*1 Merrill, 1, 332 U.S. 68 S.Ct. Crop Corp. Insurance case, For, agents if such were not the of L.Ed. power a de facto acquire the Commonwealth rights will where none had legislative grant override the and would, therefore, in the I as sug- existed law. previously Employes’ Brief for the Public School Retire- gested defer to the Board to pages ment Board at and with to insure that prerogatives restraint legal “exercise its adjust to “equitably in each case” and justice done problem”. portions those of the order I would affirm
Consequently, compensation the court below out-of-state from excluding of formula salary” component the “final the benefit average the Public Retirement permitting Employes’ School would, however, error I Board correct this prospectively. restrain- reverse order of court below portion Board Retirement from ing Employes’ Public School which were in excess recouping disbursements prior benefits. statutorily mandated EAGEN, J., O’BRIEN, J., join opinion in this C. of reversal. support Pennsylvania
COMMONWEALTH MUSI, Appellant. Carol Supreme Pennsylvania. Court
Argued 1979. Jan. Reassigned 1979. April July Decided 1979. Reargument Aug. Denied *4 Abrams, Allen N. Philadelphia, appellant. for Lawler, Chief, Div., Robert B. Appeals Asst. Dist. Atty., Finkelstein, M. Sheldon for Philadelphia, appellee. EAGEN, J., O’BRIEN, ROBERTS,
Before C. and POM- EROY, NIX, LARSEN, MANDERINO and JJ.
OPINION NIX, Justice. for the Musi, jury was tried before Carol
Appellant, husband, officer, police Philadelphia death of her shooting In degree.1 murder of the third this and found guilty was imposed upon of sentence judgment direct from the appeal alleged instances of trial verdict, cites three appellant assertion of trial error.2 and one counsel’s ineffectiveness claims we are satisfied that After consideration of these sentence. judgment merit and affirm they are without 28, 1976, was at the bar where serving On July appellant m., p. began 3:00 she approximately At employed. she was ,m. m., At p. p. until 6:00 6:15 and continued drinking to- and and drank joined appellant they deceased arrived leaving place After p. until 8:00 m. gether to another bar and couple proceeded stayed employment, home, argument p. Upon leaving until 11:00 m. required the two which intervention erupted between home, the removed police. they When arrived deceased clothing personal effects and entered a some of his and Later, appellant parked nearby. truck which was pickup proceeded and to the truck which from the house emerged seated, resumed. argument Appel- was and the her husband house, and re-entered the to only lant then left the truck of time a rifle. period carrying within a short She return truck, the rifle to her shoulder and raised approached window of the truck. through open her husband shot had threatened the testimony appellant was also There occasions. question previous and night deceased on the cause, in a this the first trial resulted is the second trial of This inability to reach a verdict. because of the mistrial denied, appellant was motions were filed and 2. Post-verdict 27, 1977, imprisonment. years December to ten On sentenced two petition granted to withdraw remanded we trial counsel’s of whether to the trial court for a determination matter July appointed the trial court counsel. On entitled proceed pauperis granted appellant’s in forma and for petition appointment of counsel.
107 not gun she testified that believed Appellant her loaded, attempting frighten that she was merely placed their house when she returning into husband truck window. maintained through open rifle She it her husband discharged only grabbed the rifle because while she was it. holding a evaluating
It is
now axiomatic that the test for
by
of counsel is whether
claim of ineffective assistance
cho
a conclusion that the
course
supports
particular
record
reasonable basis
to effec
by
designed
sen
counsel had some
ex rel. Wash
tuate his client’s interest. Commonwealth
599,
349
In
Maroney,
v.
427 Pa.
235 A.2d
ington
employ
hindsight
this assessment we are not to
a
making
may
evaluation to
whether other alternatives
determine
reasonable,
v.
Washington Maroney, supra,
have been more
course of
but whether there was a reasonable basis for the
Hosack,
v.
485 Pa.
actually
action
selected. Commonwealth
Weath
128,
(1979);
If a reasonable basis for counsel’s trial
decision
strategy
exists,
to the client. Common
imputed
that decision is
denied,
Sullivan,
wealth v.
cert.
