27 A.2d 737 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1942
Argued April 14, 1942. Defendant appealed from a judgment of sentence following his conviction of fornication and bastardy. No notes of the testimony were taken at the trial but the facts material to the assignments of error have been stipulated by counsel with the approval of the trial judge, and are before us in the nature of bills of exceptions. It is conceded that the Commonwealth's testimony is sufficient to support the conviction. Defendant seeks a new trial on three grounds.
1. He complains that the court erred in failing to withdraw a juror because he was prejudiced by the district attorney's cross-examination. Defendant on the stand denied sexual relations with the prosecutrix. The transcript of the justice contained the following statement: "Defendant admitted being with affiant and having sexual intercourse with her." The district attorney, with the transcript before him, asked the defendant on cross-examination: "Did you not admit having sexual intercourse with the prosecutrix?" Defendant's objection to the question was overruled. Immediately thereafter, the Commonwealth offered the transcript in evidence; the offer was properly refused by the trial judge upon defendant's objection but there was no motion to withdraw a juror.
A transcript is not admissible as proof of facts found by the magistrate from the evidence. Where the testimony was taken in short hand, the transcribed notes, duly authenticated, would perhaps be the best evidence. Com. v. Bone,
2. Defendant complains that the district attorney, *517
in his address to the jury, declared that the defendant would `jump at the chance to plead guilty to the fornication charge' if he could thereby eliminate the bastardy count. The trial judge's recollection of the statement is that the district attorney asked the jury to reach this conclusion as a reasonable inference. In view of the testimony that defendant had admitted the fornication, the conclusion which was urged upon the jury was not illogical. "The important question is whether the prosecuting officer's remarks are mere assertions intended to inflame the passions of the jury, or statements that are fair deductions from evidence. . . . . . Assertion of opinion for the purpose of stimulating the jury to a careful and conscientious discharge of their duty in a particular case is always allowable. Where, under all the circumstances of the case, the verdict rendered is a just one, the language of the prosecuting officer which will justify a reversal must be such that its unavoidable effect would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant, so that they could not fairly weigh in his behalf such circumstances of doubt, extenuation or degree of guilt that may be present in the case, and thus make them unable to render a true verdict": Com. v. Meyers,
Finally, defendant complains that the proof of the date of the sexual intercourse varied by two days from that alleged in the indictment. We have repeatedly held that the Commonwealth is not restricted, in proving the date of an offense, to that alleged in the indictment. The burden upon the Commonwealth is met by proof of the commission of the offense on some other *518
date, fixed with reasonable certainty and within the prescribed statutory period. Com. v. Levy,
We find no merit in any of the assignments of error.
The judgment of sentence is affirmed.