The defendants were tried together on six indictments. Morrison and Darling were convicted of a conspiracy to steal property of the H. Angus Conners Corporation and of obtaining-money of the same corporation by false pretences. Morrison and George (who was indicted under the name of Coggswell in two of the cases) were convicted of conspiracy to steal property of Robert W. Ramsdell and of Joseph W. Henzler; of obtaining money of Ramsdell by false pretences; and of attempting by false pretences to obtain money of Henzler. Morrison had at his place of business in Boston, a large quantity of metric spark plugs, described in various ways in the evidence, but which could have been found to be of an obsolete type and of no market value, and not carried by any one in Boston except him. Upon the testimony, the jury could have found that Darling and George entered into separate agreements with Morrison to aid him in creating an artificial demand for these spark plugs and turning them into money by fraudulently representing themselves as bona fide purchasers thereof. Testimony was offered that Morrison and George were acquainted; that they had been seen together on the street and dining together near Morrison’s place of business. After his arrest, Morrison stated to an officer that he was selling spark plugs through salesmen in different parts of the State, and had sent men out to create a demand for them; that Darling could be found at Barre, New Hampshire, where everybody knew him; and that George was a neighbor of his.
The H. Angus Conners Corporation was a dealer in hardware in Boston; its business, so far as material to this case, being transacted by H. Angus Conners. Several months before October, 1922, Morrison recommended these spark plugs to Conners and sold him a few. On the morning of October 18,1922, Conners received a typewritten communication on a telegraph blank dated New Haven, Connecticut, October 17, 1922, in the following form: “Have traced Government bar point spark plugs as coming from you. Can you supply Bethlehem, metric, with No. 775 core and ball top.
The telegrams and telephone talk were properly admitted. There was uncontradicted testimony that the name and address “L. Darling, Lewiston, Maine,” in the register of the hotel were written by the defendant Lou Darling on
False representations may be made by acts as well as words. G. L. c. 277, § 39. They “may be made in any of the ways in which ideas may be communicated.” Commonwealth v. Drew, 19 Pick. 179, 185. Rex v. Barnard, 7 Car. & P. 784. A misrepresentation as to a person’s present intention may be a false pretence. Commonwealth v. Walker, 108 Mass. 309. Donovan v. Clifford, 225 Mass. 435. When a person enters into a contract to buy goods, he impliedly represents that he intends to make a genuine contract; if such is not his intention, he may be found to have made a false representation. Commonwealth v. Stone, 4 Met. 43. Commonwealth v. Harley, 7 Met. 462. Commonwealth v. Walker, supra. In such a case the intention not to pay for the goods is merely incidental; the false pretence is the assumption of a false character as a contracting party. The facts in Commonwealth v. Althause, 207 Mass. 32, make it inapplicable to the case under consideration. Moreover, there were additional facts which would justify Conners in believing that Darling was making a genuine contract. A deposit of $100 was made, the balance to be collected when the goods were delivered; and the telegram indicated that the buyer was in pressing need of the plugs to fill orders. It is not necessary to have direct evidence that a representation was false. It is enough if all the circumstances considered to
Upon the testimony the jury could have found that the defendant Darling gave a fictitious order for spark plugs, which were of little or no value, for the purpose of inducing Conners to part with his money to Morrison with whom Darling was in collusion. Commonwealth v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103. Men are presumed to intend the natural consequences of their own acts. Commonwealth v. Hersey, 2 Allen, 173, 174. If two parties are working with a common purpose to obtain the money of another by false pretences, both are criminally hable. “The act of one was "the act of both. Commonwealth v. Harley, 7 Met. 462.” Commonwealth v. Mulrey, 170 Mass. 103, 110.
On October 28, 1922, the defendant George brought a metric spark plug to the store of Joseph W. Henzler, a dealer in automobile accessories, and asked him if he could supply plugs like the sample. Henzler told him to leave it and call the next day. Henzler then saw Morrison, who told him he could supply them at sixteen cents each. Later George ordered two thousand plugs at twenty-five cents each, paid $50 on account, and instructed Henzler to ship them C. O. D. to “F. S. George, Portland Maine, by American Express.” When asked for his address, George declined to give it. Later Henzler asked Morrison to ship the plugs C. O. D. but he refused to do it, stating that it must be a cash transaction; whereupon Henzler refused to complete the purchase. About three hours later George notified Henzler that he had. bought the plugs elsewhere, cancelled his order, and asked for the return of his deposit.
In December, 1922, Morrison tried to sell some of the spark plugs to Ramsdell, and prevailed upon him to take a few samples, saying “Somebody may drop in and be interested in them.” Within a few weeks the defendant George, giving his name as F. J. Coggswell, called upon Ramsdell with a sample plug and asked if he had any like it. Upon being shown the one Ramsdell had received from Morrison, he said he wanted to purchase a large quantity of them. Ramsdell, after communicating with Morrison and finding
From the foregoing recital of facts the jury could find that the defendants Morrison and George wer.e in a conspiracy to defraud, as alleged in both indictments; that the contracts which they purported to make with Ramsdell were not genuine; that Ramsdell parted with his money to Morrison relying on the truth of the representations made to him; and that the defendants were guilty of obtaining money by false pretences.
In the Henzler case the jury had a right to consider the Ramsdell transaction on the question of the defendants’ intent; they could have found that George had performed his part of the plan by pretending to buy the plugs, making a deposit, and giving directions for shipment; and that Morrison was endeavoring to perform his when the accomplishment of his purpose was prevented by Henzler’s refusal to pay cash for the goods. The parties had gone far enough by their overt acts to warrant a finding of criminal attempt. Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 177 Mass. 267.
For reasons hereinbefore stated, the defendants’ motions for directed verdicts were properly denied. Their requests for rulings also were rightly refused. The first related to the alleged false pretence and has been sufficiently considered. The second and third related to failure to prove delivery of the plugs to the addresses given. There was ample evidence to warrant the jury in reaching the conclusion that the alleged crimes were committed, without further evidence
It is no defence to these indictments that the Conners company and Ramsdell paid their money to Morrison in accordance with the terms of contracts made with him, under the circumstances disclosed. It could still be found that the money was obtained by Morrison as a direct result of the false pretences of Darling and George, made in pursuance of a prearranged fraudulent scheme of which the contract made • with Morrison could have been found to be a part and was, therefore, of no validity.
It is not necessary to prove that the false representation was the only inducement; it is enough if it was a decisive influence. Commonwealth v. Farmer, supra. The remaining requests have been sufficiently covered in the foregoing discussion.
Testimony was admitted of what purported to be a telegram partly in code from someone by the name of Morrison to someone by the name of Darling. Later this testimony was stricken out and the jury told to disregard it. It must be assumed that the jury followed the instructions and that the defendants were not prejudiced. Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 222. Commonwealth v. Ham, 150 Mass. 122. Clark v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 164 Mass. 434, 439.
The portion of the charge objected to, taken in connection with the whole charge, was an accurate statement of the controlling principles of law which should govern the jury in deciding whether the crime of obtaining money by false pretences had been committed.
Exceptions overruled.