*1 this, purview. ing by outside the Act’s Id. at Because of Bell is law said to have however, importantly, More 105. neither assumed the risk Dean duty owed no the Act’s nor the decisions cited protect Thus, Bell from this risk. Dean herein lend credence to Bell’s fear that be negligent. Chepkevich, cannot See skiers or snowboarder alike “would be free court, therefore, 1196-97. The trial prop- they to ski fast as want and as out of erly granted Dean’s motion for summary they “injure control as want” and each judgment, as he was entitled to judgment Appellant’s Brief, with impunity.” aas matter of law.8 Rather, plaintiffs at 12. are barred Order affirmed. injuries from recovery Act sustained engaged sport while downhill
skiing where injury arises from an skiing,
inherent risk of defined as those “common, frequent,
risks are or ex-
pected.” Hughes, Chepkevich, supra; su- has, therefore,
pra. Supreme Our Court defined, law,
clearly matter recovery within which scope barred and Pennsylvania, COMMONWEALTH of Thus, permitted. Bell’s assertion is un- Appellee founded. v. sum, legislature expressly our has MORAN, Appellant. Fred Charles recognized that the of downhill sport ski- ing is economic interest to this Com- Superior Pennsylvania. Court monwealth and that there are risks inher- 8, Argued ent June sport. Pa.C.S.A. 7102(c)(1). Our has legislature account- Aug. Filed
ed for these risks preserving com- Reargument Denied Oct. assumption law doctrine mon of the risk 7102(c)(2). in this area. 42 Pa.C.S.A.
Indeed, our Supreme specifical- has Court
ly accounted for the exact risk of harm claim categorized
Bell’s arises from and colliding
this risk —the risk of with another
skier a risk of snowboarder —as down- common, skiing
hill frequent, ex- and, therefore,
pected inherent to the
sport of downhill skiing. Hughes, See su- 344; Crews,
pra, supra, at summary judgment trial applied 8. The court entered them the facts of this case. We, however, concluding in favor of Dean after that Bell granting affirm the court order producing to meet summary judgment failed his burden of Dean suffi- as a matter of law support negli- recovery cient evidence to his claim for because Bell's is barred the Act. Keener, gence, Inc., Erdely therefore there were no issues of & Hinchcliffe Although material fact for (Pa.Super.2005) to consider. (providing summary judgment court appellate did not enter that an affirm court the deci upon finding Dean based owed Bell sion of the trial when court it is correct on Act, duty opinion any legal ground of care regard no under the its without relied.). ground addressed several cases cited herein on which the court *2 many years
served for years ago, Several Commissioner. *3 sold its interests in a parcel several hundred acre located en- tirely Township formerly within the operated as the Haverford State Mental Hospital, Township to the for its use. The Township’s proximity to Philadel- phia, undeveloped the relative lack of the Township, land within and availabili- Rose, Philadelphia, appel- A. for Burton ty undeveloped open space lant. parcel realty made this sizeable transfer Stoycos, Atty., Dist. William R. Asst. very Township valuable asset. The Com., appellee. many opportunities op- examined tions to determine the best use for the BENDER, BEFORE: OTT and real estate consistent obligation with its KELLY, JJ. people of the Township both as BENDER, BY J.: OPINION development stewards of its con- open space greater servators for the appeals judg- Fred Charles Moran good. imposed following ment of sentence 2003, Bribery February conviction of in Official and Politi- Com- missioners, Matters, vote, § cal 4701. Moran a 5-to-4 Pa.C.S. decided to retain the services of a consultant ... contends that evidence adduced was legally supervise disposition par- not sufficient to establish that he of the cel.... gain prepared [The acted with criminal intent consultant] and/or required by Request Proposals issued a unlawful benefit as solicit addition, proposals property. statute. In he contends that the bid for the In De- in denying trial court abused its discretion cember Goldenberg- Pohlig, doing requests jury counsel’s to instruct on business as Haverford Hills, (“HH”), conformity with 18 L.P. was selected to de- Pa.C.S. review, Upon velop ground Township pre- and the we find evidence ample liminarily agreed more than to sustain Moran’s con- to sell about 61 acres Moreover, viction. in view of the measure about million dollars. $30.65 of intent inherent in the * * * overwhelming statute and the na- The original arrangement sale became case, ture of the evidence of intent in this unworkable when An- [Commissioner
we find no abuse of discretion in the trial discovered, September Lewis drew] court’s refusal to instruct the con- planned using that HH 74 acres formity with 18 Pa.C.S. (in- Hospital grounds of the Haverford judge,
