this case with the crime of conspiracy.
For decisions considering presence at the scene as a factor in determining joint criminal liability see: Commonwealth v. Williams,
For decisions defining joint criminal liability in terms of the second theory without regard to the factor of presence see: Commonwealth v. Stewart,
Some of the difficulties that led to illogical results include jurisdictional difficulties (an accessory could be tried only in the State where his acts took place, which could be a different State from the one where the felony was committed), and with variances between charge and proof (a principal could not be convicted on proof that he was an accessory and vice versa). There аlso was the problem that an accessory could not be convicted until the principal had been convicted and could not be placed on trial in advance of the principal, even if the principal could not be tried because he could not be found or had died. See 2 W.R. LaFave & A.W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 6.6 (d), at 130-132 (1986).
A criminal law treatise sets out one оf the policy reasons behind the modem rule in the following descriptive terms:
“One of the greatest social menaces of the present day is the one who would be termed an accessory before the fact by the common law but in lay language is referred to as the ‘brains’ of a crime ring. He tends to put crime on a ‘business basis,’ he recruits members оf the ‘profession,’ he provides the means by which crimes are perpetrated on an elaborate scale, and weapons so that death will result from any interference with his plans. The guilt of his terrified underlings, who carry out his commands because they dare not ' disobey, is certainly no greater than his. And it will not promote the general scheme of social discipline to handicap the prosecution of such an offender by unreasonable obstacles.”
R.M. Perkins & R.N. Boyce, Criminal Law 764 (3d ed. 1982).
A sample instruction that is satisfactory in this regard is Instruction 5.05 of the Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court (1989). Although this sample instruction was criticized in Commonwealth v. Lafayette,
Indictment no. 93934 reads as follows:
“THE JURORS for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on their oath present that: MARIA ORTIZ of BROCKTON in the COUNTY of PLYMOUTH, on or about February 19, 1993, at BROCKTON in the COUNTY of PLYMOUTH did traffick in COCAINE or any salt or mixture thereof by knowingly or intentionally manufacturing, distributing or dispensing, or possessing with intent to manufacture, distribute or dispense, or did bring into the Commonwealth a quantity of COCAINE or any salt or mixture thereof, with a net weight of Fourteen Grams or more, but less than Twenty-Eight Grams.”