Aрpellant James Neely was convicted by jury of recklessly endangering another person and of possessing an instrument of crime. He appeals from the judgment of sentence. Neely asserts that the trial court erred by failing to include *522 in its reputation evidence jury charge the words “character testimony in and of itself is such as to create a reasonable doubt.” Prior Superior Court panels have found reversible error where the trial court failed to charge that reputation evidence may in itself raise a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s guilt. Because these cases appear to misinterpret Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions, we have granted en banc review to resolve the apparent conflict.
On the night of February 15, 1984 Neely encountered complainant Donald Williams, an off-duty deputy sheriff, who was walking his dog without a leash. Neely pulled out a knife and threatened to use it on the dog. When Williams produced his badge and drew a gun, Neely began to slash at Williams’ face with the knife and Williams fired a warning shot. Neighbors summoned the police. Neely attempted to flee over a fence. He fell off the fence towards Williams with his knife still drawn, causing Williams to fire his gun and hit Neely in the leg. Neely continued to run until police told him repeatedly to halt. A knife was recovered in the grass nearby.
Neely was charged by information with recklessly endangering another person, possessing an instrument of crime and aggravated assault. At trial before the Honorable Lynne M. Abraham, Neely produced two character witnesses who testified to his good reputation as a peaceful and law-abiding person. Neely himself also gave lengthy testimony, claiming that he drew the knife to protect himself from a possible attack from the unleashed dog. The trial court’s charge to the jury included the following instructions on reputation evidence:
Evidence of gоod character is very important testimony, because the law says that when a person has a prior good reputation in the community, that person is not likely to commit a crime that’s against that person’s nature. Evidence of good character is material essential testimony in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This kind of testimony as to the defendant’s good character is not to be made light of. It’s not a mere make *523 weight thrown in to fill out the casе or fill in a gap. It’s affirmative, substantive testimony to be weighed and considered by the jury in connection with all the other evidence in the case as bearing upon the question of whether or not the Commonwealth has or has not established the guilt of the defendant as he stands charged beyond a reasonable doubt.
N.T., 7/25/85 at 598. This elicited an objection from Neely’s counsel who argued that Neely was entitled to an instruction that “character testimony in and of itself is such [as] to create a reasonable doubt.” N.T., supra, at 606. The trial court declined to alter the instruction.
Following the trial of July 23-25, 1985, Neely was convicted of recklessly endangering another person and of possessing an instrument of crime. His post-verdict motions raising the denial of the proposed jury instruction were denied. On October 8, 1985 Neely was sentenced to three months to twenty-three months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration and to a concurrent three-year term of probation. Neely timely appealed to this Court.
We will begin our inquiry with a discussion of the standard for an adequate jury charge. This court must review and consider the jury charge as a whole. Error cannot be predicated on isolated excerpts. It is the general effect of the charge that controls.
Commonwealth v. Alvin,
[T]he trial court is not required to accept the language of the point submitted by counsel but rather is free to select its own form of expression. The only issue is whether the area is adequately, accurately and clearly presented to the jury for their consideration.
Commonwealth v. McComb,
Thus a jury instruction on reputation evidence must accurately state the substantive law on the role of reputation evidence at trial. While evidence of bad character is inadmissible against a defendant in a criminal case:
It has long been the law in Pennsylvania that an individual on trial for an offense against the criminal law is permitted to introduce evidence of his good reputation in any respect which has “proper relation to the subject matter” of the charge at issue. Such evidence has been allowed on a theory that general reputation reflects the character of the individual and a defendant in a criminal case is permitted to prove his good character in order to negate his participation in the offense charged.
Commonwealth v. Luther,
In this way the law allows a criminal defendant the benefit of his good reputation. “Of what avail is a good character, which a man may have been a lifetime in acquiring, if it is to benefit him nothing in his hour of peril?”
Commonwealth v. Cleary,
Neely argues that he did not recklessly endanger another person because his disposition is peaceable. He is “arguing from his actual moral constitution, which in turn becomes a fact to be proved” by the introduction of reputation evidence. Wigmore,
supra,
§ 1608. Character, then, is a
fact
offered by the defendant which he must prove, as any other fact must be proved at trial. He attempts to prоve this fact by introducing reputation evidence. This reputation evidence “is to be regarded as evidence of a substantive fact like any other evidence tending to establish innocence.”
Commonwealth v. Sampson,
We must next inquire into the manner in which this substantive law must be incorporated into instructions to a jury. It is easy to understand why a jury is confused about reputation evidence. By requirement it is general. It does not relate to the incident for which the defendant is on trial, nor can it. The jury certainly hears, throughout trial, objections to admission of other evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant. The jury may wonder why reputation
*526
evidence is not also irrelevant. The court’s charge must explain this confusing state of affairs. Courts have early seen this source of confusion and, in rulings on propriety of jury charges, have attempted tо set reputation evidence in its proper context. This issue was squarely addressed by our Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Heine v. Commonwealth,
If a man is guilty, his previous good character has nothing to do with the case, but if you have reasonable doubts as to his guilt, then character steps in, and aids in determining that doubt.
