*1 Walls, v. appeal. failure to take a direct aff’d, 1, 125, 126 (1977), 375 A.2d A.2d affirmed. Order Pennsylvania
COMMONWEALTH NOYER, Appellant. Ronald J. Pennsylvania. Superior Court Nov. 1977. Submitted April 1979. Decided Appeal Sept. Petition for Allowance Granted *3 Altoona, for James V. McGough, appellant. Jr., District Peoples, Attorney, Hollidaysburg,
Thomas G. Commonwealth, appellee. JACOBS, WATKINS, Before President and Judge, PRICE, HOFFMAN, CERCONE, VAN der VOORT and SPAETH, JJ.
PRICE, Judge: imposition following This from of sentence appeal arises in the court motions fоr a denial below new trial and in arrest of raises seven judgment. Appellant herein, issues on For the reasons stated we reverse appeal. of sentence and for a judgment remand the case new trial.
The facts essential for resolution of this are appeal following. On Robert February appellant, Sweit- zer, and a third were from the party being transferred Blair Courthouse, where were all County they incarcerated time, Huntingdon, to the State Correctional Institution in a distance of about twenty-five Ferguson miles. Robert Gormont, J. Reed two both deputies sixty-nine years age incident, at the time of this were assigned transport the trio vehicle. The by prisoners were handcuffed to one another handcuffs, two sets of occupied the rear they seat of the sheriff’s automobile. ten miles
Approximately east while Hollidaysburg, car proceeding Route ensued in which affray prisoners managed overcome the deputies. trio seized the deputies’ weapons, and a shot was fired at Mr. Gormont as the prisoners good made their Both escape. deputies hospitalized were and remained incapacitated for long periods thereafter.
As trial, the result of a which and his co-defendant Robert were together, Sweitzer tried was convicted of three counts of and one count robbery,1 assault,2 each of aggrаvated recklessly endangering another person,3 escape,4 prisoner,5 assault theft by unlaw- ful or taking disposition.6 first contention is that the trial court erred in *4 to
failing discharge him due to a violation of Pa.R.Crim.P. 140(f)(1) and Pa.R.Crim.P. that requiring issuing 1. 18 Pa.C.S. 3701. §
2. 18 2702. Pa.C.S. §
3. 18 Pa.C.S. 2705. §
4. 18 Pa.C.S. 5121. §
5. 18 Pa.C.S. 2703. §
6. 18 Pa.C.S. 3921. § fix a and hour arraignment day at a
authority which is not less than three nor hearing for the preliminary thereafter, be extended only than ten days more cause. lodged against in this case was complaint
The criminal 28, 1975, was not ar- on but Fеbruary he remained at large until March because raigned received written notice that his Appellant until that time. was scheduled for March but preliminary hearing hearing might told that issuing magistrate be that date due to the condition postponed beyond have to 10, 1975, was a preliminary of the Not until June deputies. held, and at that time a facie case was found prima against appellant. filed a for an extension of petition
The Commonwealth and John to trial bring appellant time which Sweitzer 1100(c), August Sep- under Pa.R.Crim.P. On held, 22, 1975, a on that motion was com- tember and his chal- bined with John motion to quash Sweitzer’s appellant’s to the of the chal- lenge array grand jury, of the The Commonwealth lenge array grand jury. extensions, were denied the defendants granted grand relief and on October requested, subse- Appellant returned an bill of indictment. approved of evi- change, suppression filed motions for venue quently dence, discovery inspection, bill of particulars, motion to the indictment. quash that the magistrate
It is basic contention date. How preliminary hearing had no cause to extend the ever, September our review of the record of the and the lower court’s of fact thereon findings 1975/ us that with persuade magistrate satisfactorily complied 140 and 142. The court found that on the date Pa.R.Crim.P. written notice was that provided appellant of arraignment, 17,1975, would be held on March but preliminary hearing wit inability virtue of the Commonwealth’s time, extension was almost nesses to testify April doctor testified that as of Ferguson’s certain. Deputy *5 30, 1975,, the was still deputy not able to testify. Deputy Sheriff Gormont’s doctor 19,1975, stated that not until June (after would he hearing) have approved ap- Gormont’s to pearing testify. judge found magistrate received word from the 21,1975, individuals on or about May could but they appear, he did not schedule the officer, because the immediately complaining Behe, Trooper was on vacation and would thereafter be in court. June 1975,was set as the earliest feasible date for the preliminary hearing. received Appellant notice of the June 10th pro- ceeding.
