Commonwealth v. MorrisCommonwealth v. Morris
- Reporters:
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- Before:
- Brosky
Lead Opinion
This аppeal of Kenneth C. Morris is from the judgment of sentence of life imprisonment that was imposed following a non-jury verdict of guilty of murder of the first degree but mentally ill. Appellant’s sole argument on appeal is that a defendant who has been found “mentally ill” pursuant to
The facts of the case, briefly summarized, are as follows: On August 30, 1986, appellant, accompanied by his girlfriend, Donna Kilpatrick, drove to the home of Kilpatrick’s daughter Tina in Bradford, Pennsylvania, in order to retrieve a hunting rifle belonging to appellant. Kilpatrick, fearing that appellant was suicidal, had earlier takеn the rifle to her daughter’s home. As they were parked in the driveway outside Tina’s home, the couple argued, and Kilpatrick attempted to leave the car and go into the house. Appellant pulled her back into the car, stabbed her with a hunting knife that he hаd brought with him, and drove off. An autopsy revealed a total of nine stab wounds. Appellant eventually wrecked the car in New York State. After putting Kilpatrick’s body in the trunk of the car, he wrote a note explaining that a former girlfriend had “caused all this” and that “Donna wаs good to me so I wanted to take her with me.” At some point appellant also stabbed himself in the abdomen in an apparent suicide attempt. In statements to police officers, emergency and hospital personnel, and an examining psychiаtrist, he admitted killing Kilpatrick.
At the non-jury trial, defense counsel attempted to prove that appellant was not guilty by reason of insanity. The expert witness for the defense, Dr. Jodh Sanghi, testified that he had diagnosed appellant as suffering from “bipolar *565illness,” formerly called manic-depressive disorder, and that he saw no evidence to indicate that appellant had the willfulness or the premeditation to commit harm to Kilpatrick (N.T., 151, 166). His testimony was disputed by that of the Commonwealth’s witness, Dr. Anthony Montecalvo, who diagnosed аppellant as suffering from an adjustment disorder and not from bipolar illness (N.T., 244-47).
The trial court, after concluding that appellant had understood both the nature and the wrongfulness of his act, found him legally sane and guilty of murder of the first degree but mentally ill. Post-trial motions were filed and denied. On September 23, 1987, the court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. 1102(a) and directed that appellant receive treatment pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act,
The argument raised by appellant in this apрeal turns upon the Crimes Code’s allegedly incompatible definitions of “guilty but mentally ill” and “murder of the first degree.” 1
[a] person who timely offers a defense of insanity in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure may be found “guilty but mentally ill” at trial if the trier of facts finds, beyоnd a reasonable doubt, that the person is guilty of an offense, was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense and was not legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense.
As defined in
A person who has been found guilty of first degree murder but mentally ill has been found to meet the definition of mental illness given by
*567We note at the outset that the application of
In interpreting the statutes at issue herein, our purpose is to effectuate the intеntion of the legislature.
the General Assembly determined that this classificatiоn of individuals is capable of possessing the requisite mens rea for the attachment of criminal responsibility. In other words, those individuals who have been found guilty but mentally ill are both “sick” and “bad” (i.e., criminally responsible).
Id., 374 Pa.Superior Ct. at 583, 543 A.2d at 1123. If, as prior case law indicates, the intent of the legislature was to hold guilty but mentally ill defendants responsible for their criminal acts, on the assumption that they possessed the requisite mens rea, we will not presume to find in the relevant statutes an unwritten, implicit exception for one class of defendants, those found guilty of first degree murder but mentally ill.