Heine,
The effect of this was to give the evidence of good character no weight whatever; for, if the other testimony left in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt, this of itself, without more, entitled him to an acquittal. Evidence of good character is not a mere make-weight, thrown in to assist in the production of a result that would happen in all events — but it is positive evidence, and may of itself, by the creation of a reasonable doubt, produce an acquittal.
Id. This selection of language by the Heine court has been employed by subsequent courts as a source for jury instructions on reputation evidence.
Both the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and this Court have held that no exact language is talismanic, as long as the charge states the law correctly and clearly.
Ohle, supra, Alvin, supra.
Thus, a reviewing court’s finding that a charge as a whole is satisfactory does not mean that the court is holding that the exact language is required. In fact, the Pennsylvania Supreme court has held that “in itself” language does
not
carry an independent meaning that reputation evidence carrys more weight than other evidence. In approving a jury charge that did not include the “in itself” language, the court wrote that while the law of Pennsylvania is very favorable when considering the weight of the accused’s good character, “it has not gone so
*527
far as to give it any special prominence or superiority to the other facts in evidence in the case.”
Commonwealth v. Beingo,
In Commonwealth v. Cleary, supra, the court analyzed this principle, writing that the law:
by no means confined the jury to attaching importance to the evidence only in cases of reasonable doubt. On the contrary, it left them at liberty to make it a basis for the foundation of a doubt.
Cleary,
Evidence of good character is always admissible for the defendant in a criminal case; it is to be weighed and considered in connection with all the other evidence in the cause, — it may of itself, in some instances, create the reasonable doubt which would entitle the accused to an acquittal____
Id. The court continued by explaining:
The evidence of good charаcter is to be considered with the other evidence in the case, and if it all combined creates a reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.
Id.
The most recent Supreme Court case holding that a reputation evidence charge is proper is
Commonwealth v. Holland,
Evidence of good reputation presented by a defendant does not present a distinct issue in the case, but it must рervade and be considered by you in connection with all the other evidence in the case on the general issue of guilty or not guilty, and is to be regarded as a substantive fact like any other evidence tending to establish innocence.
In some instances it may of itself work an acquital [sic] or create a reasonable doubt, but that is all a question for you under all the evidence in the case. When a defendant has had a good reputation, this fact must be given due *528 weight. But, if he has been proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, he is not to go free simply because he has previously had a good reputation.
In other words, you may not in arriving at a verdict exclude everything but the evidence of good reputation and decide the case solely on such evidence.
Holland,
We conclude that Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases do not require an “in itself” charge to be given to the jury; the cases require only that the instructions make clear that reputation evidence is on a par with any other genre of evidence. The
Holland
charge illustrates how this concept is to be put in perspective. Three crucial points emerge. First, reputation evidence is a substantive fact just like any other evidence and should be considered along with other evidence in the same manner that other evidence is considered. Second, in some instances it may itself create a reasonable doubt, but, third, if all other facts in the Commonwealth’s case prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, “he is not to go free simply because he has previously had a good reputation.” This makes eminеnt sense when we consider it in tandem with the well-settled principle that it is entirely within the province of the trier of fact in a criminal case, in this case, the jury, to decide what weight to accord the evidence produced.
Commonwealth v. Favinger,
Superior Court panels have recently held that the jury charge
must
contain “in itself” language in
Commonwealth v. Belmonte,
In
Commonwealth v. Vander Weele, supra,
the Court invalidated a jury instruction that not only omits “in itself” language but also fails to convey the crucial point about reputation evidence, that it could, like any other evidence, carry enough weight to create a reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, the Court invalidated the charge wholly on the grounds that it lacked “character evidence alone” language and in fact cited no authority for this specific proposition. In
Commonwealth v. Belmonte, supra,
the statement that the defendant is entitled to an “in itself” charge is dictum. The actual holding of the case was that the particular evidence in question was not reputation evidence and thus
*530
the defendant was not entitled to any reputation evidence charge. Adding dictum, the Court wrote that if reputation evidence were in the case, then the defendant would be entitled to an “in itself” charge.
Belmonte,
In
Arenella
the court relied on the
Scott
footnote and on the acceptance of the instructions at issue in
Holland, supra.
The Court cited the
Holland
instruction passage “in some instances [evidence of good reputation] may of itself work an acquital [sic] or create a reasonable doubt.”