The trial the Honorable Harold roads) cluding even though agree- Jr., S.J., Thompson, ably A. summarized only ment called for a transfer of a 61 Opinion pursu- case in his facts parcel. acre Lewis [Commissioners] 1925(a): ant to Pa.R.A.P. and D’Emilio informal commenced dis- politician Defendant was a well-known cussions with HH. On November Township (“Township”), Haverford De- Township’s Commissioners of- He County, Pennsylvania. ficially prior agree- laware had voted to rescind the renegotia- development formal accelerate approved process. ment and New discussions took suggested tions with HH. Lewis then that he and [De- in new terms. A resulted place which presentation could make a fendant] arrangement, negotiated restructured Pohlig, principal at Goldenberg- Todd approved 2005 and (the [the] November Pohlig development partnership), meeting the Board of Commissioners However, telephone on a call. Lewis did following month involved the transfer of not ask what intended [Defendant] [he] price than 40 acres and a slightly less say. *4 contemplated million. It tag $17 Township meeting Just before the development age-restricted of 198 con- mid-December, arrange- where the new dominiums, age-restricted carriage ratified, presented ment was be single family dwellings. houses and 80 negotiation place final took where the only These units would be made avail- Township agreed drop age-re- years people able to or older and (to designation stricted age-targeted) for school-age allowed no children to live in exchange the condominium units permanent there on a basis. In addi- agreement HH’s to increase the cash tion, arrangement the revised made $500,000 by consideration and a conces- practical prospect including 6 ball- single family sion eliminate the homes (a development component fields in the and increase the number of condomini- prior arrangement but which was ums. The additional half-million dollars not possible steep slopes speci- on the was couched as a contribution to Haver- plans fied in the under the original pro- Township ford to be used exclusively posal). towards construction of a nature center major
After aspects of the new ar- walking arrangement trails. This rangement subject agree- were the of an accepted by was parties. (but principal ment in before the [sic] 20, 2005, On December Defendant and writing), terms were memorialized placed phone Lewis call to Michael Township’s Commissioners convened a Lawry, development director for Gold- special budget meeting po- to address a enberg Group[,] acting which was as the budget following tential shortfall for the project manager for Goldenberg-Pohlig year. proposals calendar Several were in connection with the Haverford One, State suggested by discussed. Defen- was, dant, development. by tract It all ac sought to accelerate the collection counts, by a brief call. Lewis by opened of real estate taxes seeking HH’s saying the had cooperation something [Defendant] in prepaying about a half ask. realty million dollars in then said words to the [Defendant] taxes to cover effect, purchase price if the budget. Commissioner D’Emilio is increased $500,000 posed zoning process question: why the critical will be HH agree to such an arrangement? expedited. off-handedly De- [Defendant] fendant responded might be used the during HH word “extortion” call.[1] if accommodating Lawry could responded he would trial, testimony 1. In his Commissioner I turned it over to Mr. Moran. And Mr. extortion, Lewis described the conversation as follows: “Call it call it what $500,000, you will. We need and we'll Lawry. I—I introduced Mr. I we have said zoning. get you accelerate the budget facing We’ll some—some issues the town- ship, zoning approvals you and Mr. Moran an idea that he need and accelerate has you. point process.” Lawry, would like run to—to At that Mr. for clarification take the matter under advisement. Lewis alone. explained Lewis that he Lawry prospect was concerned did not know what go- was [Defendant] prior dealings because his with [De ing say and that he any “disavowed fendant], apparent it was that [Defen suggestion zoning in the Town- power wielded in the Township dant] ship was for sale.” “probably position and was in a to influ 2/2/09, Trial Opinion, Court at 2-7. the [development] process.” ence Following investigation by agents of the Lawry also aware that anything Attorney Office, General’s Moran was which could slow the development pro- charged by grand jury with, presentment adversely cess could [e]ffect its financial offenses, among other Bribery in Official viability. approv- Unless and until local Matters, and Political received, als were the actual construc- Moran waived right to a speedy trial tion begin. could not At least one such under Pa.R.Crim.P. following which approval, a land approval, use would be proceeded his case to a jury trial which secured through application direct *5 commenced on July 2007. The Com- through the Township’s Board. In addi- called, others, monwealth among Michael tion, ... the property, operated while as Lawry Lewis, and Commissioner both of Hospital, State was in an area zoned whom attested to substantially the same institutional use. The contemplated conversation defense, with Moran. development would require develop- the presented evidence, Moran no electing nei- er to secure relief from the existing ther to testify on his own behalf nor to call zoning to accommodate the use of the character witnesses. Moran’s counsel ar- grounds for purposes. residential This gued jury that although his client’s process could be handled either as a language tactless, was no doubt it reflected change of the zoning local ordinance or merely the defendant’s effort to assure the an application for a conditional use-ei- maximum price sale for the ques- ther of land in which would also be considered thereby tion benefiting public the by large. the Board. zoning [T]he issue could Moreover, be counsel by specifically [also] addressed the asserted through