(1973). Moreover,
Appellant argues instructed that the be request of his failure to because If there was evidence homicide misadventure. by as to accidental of an support jury finding record that would the be entitled to certainly would killing, excusable the defense 37, Beach, Pa. 264 A.2d v. 438 charge, such a Commonwealth would cast request failure to make such a (1970), 712 and the given by quality representation question upon serious in this argument with difficulty counsel. The of the facts most favorable case is that the version accepting homicide of not constitute a her position they to misadventure. 145, 156-157, A. Flax, Pa. 200
In Commonwealth v. 331 which 632, killing we defined an accidental (1938), 637-638 for responsibility the actor of the criminal would relieve as being: death another, where the killing of
the accidental
act,
any crimi-
unaccompanied by
doing
is
a lawful
slayer
“Three elements enter
reckless conduct.
careless or
nally
homicide
misadventure:
the defense of excusable
into
one;
It
(2)
lawful
in death must be a
(1)
resulting
The act
regard
and due
with reasonable care
must be done
others;
be
(3)
killing
and
The
must
persons
lives and
intent,
intentional,
without unlawful
not
or
accidental and
person seeking
requested
post
on the
relief is
rests
which
conviction
Logan,
seq.;
v.
et
Commonwealth
See 19 P.S.
1180-1
§
relief.
London,
424,
(1976);
461 Pa.
v.
266
Commonwealth
468 Pa.
364 A.2d
Walker,
658,
673,
(1975);
v.
460 Pa.
The defense’s version at
was that
her
it at the decedent in order
pointed
rifle to
shoulder
him”.
Claiming
thought
the hell out of
she
to “scare
unloaded,
rifle was
she aimed it at
decedent
*7
f___in
said,
the
before
wreck our
get
you
“Now
the
house
it
weapon causing
and that
struck the
to
lives”
the decedent
Thus
concedes that the
occurred
discharge.
appellant
killing
the act
the
at the
committing
pointing
while she was
rifle
is clear that
it is
jurisdiction
victim. The law of this
another,
at
whether loaded or
point
unlawful to
a firearm
Jackson,
292,
v.
464 Pa.
unloaded. Commonwealth
Chruscial,
17,
v.
447
Pa.
288
746
Commonwealth
(1972)
being,
a firearm at another human
A.2d 521
(pointing
scare, is
act in Pennsylvania).5 Appel-
even to
not a lawful
she
the
that
impression
stresses the fact that
was under
lant
fact,
believed,
if
unloaded. While this
weapon
the
was
was
killing
the
the
support
premise
would
unintention-
was an
al,
satisfy
finding
that alone does not
a
it
Flax,
noted
v.
excusable homicide. As
in Commonwealth
unintentional,
“even
the homicide is
it is not
supra,
though
result
incident of an unlawful
excusable where it is the
or
”
157,
at
A.2d at
.
.
.
331 Pa.
200
638.
act
Id.
2701(a)(3);
Appellant’s
18
1705.
See 18
Pa.C.S.A. §
Pa.C.S.A. §
Beach,
upon
v.
438 Pa.
We have
already
defense,
facts most favorable to the
at
or
conduct which
guilty
grossly negligent
least
reckless
In
the death.
legal
charge given
was the
cause of
court,
were confined to either
jury’s
finding
alternatives
e., murder),
(i.
malicious
an intentional
killing
killing
*8
resulting
passion
acquittal.
from
or
provocation
defense,
it
jury
accepted
Thus if
had
version of
If,
a
not
properly
guilty.
could
have returned
verdict of
however,
sought
charge
trial
had
obtained a
counsel
involuntary
option
outright
of an
ac-
manslaughter,
inquiring
for
to raise
6. Before
into the basis
counsel’s failure
or
trial,
pursue
if
a certain issue or claim at
we must determine
Sherard,
arguable
or claim is
merit. Commonwealth v.
