Opinion by
On September 15, 1972, Nathaniel Nelson, the appellant, while assisted by counsel, entеred a general plea of guilty to an indictment charging him with the murder of Eonald Lee Campbell on May 29, 1971. In answer to questions by the court, Nelson affirmatively indicated hе understood the presumption of innocence in favor of a criminal defendant; the right to trial by jury; that by pleading guilty he was waiving Ms right to a trial and “was admitting doing everything” that hе “was charged with”; that he was aware of the possible consequences аnd was pleading guilty “of my own free will.” The assistant district attorney then recommended to the court that Nelson be adjudged guilty of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to рrison for not less than three and one-half and no more than ten years.
Following the foregoing, the court stated it was accepting “the plea of voluntary manslaughter,” although at that point in the proceedings, no factual basis for the guilty plea had been made part of the record. However, immediately therеafter, an evidentiary hearing ensued and the assistant district attorney with the acquiescence of defense counsel introduced into evidence in the presence of Nelson a recorded extra *463 judicial inculpatory statemеnt by Nelson, and a recitation or summary of the testimony of certain named eyewitnesses who were present in court and ready to testify to the circumstances of the crime. This evidence indicated Nelson fatally stabbed Ronald Lee Campbell with a knife during a fight which began in a bar in Philadelphia and continued on out in the street; that Campbell was unarmed at the time and the fight was the culmination of prior hаrd feelings existing between the two. When the district attorney finished, the court asked defеnse counsel, “Do you wish the court to hear from the defendant or any witnesses оn behalf of the defendant? Counsel replied, “No, Sir.” The court then asked, “None at all?” Counsel responded, “None.”
The court then directed questions to Nelson сoncerning his background after which defense counsel was asked if he wished to bring to the court’s attention any facts concerning Nelson. In response to this, Nelsоn’s mother was called and testified to his prior personal history.
At the conclusiоn of the above testimony, the court postponed sentence until a later date. On October 11, 1972, Nelson appeared with counsel before the cоurt for sentencing. No request to withdraw the guilty plea was made. A prison sentencе of three and one-half to ten years was imposed. This direct appeal was filed on November 9th.
It is now urged the guilty plea should be set aside, and the judgment that followed be reversed because the trial court did not “make a personаl inquiry into the facts of the case to determine that there was a substantial basis for a guilty plea.”
Before accepting a plea of guilty to a criminal indictment, the court is required to satisfy itself there is a factual basis for the plea of guilt. See Rule 319, Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure;
Commonwealth v.
Ingram,
The validity of the guilty plea is also challenged becausе allegedly his counsel told Nelson the assistant district attorney agreed that if a guilty рlea were entered, Nelson would be sentenced to Eaglesville Sanatоrium where he would be treated for chronic alcoholism. Since there isn’t an iоta of evidence in the record to support this allegation, it is impossible fоr us at this time to intelligently determine the truth or merits thereof.
Judgment affirmed.