an that Moran application by personal handled did not solicit a bene- local zoning hearing fit in special exchange for the govern- [b]oard exercise of exception request that, or as a authority for a variance. mental consequently, and meantime, [however,] In the any delay his conduct could not be deemed criminal. would not abate the accruing costs and In argument, accordance with his counsel expenses investment by incurred HH as prompted judge the trial to instruct project moved forward. jury that it could convict Moran only upon Shortly call, after phone Lawry proof re- prescribed by mens rea ceived another call. This time it was Pa.C.S. which provides “[g]eneral said, this, $500,000, part "is something you.” has to ask Commissioner million, $17.5 said, or is it in addition to it?” if the—and paraphrasing I'm And Mr. Moran said it was in addition to here ... I don't know the exact words. If $17.5 million. purchase price property for the is in- N.T., 11/19/07, testimony, 112. In his own $500,000, creased zoning process Lawry confirmed Lewis’s recollection of the expedited. you will be He said can call this conversation: will, you extortion if but that’s what it’s telephone I received the call from Commis- going Very telephone be. brief call. sioners Lewis and Moran. And Commis- N.T., at 93. 11/20/07 sioner Lewis "Commissioner Moran sufficient will be deemed an ex- “Evidence where culpability5’
requirements verdict when establishes support the stated. not otherwise rea is mens plicit the crime element of howev- each material request, counsel’s court denied The thereof statutory and the commission charged in view the er, concluding accused, reasonable beyond offense describing the Nevertheless, “the Common- evidence of Moran’s doubt.” compelling guilt was not to a intent, section 302 need not establish wealth instruction deliberation, may sus- Following certainty,” mathematical necessary. charged cir- guilty wholly means of found Moran tain its burden a sentence of six imposed Significantly, trial court evidence. cumstantial $10,000.2 fíne of judgment and a probation [our] months’ not substitute “[we] post-sen- factfinder; Moran’s denied if the record The trial court for that of Moran then filed they support tence motion for the convictions contains following questions raising the appeal may not be disturbed.” review: our Brewer, 876 A.2d prove sufficient to the evidence omitted). 1. Was (citations (Pa.Super.2005) a reasonable doubt beyond fact that the evidence Accordingly, “[t]he Bribery guilty of [Moran] participation establishing a defendant’s respect § 4701 in the preclude does not crime circumstantial inadequate proof there was coupled the evidence where a conviction *6 with criminal intent acted [Moran] inferences drawn with the reasonable an unlawful gain to himself and/or presumption overcomes the therefrom benefit? (quoting Id. innocence.” Commonwealth judge (Pa.Su abuse his discre- the trial Did A.2d 1038-39 Murphy, v. refusing grant to [Moran’s] tion ad long as the evidence per.2002)). So jury be instructed request duced, most favorable accepted light be convicted of Commonwealth, cannot [Moran] demonstrates to the Bribery unless of a defendant’s respective elements crim- acted with proves doubt, [Moran] his con beyond a reasonable crimes Brewer, intent? inal upheld. victions will be Any about the defen A.2d at 1032. doubt at 3. Appellant Brief for fact be resolved guilt dant’s is to challenges the le- question Moran’s first evidence is so weak and finder unless the sufficiency to sustain evidence gal law, that, no as a matter inconclusive Appellant Brief for 8. As his conviction. from the of fact can be drawn probability matter, of review of our standard general circumstances. See Common combined evalu- requires claims that we sufficiency 574, 582 DiStefano, 782 A.2d wealth v. light “in the most favorable ate the record (Pa.Super.2001). giving prosecu- winner to the verdict case, was convicted In this Moran inferences of all reasonable tion the benefit Political Matters Bribery in Official and from the evidence.” Com- to be drawn defines, Widmer, applicable statute Pa. 744 which the monwealth (2000). part, as follows: pertinent Sentencing Pennsylvania’s Matters is a sentence Bribery in Official and Political sanctions to 9 is restorative degree carrying an Guidelines felony third Offense imprisonment. See 204 Pa.Code Assuming months' Gravity of 5. a defendant’s Score Matrix). (Basic zero, Sentencing § 303.16 the recommended prior record score of political Appellant Bribery § 4701. official and established was at- tempting purchase price to raise the of a matters property township selling, but (a) guilty defined.