Several cases of this court shed light on the read- proper ing to be given 140(f)(1). Pa.R.Crim.P. In Commonwealth v. DeCosey, 246 Pa.Super. (1977), A.2d 905 wherein former Judge President Jacobs elucidated the purpose rule, we held that failure to comply with the rule does not entitle one to automatically discharge. We noted in that case that there is no right constitutional to a preliminary that its hearing, is purpose merely determine whether a facie prima defendant, case exists against and that it is not to substitute as a guilt-determining procedure. Judge Jacobs therein noted that
“One of the prejudices obvious to an accused resulting from a in the of a delay scheduling hearing preliminary fact, In incarceration. the hearing’s principal function is to protect an accused’s right against an unlawful deten- tion. Mullen, Commonwealth v.
(1975). Here, however, the defendant was released on
bond, and
when the
only
preliminary hearing
finally
held did he object
Id.,
to its untimeliness.”
246 Pa.Super.
Another case decided
this
just
court
after
shortly
DeCosey
was Commonwealth v. Wansley,
The written this complaint herein involved. of the occurrences the same date bring appel- was therefore required The Commonwealth absent any to trial or before August lant 1100(d) or Pa.R.Crim.P. automatic exclusions of time under Pa.R. extensions in accordance with Commonwealth any Shelton, 469 Pa. 1100(c). Crim.P. case, the lower court found In the instant A.2d 694 and March complaint filing the time between the *7 authori- whiсh was located the on day in magistrate before a local Pittsburgh presented ties was excludable under 123(a), with Pa.R.Crim.P. accordance Thus, the unavailability. 1100(d) appellant’s Rule because to bring appel- had until September Commonwealth lant to trial. and thus days well within the August
On filed a document 1100(c), the prosecution under Rule timely 1100 of entitled, Pursuant to Rule “Petition for Continuance The court the Rules Criminal Procedure.”9 Pennsylvania 3,1975, at petition Septembеr scheduled a on The assistant present. which his counsel were appellant and on the record the between delay district attorney explained He stated hearing. appellant’s arraignment preliminary possible can as soon as successfully the circumstances and that under delay. prejudice from the claim no 1100(a)(2)provides: in which a “Trial in a court case 8. Pa.R.Crim.P. against complaint the defendant after June written is filed (180) days eighty frоm the shall no later than one hundred commence complaint is filed.” date on which the was for an extension It is clear from its contents that the document continuance, overlook the we will therefore of time rather than a obviously caption, and court received error in the since the defendant Kincade, see, effective notice. But that it was that the matter would be although contemplated August, that session was not presented grand jury conducted. The next earliest time that the grand jury at which indictments could would be in session and be on 29th. The sought September was to commence Common- facts, wealth contended that based these the court upon should make a of due and extend the run finding diligence date of Rule 1100. objected, trial counsel that he had
Appellant’s contending knowledge no condition of the victims nor of physical the times or circumstances surrounding physicians’ ap- hearing. of their attendance at a Coun- proval sel insisted that the Commonwealth could not make merely assertions, required factual but was to substantiate them. The court the Commonwealth bore the agreed burden, and, objection, granted over Com- monwealth’s to continue the so that request victims and their could be physicians produced testify. The court date as subsequent hearing September set 19th, the continuance would not noting delay grand trial. one of the jury presentment physicians or Because 19th, was unable to on the appear finally 22,1975. finding conducted on The court made a September of due and extended the run date to diligence January 1976.10 argument is that Common appeal
wealth not exercise due in with diligence proceeding did and that therefore the Rule appellant’s preliminary hearing, 1100 extension was To the improperly granted. contrary, we сoncur with the of the court below that the findings entitled to the Commonwealth was extension. 22, 1975, justifies
The record of the September adequately court’s that the earliest date conclusion June was Although January beyond trial did not commence until any passage period, the extended we need not consider of time after elapsed, the made no further extension since the Commonwealth petition appellant objected, to which nоr did file a written dismiss, thereby waiving any objection. motion to