Arenella,
Commonwealth v. Schultz, supra,
in an ineffectiveness of counsel context, held that failure to request an instruction that evidence of good character may itself be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt constituted ineffectiveness of counsel. The court relied on the following language from an earlier Superior Court case,
Commonwealth v. Padden,
Evidence of good character is substantive and positive evidence, not a mere make-weight to be considered in a doubtful case, and ... is an independent factor which may of itself engender a reasonable doubt or produce a conclusion of innocence. To be sure, it is to be con *531 sidered with all the other evidence in the case. But it is not to be measured with all the other evidence. Its probative value, its power of persuasion, does not depend upon, and is not to be measured by, or appraised according to, the might or the infirmity in the Commonwealth’s case. Even though, under all the other evidence a jury could reach a conclusion of guilt, still if the character evidence creates a reasonable doubt or establishes innocence a verdict of acquittal must be rendered.
Commonwealth v. Padden,
Both the Commonwealth in its brief and the trial court in the thorough opinion by the Honorable Lynne Abraham discuss federal case law on reputation evidence instructions. We will summarize the federal cases because there, as in the Pennsylvania courts, some of the Courts of Appeals had misinterpreted the two United States Supreme Court cases that consider reputation evidence instructions and have recently recognized the discrepancy by reversing themselves. In
Edgington v. United States,
“the decided weight of authority now is that good character, when considered in connection with the other evidence in the case, may generate a reasonable doubt. The circumstances may be such that an еstablished reputation for good character, if it is relevant to the issue, would alone create a reasonable doubt, although, without it, the other evidence would be convincing.”
Edgington, Id. The court cited Heine among cases in which a similar conclusion was reached. As in Heine:
this passage does not support an instruction that singles out character evidence. The Court was trying to put an end to instructions that had disfavored character evidence by telling the jury not to consider the evidence unless it first found the case close. The point of the passage— that character evidence when taken with other evidence may create a reasonable doubt — assimilates character evidence to other kinds of evidence. It is a mistake to lift language out of a passage such as this and insert it in a jury instruction.
United States v. Burke,
Burke
overruled the Seventh Circuit’s previous position that a “standing alone” instruction is required on the grounds that it had misinterpreted
Edgington
and
Michelson v. United, States,
This is not the same as requiring an “in itself” instruction in all cases. As the
Burke
court said, “it does not imply any particular instruction.”
Burke,
We reserve for future determination the issue of whether an “in itself” instruction would be required where reputation evidence constitutes the entire defense. This was not so in the case before us. A peaceable reputation was not Neely’s only defense. He based his defense primarily on a self-defense theory. Neely testified at length that he was defending himself from the potentially vicious dog. Hence the jury had ample opportunity to weigh Neely’s credibility on this point. We hold that the trial court was not required by Pennsylvania law to charge the jury that “character testimony in and of itself is such as to create a reasonable doubt.” We do not determine whether “in itself” language should be prohibited, leaving it for a future case in which the issue is specifically raised.
As we noted in beginning our review, a trial court has broad discretion in phrasing its points for charge, and is not bound to give instructions in the form requested, particularly where that form does not reflect a correct interpretation of the law. A trial court may chоose its own wording for jury instruction so long as the area is adequately, accurately and clearly presented to the jury for their consideration. This court’s evaluation of the charge must be based on an examination of it as a whole to determine whether it was fair or prejudicial. Commonwealth v. Ohle, *534 supra. Where the given charge properly covers the requested point, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to give additional instructions. Commonwealth v. Grove, supra.
Here, our task is made easier in that Apрellant limits his challenge on appeal to the trial court’s charge on evidence of good character. Appellant does not contest the accuracy of the charge as given, but contends that, in addition to the charge set forth above, he was entitled to have the jury instructed that character testimony in and of itself is such as to create a reasonable doubt of guilt and justify a verdict of not guilty.
We remain mindful that reputation evidence is on а par with any other genre of evidence. It is a substantive fact and should be considered by the jury along with other evidence in the same manner that other evidence is considered. It remains entirely within the province of the trier of fact, in this case the jury, to decide what weight to accord the evidence produced. With these principles in mind and after a careful review of the entire jury charge on this appeal, we find no abuse of discretion in Judge Abraham’s rеfusal to supplement her clearly presented and adequate charge with Appellant’s request for additional instructions.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.
Notes
. See F.R.E. 405(a).
.
Scott
held that the prosecution may not cross-examine a defendant’s character witnesses about the defendant’s prior arrests. The footnote relied upon
Commonwealth v. Cleary, supra,
which does not stand for that proposition, and
Commonwealth v. Shapiro,
. Most recently, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, so long as the court’s charge to the jury on the role of reputation evidence-is otherwise proper, the trial court does not abuse its discretionary power to choose the wording if it omits expressly requested "standing alone” language.
United States v. Spangler,