483
issues
Hubbard,
183,
(1978);
472 Pa.
Ill quittal on this record would have been eliminated.7 In view of the presence legitimate of this reason for not electing charge a that would end all virtually hope of an we acquittal, urged cannot conclude as by appellant counsel’s decision without a reasonable basis to effectu- ate his client’s best interests. McGrogan, Commonwealth v. (1972).8 449 Pa. 456 A.2d
The final claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel is upon based his failure to raise in post-verdict motions the legality appellant’s premises search and the subse quent seizure of a .22 calibre rifle. This issue must be considered in two whether there was steps, probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and then it must be deter mined whether the execution of the search warrant was proper. Addressing first adequacy the affidavit supporting warrant, appellant argues that the search was premised “double upon hearsay” and thus invalid. The affidavit set forth that an to the eyewitness shooting told one of the investigating detectives at the scene appel lant re-entered the house officer, with the rifle. That rather scene, than leaving called this information to a fellow officer who work completed paper and secured the warrant. Appellant that we argues condemned this type double hearsay Garvin, in Commonwealth v. 448 Pa. (1972)
A.2d 33 and should hold that the rifle obtained pursuant to a search authorized in this manner must be suppressed.
It is
apparent
appellant has misconstrued the lan
Garvin,
of our
guage
opinion
Garvin.
we stated:
In
recognize
power
7. While we
has the
to return a verdict of
case,
acquittal
Bennett,
every
Commonwealth v.
471 Pa.
Goins,
(1977);
A.2d 373
Commonwealth v.
457 Pa.
The
in the instant
pertinent
Philadelphia
the
Police Depart-
Covotta of
that Officer
approximately
call at
2:40 P.M.
telephone
ment received
was
an
The call
from informant
September
him
supplied
known
officer and who had
who was
to the
five
to six
years leading
the
during
past
with information
However,
this
regard
with
to
arrests and six convictions.
call,
and inadequate
the record
contradictory
particular
the information had been obtained
as to what
of
portion
observation,
any,
if
and what
personal
the informant’s
by
the informant from a third
by
had been received
portion
to
retaliation. The
sought
who
avoid
person
anonymity
the
of a
trustworthiness
requirement
determination
be
solely
of the
cannot met
because
the source
information
known to be relia-
through
it is
informant
channelled
the
may
it
be assumed that
informant
properly
ble. While
reliability
person supplying
the
of the third
upon
passed
him,
makes most
that it
the law
it
clear
the information
to make. As the
Court
judgment
Supreme
is not his
the officers to make the
permit
did not
Aguilar, supra,
authority
permit
for the
we cannot
issuing
determination
his
delegate
responsi-
officer in a
arrest to
warrantless
question
To
without
bility
accept
to the informant.
infor-
messages
alleged
relayed through
eyewitnesses
Supreme
be
Court’s
totally disregard
mants would
From
information received
the phone
mandates.
conversation,
was
that an
only
the officer
aware
unknown
portion
who
witnessed some
person,
allegedly
third
a man
robbery,
participants
identified one
the two
on a
street two blocks
walking
particular
who was then
the time of the call. When the officer
from the district at
location there was
about
specified
nothing
arrived at
which would have furnished
appellant
the behavior
into
taking
custody,
though
basis
him
and even
been
with an
record
the officer had
furnished
indicated
victims,
testimony
identification
there is no
ap-
he
when he
suggest that
considered this information
find
On this record we
proached
appellant.
Id.,
arrest of the 263-64,
448 Pa. at
illegal.
*10
(italics added).
Appellant only the italicized of the portion quote ignores the context in which these comments were Garvin, In made. we were confronted with information upon based double when it hearsay police reached officials. We expressly pointed to the fact that the evil in such a case was that there was no basis for the police to assess the reliability of the initial source of the information. Here a police officer received the information from directly an eyewitness to Therefore, the event. there is no as question to how the information was obtained the witness nor can there be any serious here challenge to that witness’s reliabil- Thus, ity.9 to reach appellant’s position we would be re- quired find that police officials could not upon rely information relayed to them by other members of the de- partment during performance of their duties. Such a rule would not only unduly hamper police administration but would serve no useful purpose in assuring the of reliability the information acted upon.