553 have officer could complaining the on which victims hearing; and the for the preliminary been present for the grand that in fact day. conducted 2, 1975, and the commenced on June term of court June then. not be the case present would able attorney district 29th. commence on September would grand jury The next for to secure the Commonwealth necessary was therefore It extension, properly the court below we hold that an Common- it a record that establishes upon granted due diligence. wealth’s is that the court erred third contention witnesses of six Commonwealth
permitting on the bill of indictment. names not endorsed whose were held on December all pre-trial applications At a on alia, inter it, the court had before for of for particulars a bill via request application “[t]he crimes.” of witnesses to any allegеd names and addresses Woodcock, Mr. coun- hearing, of the At the commencement co-defendant, stated: for appellant’s sel We endorsed on the indictment. have the names “[W]e en- of the witnesses that are would like the addresses Hearing (December on dorsed the indictment.” 2). at had discovery particular this argument
No further the court ruled: Accordingly, information. upon as names of the witnesses endorsed
“[Ijnsofar concerned, Bill of are the application Indictment witnesses is denied virtue the addresses of these upon transcript presently appear fact same readily and are available filed these matters (December defendants from said transcripts.” 7). Hearing had
First, former Pa.R.Crim.P. under discover names witnesses no automatic right v. intended to call. Commonwealth the Commonwealth Bederka, A.2d (1975); Pa.
Jones, The Common 245 Pa.Super. request for a bill so in its answer to respondеd wealth *9 Second, it was the co-defendant’s who particulars. attorney then of scope narrowed the the at the December request 19th asking only for addresses of the witnesses hearing, named in the It this indictment. narrowed request which the to responded order. judge Appellant’s counsel offered no nor protest, proof did he offer of any “exception- al circumstances or reasons” to entitle to compelling him under discovery fоrmer. Pa.R.Crim.P. 310. note,
We is no finally, that there requirement the indictment the potential have names of all Common wealth witnesses endorsed thereon. 437, 192 A.2d
Gockley, (1963); Commonwealth v. Emmel, 194 Pa.Super. According we ly, find no error. assertion, merit,11 next which we find that the
is court below erred in charging the it jury that should receive the testimony with caution as it source, came from corrupt namely, his co-defendant’s accomplice. Sweitzer, co-defendant,
Robert did nоt testify trial, was the sole witness for the defense. In his charge jury, to the court below stated:
“Now, no rule of which there is law forbids the jury convicting upon uncorroborated ac- which, Appellant issue, meritorious, one more if raises would greater grant. entitle him to relief than we He asserts that because appeared indictments, the words “true bill” on the face of his quashed comply indictments should have been for failure to with 210(a), provides: which Pa.R.Crim.P. grand jury indictment, “After a has bill of considered the action, foreman ‘approved’ shall thereon endorse their either or ‘dismissed,’ sign shall it and he and record thereon the date of grand jury’s action.” “Heretofore, provides: The comment rule to the bill’ the words ‘true ‘ignored’ or were endorsed the bill of indictment. ‘not The term approved’ layman ‘ignored.’ sense makes more than the word discarding terminology Another reason for ‘true bill’ is that it has against connotаtion that accusation the defendant is true.” Appellant argues prejudiced he was because of the notation. However, expect upon hypertechnicality, relief such a when there possibility prejudice exposed no since the tried was not indictments, argument is a frivolous at best. *10 conviction, such a it permits the law While complice. and, of proof, this character upon looks with disfavor not ordinarily the should corrupt, jury because its source is should is You present. on it unless corroboration rely of Mr. and deter- Noyer closely scrutinize the testimony to be Testimony exists. mine whether corroboration not relate to the main solely as corroboration need classed corroboration involved, but be considered as may fact material facts relates to relevant and testimony when the involved. relation to the main fact which have a direct