51 Mass. 259 | Mass. | 1845
The question here raised as to the liability oí the principal to be punished criminally for the acts of his agent or servant, in which he does not directly participate personally, is certainly not free from difficulty. As to civil liabilities, a broader and more general principle of responsibility applies, and the- master or principal may be held to answer in damages for default and misdoings with which he had no other connexion than that which arises from the fact that the injury was occasioned by one employed in his service. As a general rule, something beyond this is necessary to charge the master criminally for acts done by the servant. There must be such a direct participation in the act, or such assent and concurrence therein, as would involve him morally in the guilt of the action. Hence the cases are comparatively rare, and may be considered as exceptions to the general rule, where by legal rules a party is charged criminally for acts of his servant done without his knowledge and assent. The case of a bookseller, or publisher of a newspaper, is to some extent one creating such liability; to what precise extent is, perhaps, yet an unsettled question. Rex v. Almon, 5 Bur. 2686, a leading case on that subject, only carried the doctrine so far as to hold that such relation to the act of sale by a servant was prima facie evidence to establish the liability of the party, but was not conclusive and might be controlled. It was said by Lord Mansfield that he might avoid the effect of
The general rule, however, has been stated, 1 think, somewhat more broadly as to the liability of booksellers and publishers, respecting all publications issued from their establishments in the regular course of business; and they have been held answerable criminally in such cases, although the particular act of sale or publication was done without their knowledge. 1 Hawk. c. 73, § 10. Rex v. Walter, 3 Esp. R. 21. In the recent case of Rex v. Gutch & others, 1 Mood. & Malk. 437, where it appeared that Gutch was residing at a distance, was in ill health, and not interfering with the conducting of the paper, the rule is thus stated: “ A person who derives profit from, and who furnishes means for carrying on the concern, and intrusts the conduct of the publication to one whom he selects, may be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and ought to be answerable, although you cannot show that he was individually concerned in the act of publication.” But in that case, Lord Tenterden, in delivering the opinion of the court, says, “ I do not mean to say, that some possible case may not occur, in which he would be exempt; but generally speaking, he is answerable.”
Another class of cases, where the liability of the master for the criminal acts of the servant has been recognized, has arisen under revenue laws and police regulations. In Attorney General v. Siddon, 1 Crompt. & Jerv. 220, and 1 Tyrw. 41, (a case of concealing smuggled goods,) it was held that a trader is liable to a penalty for the illegal act of a servant, done in the conduct of his business, with a view to protect the smuggled goods, though the master be absent at the time the act is done. It seems here again to have been held only prima facie evidence, and that the master might have introduced evidence for the purpose of rebutting such prima fade case.
It seems to us that the case of a sale of liquors prohibited by law, at the shop or establishment of the principal, by an agent or servant usually employed in conducting his business, is one of that class in which the master may properly be charged criminally for the act of the servant. But in looking at the question presented by the bill of exceptions in the present cases, and considering what should be stated as the rule as to the responsibility of the principal or master in such cases, the court have come to the opinion that the law was stated too strongly, upon that point, against the defendant, inasmuch as the defendant, under the instructions given, might have been found guilty of the charge in the indictment, if a sale had been made in his shop by any person in his employment, without any reference to the circumstances under which the sale was made, and although against the will and in contravention of the orders of the defendant.
We think that a sale by the servant, in the shop of the master, is only prima facie evidence of such sale by the master as would subject him to the penalty for violating the statute forbidding the sale of spiritous liquors without license; that the relation of these parties, the fact that the defendant was in possession of the shop and was the owner of the liquor, and that the sale was made by his servant, furnish strong evidence to authorize and require the jury to find the defendant guilty. But we cannot say that no possible case can arise in
New ti ial granted.