The concept of evaluating police operation as a collec- tive function opposed to an individual one is not new. instance, For we have held that it is unnecessary for an arresting officer to have knowledge the information which supported the probable cause of a arrest, warrantless provided that the officer issuing the order to arrest had sufficient information to act. Commonwealth v. Kenney, 449 Pa. 566-567, See also Whitson, Commonwealth v. 461 Pa. A.2d 653 Here, the officer supplying information for the affidavit possessed the requisite information to satisfy probable cause requirements. The fact that he delegated the respon- sibility placing this information in affidavit form and the securing the warrant from the issuing authority is of no consequence, where the affidavit accurately reflects the name, race, age, 9. The affidavit contained the sex and address of the witness, neighbor who was the next door and her husband. the officer and information possessed by information cause probable requirement. satisfies set forth probable that the affidavit did Having concluded provide and did sufficient information cause for search authority reliability which an could find issuing upon information, be successfully it cannot the source failing to pursue that counsel ineffective maintained be premised A of ineffectiveness cannot finding the issue. pursue preserve obviously counsells failure to upon Martin, 63, 68, meritless issue. Commonwealth Smith, 76, 80, Commonwealth v. (1979); Hubbard, supra, A.2d 1320 Commonwealth v. (1979); cited therein. and cases *11 to the argument, this relates manner
The second aspect the was executed. A warrant copy in which the warrant upon appellant, not served either the and affidavit was seized, upon item the the persons of the or alleged possessor suppression at the the search.10 The court time of premises had been 2008(a)11 found that Pa.R.Crim.P. violated initially an the introduction of the suppressing and entered order petition trial. a the Commonwealth to by rifle at After court its original reversed order suppression reconsider 2008(a) had rule viola- although held that there been a and tion, that the fruits of search to require this fact did not .be suppressed.
10. The defense witness testified one of minor sons present at the the search demanded that a search warrant be time of ignored. conducting produced The officer and that believed, certain, but that he a the search he was not served testified son, being present copy upon in the there no adults home at although custody, inwas time. It was conceded that available, not served the warrant and affida- therefore she was with vit. 2008(a) provides: 11. Pa.R.Crim.P. officer, pursuant (a) upon taking property A law enforcement warrant, person whom search shall leave with the from or from a premises copy property was taken a of the warrant and whose thereof, affidavit(s) receipt property support for the and a affidavit(s) copyA must be wheth- seized. of the warrant left any property er or not is seized. claim Thus, perspec- in an ineffective assistance framed is whether counsel should have presented tive the issue Normally, motions. question post-verdict pursued be dependent upon of the issue so framed would resolution whether constituted an question as to determination strategy issue and whether there existed arguable it, rather than a determination as abandoning would justify proposition. the ultimate of the Commonwealth validity Hubbard, However, since the is supra. question presented Court, see and has to be considered this importance yet Walls, Pa.Super. Commonwealth us is one which is sufficient for (1978), and the record before contention, make a decision the merits of the we upon us to that we If we were appropriate are satisfied that it is do so. as to whether counsel was ineffective in inquiry to limit the was, and determined that he abandoning argument this would not be the award of a in the first instance remedy for the opportunity new trial but rather the allowance Restated, its if upon appel- to be decided merits. question claim, lant in her ineffective assistance that fact prevailed her with a basis for a waiver merely provide avoiding issue; relief she retrial and a ultimate seeks—a of the rifle —would be a final suppression dependent upon determination on the merits of the claim. We are satisfied in such a it sound to reach posture jurisprudentially 2008(a) the merits of the as to whether the rule question *12 required suppression violation the of the fruits of the search in this case.
A rule of exclusion is
where
properly employed
the
the
objection goes
question
the
of the
reliability
evidence,
Brathwaite,
98,
v.
challenged
Manson
432
97
U.S.
2243,
(1977);
Biggers,
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
not
(1961).12 Experience
suggest
does
1684,
Federal
interpreting
see
41(d)
Federal Rules of Criminal
procedure,
Rule
Procedure,
important,
have
although
concluded
return of the
required for execution and
warrant
procedures
void
irregularities
ministerial
should not
are
e.
See
showing
prejudice.
valid search absent
otherwise
Hall,
v.
In Re Ellsberg,
U. S.
(3d
1974);
961
Cir.
g.
505 F.2d
McKenzie,
v.
U. S.
(1st
1971);
446 F.2d
12. A third
rule concerns
rationale
Ohio,
judicial
preserving
integrity
system. Mapp
643, 660,
Dunaway
(1961),
U.S.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
O’BRIEN, J., did not in the participate consideration or decision of this case.
LARSEN, J., agrees with the opinion joins therein except that he would find that the final issue was also waived.