Appellant contends that this Court’s opinion in Commonwealth v. Johnson, 373 Pa.Super. 312, 541 A.2d 332 (1988), requires a different result. In Johnson, a panel of this Court concluded that “there was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to find that appellant was not mentally ill at the time of the killing and, therefore, that the killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated.” Id., 373 Pa.Superior Ct. at 327, 541 A.2d at 339. According to apрellant, it follows from this conclusion that if a defendant was mentally ill, as defined in
*569However, the issue before this Court in Johnson was whether the verdict of guilty of first degree murder was against the weight of the evidence and was unsupported by sufficient evidence, given testimony which allegedly showed that appellant’s “mental illness at the time оf the offense negated an element of the crime of first degree murder, i.e., specific intent.” Id., 373 Pa.Superior Ct. at 321-25, 541 A.2d at 337-38. It was held that because the jury had been presented with conflicting evidence as to whether appellant was mentally ill at the time of the offense, the evidеnce of the specific intent necessary for first degree murder was sufficient and the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. Id., 373 Pa.Superior Ct. at 325-26, 541 A.2d at 339. This Court was not presented with, and did not rule upon, the issue of whether a defendant found to have been mentally ill at the time of thе offense can, as a matter of law, be found to have possessed the specific intent necessary to commit first degree murder. Accordingly, the Court’s opinion in Johnson does not support appellant’s argument.
If we were to conclude that appellant’s mental illness, as defined in
Our analysis of the relevant case law and statutes indicates that in enacting the guilty but mеntally ill statute,
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
BROSKY, J., files a concurring statement.Notes
. We are required to proceed without the benefit of the Commonwealth’s response to appellant’s argument, as the Commonwealth has not filed an appellate brief.
. At oral argument, counsel for appellant also asserted that there is a constitutional basis to appellant‘s challenge to the verdict of guilty of first degree murder but mentally ill. He did not set forth the basis of *567the constitutional claim, however. Appellant did not raise any constitutional claims in the trial court, nor hаs he discussed any such claim in his appellate brief. Accordingly, we decline to address any possible constitutional challenges. We note that Commonwealth v. Trill, 374 Pa.Super. 549, 543 A.2d 1106 (1988), contains an extensive discussion of the constitutionality of
.
[a] defendant found guilty but mentally ill or whose plea of guilty but mentally ill is accepted under the provisions of18 Pa.C.S. § 314 (relating to guilty but mentally ill) may have any sentence imposed on him which may lawfully be imposed on any defendant convicted of the same offense. Before imposing sentence, the court shall hear testimony аnd make a finding on the issue of whether the defendant at the time of sentencing is severely mentally disabled and in need of treatment pursuant to the provisions of the [Mental Health Procedures Act,50 P.S. § 7101 et seq.].
Concurrence Opinion
concurring:
I join the opinion of the majority yet would like to write separately to stress one point. I believe the proper focus of our inquiry should be first on whether or not a finding of guilty but mentally ill is inconsistent with a finding of guilt as to murder in the first degree. I believe considerations of legislative intent should arise only to the extent necessary to answer that inquiry, if at all, and consequently, I believe we should refrain from such a discussion.
The majority quite aptly demonstrates that there is nothing to indicate thе legislature’s belief that a guilty but mentally ill verdict cannot be returned on a first degree murder charge. However, the fact remains that the finding in this case, by virtue of the legislature’s definition, is tantamount to a finding that appellant lacked a substantial capacity to either appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. If by making this finding we would have to conclude that a necessary element of first degree murder was negated, we would be duty bound to vacate that conviction regardless of legislative intent. However, as also demon*571strated by the majority, it appears that a finding of guilty but mentally ill does not necessarily negate an element necessary for first degree murder. Our Supreme Court described the elements of that crime in the following manner:
Section 2502(a) of the Crimes Code,18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a) states that “[a] criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an ntentional killing ” (emphasis added). The phrase “intentional killing” is defined as a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.”18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(d) . This Court has held that a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing” is onе where the actor has a specific intent to bring about the death of the victim.
Commonwealth v. Nelson, 514 Pa. 262, 523 A.2d 728 (1987).
Although, the finding in the present case would indicate that appellant either lacked a substantial capacity to understand that stabbing the victim was wrong or, perhaps, knowing that this wаs wrong, lacked a substantial capacity to refrain from stabbing the victim regardless of that understanding, it would not necessarily mean that he was incapable of developing a specific intent to kill the victim. As such, and as noted in the majority opinion, the finding that appellant was guilty but mentally ill of first degree murder is not necessarily inconsistent.