does not have to extend to the testimony Corroborative If is shown that he whole of the it testimony. witness’s particulars, jury the important has testified some truly words, in others. In other infer that he has done so may corroboration, we refer to evidence when we speak witness, the given by which is to that supplementary and confirm it. strengthen which tends to for corroboration is fruit- However, even if search your less, accomplice’stestimony believe an jury, may the you, bеfore, As were told there ring if it has the of truth. you disbelieve the is no rule of law which commands you of an and the deter- testimony accomplice, uncorroborated corroboration is or the suffi- necessary, mination whether of such corroboration as be is ciency may present, solely for of the law is that only requirement you you. must, it, it accept carefully before scrutinize you (N.T. 332-33) added). critically.” (emphasis objected charge. Defense counsel Co-defendant’s objection noting counsel articulated Commonwealth, defense, for the not testifying source” “corrupt charge appropriate only and that accomplice prosecution. when an testifies for the Russell, We find 383 A.2d Commonwealth, (1978), a case of first in this impression Russell, of this issue. In the Commonwealth dispositive from one individual who claimed that he produced testimony crime, he organized when Russell and that presеnt lookout, was to act but withdrew from the enterprise. as a defense, Another of the testified for declar- perpetrators he ing that did not know the and that appel- lant was not involved in the criminal incident. The appel- lant also testified in his own behalf. The gave court “accomplice charge” as to both the Commonwealth defense witnesses. court held that supreme Our
“A
charging
basis exists for
to view
legitimate
accomplice’s
with
whеn the
suspicion
accomplice
witness,
testifies for
Commonwealth.
out of a
Such
reasonable
has an
expectation
leniency,
interest
however,
This
inculpating
inapplicable,
others.
basis is
when the
testifies on
accomplice
behalf of the defense.
*11
in
implicated
One
a crime cannot
such
reasonably expect
others,
where, as
leniency
exonerating
particularly
here, the witness has
been sentencеd for
already
commit-
Id.,
All Pa. at
ting
the crime.”
The accomplice charge,
long
as
recognized
appropri
ate when the
testifies
for the
accomplice
prosecution and
Com
might
be
his
thereby
prompted by
hope
leniency,
Cristina,
monwealth v.
481 Pa.
(1978);
SPAETH, Judge, dissenting: was held that the preliminary states majority Maj. arraignment. as after possible soon as unsupported by n. 7. This statement is opinion at 682 His on March arraigned record. Appellant delay 10. This was not held until June preliminary victimized depu- be on the that the justified ground cannot injuries because of their testify ties were unavailable to holding Common- majority until 21. Under May (1976), Rick, wealth v. not needed to bind presence deрuties court, appeared officer could have police since another Moreover, of the incidents. and summarized their accounts conducting even if some delay substan- the victims could testify, was warranted so that *12 The record unjustified. still remains part delay tial testify by was available to Ferguson shows that Deputy 21.May was available 30, and that Gormont April Deputy after justification given delaying No available; follow- delay as for the beсame Deputy Ferguson 21, that a preliminary the lower court stated ing May officer, held the complaining could not be because Yet, need for this Behe, vacation. was on Trooper Indeed, remaining contentions. find no merit 12. We co-defendant, they questions Robert John are the same raised Sweitzer, per judgment curiam of sentence was affirmed whose 608, February Pa.Super. at 253 prejudicial not to the co-defend- error we here find was hаrmless and ant. 558
person, who does not seem to have been witness, a material at the unclear. circumstances,
Under these I do not believe that hearing was held as soon as Where possible. there has not been substantial compliance 140(f), with Rule defendant need not prejudice show for the indictment to be Commonwealth v. Riley, 260 Pa.Super. quashed. 393 (1978) (SPAETH, J., A.2d 1263 dissenting); v. Wansley, 248 Pa.Super. (1977) 375 A.2d 76 (SPAETH, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. DeCosey, (1977) (SPAETH, A.2d J., Here, concurring). there was not substantial compliance, and the indictments should have been quashed. A.2d O’REILLY, Appellant,
Frederick J. INDUSTRIES, CELLCO INC.
Superior Pennsylvania. Court of
Argued Oct. 1978. April Decided