ROBERTS, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
MANDERINO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Although appellant
post-verdict
failed to raise the
issue
her
motions,
1123(a),
in violation of Pa.R.Crim.P.
see Commonwealth v.
Blair,
(1975)
question
apparently
ROBERTS, Justice, either Commonwealth v. concedes that under majority The 449, or Garcia, (1977) Pa. A.2d 1199 Commonwealth 474 378 430, (1977), 1189 Polimeni, appellant 474 Pa. to an instruction on upon request been entitled would have Nonetheless, the con- majority involuntary manslaughter. involuntary failed to request cludes trial counsel who I was not ineffective. dissent. instruction manslaughter The majority to find in purports support Commonwealth McGrogan, 297 456 view, A.2d In my reads far majority McGrogan too It is broadly. true that McGrogan rejected this Court a claim trial counsel was ineffective to failing manslaugh- a voluntary instruction, ter though appellant even contended the support Commonwealth’s case would charge. “[Cjounsel could have reasonably jury decided that the find might Commonwealth’s evidence inconclusive and thus return a verdict of outright 449 Pa. at A.2d acquittal.” 297 at 459. crucial McGrogan But to was fact that “[t]he Commonwealth, evidence of the although substantial, was somewhat as to conduct conflicting at the time of Id. slaying.” the Com- record' establishes contrast, the Here, by including eyewitness appellant, case against monwealth’s conviction subjected appellant testimony, squarely out, was “[tjhere Indeed, majority points as the murder. deceased threatened had appellant testimony also Ante, occasions.” on previous and in question the night on Though at trial counsel A.2d at accidental, the killing the theory defended on this an acquittal testified, expectation any so appel- to subject decision Counsel’s unrealistic. record was the court asking without credibility on her to a contest lant verdict on return a option permissible give designed basis had no “reasonable manslaughter involuntary to effectuate his client’s interests.” Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, A.2d (1967). Appellant should be granted a new trial.
I must also express my disagreement with the majority’s assertion that exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the provisions of 2008(a) Pa.R.Crim.P. depends on the only rela- (cid:127) tionship of the violation of the reliability evidence seized. Rule 2008(a) requires police to make a copy of the affidavit in support of probable cause and an inventory the property seized readily immediately available to the accused. This rule not only permits defendants to determine *15 in the early stages of criminal proceedings how or whether to pursue a claim that the evidence seized should be sup- pressed. It also has the beneficial and administratively wise effect of eradicating the need for utilization of court time in discovery motions and continuances to provide time for the defense to study the affidavit and inventory once it is obtained. Where the rights of an accused to suppress evi- dence illegally seized are prejudiced by violation of Rule 2008, exclusion of the evidence is required regardless of its otherwise reliable is, nature. indeed, This the mission of our Rule.
MANDERINO, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. There was no reasonable basis in this case for trial counsel’s failure to an instruction on involun- tary manslaughter. Polimeni,
In Commonwealth v. (1977),this question Court addressed the of whether the trial court in a homicide case give could refuse to a requested jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter. A majority of this Court that concluded Polimeni was entitled to the requested charge on involuntary manslaughter even though he was not indicted for involuntary manslaughter. We
therefore reversed the of sentence and judgment remanded for a new trial. Code, the Crimes defined manslaughter
Involuntary 2504(a) 18 Pa.C.S.A. § involuntary is guilty person rule.—A
“(a) General doing result of direct a manslaughter when manner, or negligent grossly reckless or in a act unlawful negligent grossly reckless or act in a lawful doing person.” another manner, he the death causes Had believed appellant’s version of the facts presented case, in this it could have rationally concluded that guilty the crime of involuntary manslaugh- Because ter. trial counsel failed to request such instruction, a jury however, the jury was not informed involuntary manslaughter was permissible in this verdict a. case.
We have often said counsel’s have strategy must some reasonable basis to effectuate the client’s designed interests. The to find majority strains a reasonable basis for The majority says trial counsel’strial that if trial strategy. had charge counsel and obtained sought involuntary manslaughter, option acquittal of an outright majority been eliminated. The “the says have also *16 were jury’s alternatives confined either a mali- finding (i. e., killing murder), killing resulting cious an intentional However, passion or an provocation acquittal.” from has this Court said: beyond not has established
“True, if prosecution charged, of the offense every element reasonable doubt offered, jury is instruction if no lesser offense matter, acquittal. verdict return a as a theoretical must instruc- offense to a lesser is entitled the defendant But because precisely or any context [the this tion—in other— risk the substantial exposed not be should defendant] Where from diverge theory. will practice the jury’s that charged remains the offense elements one 121 doubt, but the defendant is plainly offense, of some guilty jury to resolve likely its doubts in favor of convic- tion. States,
Keeble v. 205, 212-13, United 412 U.S. 93 S.Ct. 1993, 1997-98, (1973) L.Ed.2d 844 (emphasis in origi nal); Thomas, see Commonwealth 553, 170 A.2d (1961). The jury should not be forced to choose between a murder or voluntary manslaughter verdict and when, an acquittal instructed, properly the jury would find the defendant guilty of involuntary manslaughter.” (Emphasis in original.) Commonwealth Garcia, 449, 466-67,
I can perceive therefore of no reasonable basis for allow- this ing case to togo without jury requesting that be instructed regarding crime of involuntary man- slaughter. Indeed, appellant’s entire pointed case toward such a verdict: she admitted that she held the rifle that shot; fired the fatal she did not contend that she shot in self-defense. She contended that she only was not aware loaded; that the rifle was that she only frighten intended husband; her and that the rifle discharged when her hus- band grabbed it.
The prosecution argues at the time of appellant’s second 9May through 17, 1977, May trial — “ . . . had no to have right the court charge jury on ” involuntary manslaughter . . . because Common- Polimeni, wealth v. supra had not been yet (Polimeni decided was decided on October 1977). to the According prosecu- tion, appellant’s trial counsel acted reasonably relying on law; the then existing raising appellant’s present claim at that time fruitless, would have been and that counsel is not required to pursue fruitless claim.
Appellant’s trial, however, took more place eighteen than months after our decision in Moore, Commonwealth v. A.2d 850 Had trial counsel Moore, been familiar with it would have apparent been at least four members of this Court had expressed the view at that time that failure to instruct on man- involuntary *17 sup- be if where that verdict would requested,
slaughter, error. evidence, constituted reversible the ported by to version “Thus, giving if a credence a defendant’s jury, of invol- guilty find that defendant encounter could fundamental fairness dictates manslaughter, untary indictment with the consolidation, upon request, possi- indictments as manslaughter voluntary murder and Thomas, noted in Commonwealth As jury ble verdicts. refusal consolidate leads the failure to supra, In manslaughter. those involuntary jury on instruct manslaughter verdict involuntary where an instances evidence, the failure to so supported by be with it from full jury operating prevents acquaint the defend- precludes the relevant law knowledge of Id., at trial.” having fair ant from (now Justice) Eag- of Justice Chief (Opinion at 852-853. O’Brien, J.) en, joined by concurring opinion, in a Roberts stated
Mr. Justice view, jury court’s failure to instruct trial my “In appellant, as manslaughter, requested by on involuntary error. reversible constitutes at required, court is least that a trial It is axiomatic relevant to illuminate all requests, so when the defendant to instruct and, jury particular, issues for legal it permissible verdict which it would be every on Id., 323-324, A.2d at 853. Pa. to return.” at concurred, saying, also Mr. Justice Pomeroy, trial concur in the decision of Court “I motion to consolidate refusing appellant’s erred in court indict- involuntary manslaughter for trial the murder with brother Roberts in Furthermore, agree my I ments. the failure of the trial court opinion that separate his was also involuntary manslaughter charge requested Id., at 344 A.2d at error.” contention, clear, prosecution’s to the contrary Thus it known at the time trial should have counsel *18 a deny felt that of this Court majority that a her trial of manslaughter involuntary on charge jury for a request were facts where there error, at least reversible constituted based rationally have could which the in evidence coun- Trial manslaughter. involuntary guilty verdict light especially charge, such a failure sel’s case, all of instant defense in the by presented the facts shot and finding appellant toward pointed which him with a frighten attempting while her husband killed which, unloaded, if believed facts to be she believed rifle find rationally it to ,have allowed jury, manslaughter. involuntary guilty Pennsylvania
COMMONWEALTH Jr., HARE, Appellant. Lewis J. Pennsylvania.
Supreme Court of 21, 1979. May Submitted July Decided