—A Offenses money, paid, had it been not felony degree, the third bribery, gone Appellant have but to the offers, agrees if he confers or to confer politi- for which he served as a another, solicits, accepts or or upon Brief Appellant cal officer.” for at 6. from agrees accept to another: advocates, addition, that: (1) any pecuniary benefit as consider- as a matter of basic and fundamental decision, opinion, ation for the recom- Commonwealth, policy it is not mendation, vote or exercise of acceptable uphold to the conviction of a servant, party a public discretion as for public merely attempting official recipient; official or voter public position use his as an office holder (2) as consideration for any benefit try improve arrange- financial decision, vote, recommendation or ment of a real estate transaction that other exercise of official discretion political entity could benefit recipient judicial, in a administra- whom working. he was We submit that legislative proceeding; tive or or § 4701 was never to punish intended (3) any benefit as consideration for a overreaching politicians; rather legal duty violation of a known designed manifest that this law was party or official. public servant protect public corrupt from officials Although attempting the statute that were to line their own pockets by conferring withholding or premises a defendant’s conviction under (a)(1) solicitation, exercise of their official discretion in accep- subsection tance, exchange pecuniary gain or economic agreement accept “pecuniary (a)(2) (a)(3) themselves. benefit,” subsections re- *7 “benefit,” only a quire which need not be Brief Appellant at 12. in pecuniary statutory nature.3 While the argument We find Moran’s untena definition of “pecuniary benefit” offers no first, attempts, ble. It minimize to discussion of the extent to which a bribe evidence of the intent in defendant’s direct a directly, must enrich defendant the defi- language; contravention of his own to be nition of “benefit” establishes beyond clear, “merely Moran was not attempting that a premised upon doubt conviction public position to use his as an office hold
may indirectly by sustained be advan- try er to improve arrange to the financial any tage gain person entity or “to other or ment of a real estate transaction.” See id. in whose welfare [the defendant] is inter- Second, argument attempts Moran’s to re § ested.” See 18 Pa.C.S. cast the mandate section 4701 limit challenges foregoing Moran ing scope distinc- its where no such limitation is tion, arguing only apparent statutory language. evidence Penn- “[t]he Comparison chapter's advantage, anything definitions of "Benefit.” Gain or or significance both terms regarded gain demonstrates beneficiary or ad- respective this distinction. The definitions vantage, including any benefit to § appear at 18 Pa.C.S. 4501 as follows: person entity or in welfare he is in- whose terested, advantage promised but not an "Pecuniary benefit.” Benefit in the form of generally group or a money, property, to class voters as commercial or interests anything primary significance consequence public which else the measures gain. engages support oppose. which is economic or candidate
280 § To the Act, 1 18 Pa.C.S. interested.” Statutory Construction
sylvania’s Township was “an Haverford review and extent that our § focuses Pa.C.S. in- ex entity [Moran] [was] of matters in who’s welfare any consideration negates (a terested, not con- except he does statutory language proposition traneous to ambig test), is sufficiency such of the evidence in where instances 1921(b) (“When § clear. Such is the guilt uous. See his is establish and free from are clear of a statute words case here. of it is not to be the letter ambiguity, all every offers indication The evidence pretext pursuing disregarded words, own attempted, his case, Moran fails spirit.”).
its money not to enrich a vast sum of “extort” unclear; more is that the statute assert Township, but to enrich Haverford himself in the lan over, ambiguity no we discern he was a board of commissioners of whose legislature or the construction guage question He the call in member. made prohib chose, stating the conduct either pur- for the capacity expressly official ited, prescrib or in 18 see Pa.C.S. money from the Golden- pose obtaining beneficiaries expansive class of ing an at the Group in view of revelations berg may render an receipt of a benefit whose budget meeting. township commissions’ unlawful, conduct see Pa.C.S. official’s irrele- beyond motivation that is Moran’s in form and simple The statute is vant; in en- benefit personal neither application equally sim content and its prestige nor a nefarious political hanced public no ser ple. Plainly put, sought the benefit for the use of purpose pro quo quid solicit a benefit vice pre- the elements necessary to establish the official he for his exercise of discretion It defen- by section 4701. is the scribed extends, Although prohibition holds. soliciting accepting or conduct dant’s concedes, who to those as Moran government authori- benefit under color themselves, see enrich wrongdoing, criminal ty that constitutes O’Kicki, A.2d 152 Pa.Super. disposition purpose of the bene- not the who, (1991), it extends no less to those Clearly, any benefit obtained sought. fit authority, ex government under color of public trust is ren- expense at the others, payable tract a benefit see Com nor illicit for neither less real less dered Parmar, monwealth v. public treasury. having benefited the This much the statutes (Pa.Super.1996). facially clear. See 18 make Pa.C.S. responsibility Moran relieved of Nor is *8 § 4501. statutory qualifica- for his actions advantage benefit “not an tion that a is however, the
Equally significant, statute group to a or class of promised generally exception purporting creates no those consequence public meas- voters where the public to act in the interest even engages support to ures which a candidate their conduct would extract does benefit Appellant Brief for at oppose.” or See Indeed, public. the definition inure Indeed, suggestion private 12 n. to a 5. upon of “benefit” which conviction under treat- real estate of favorable 4701(a)(2) (3) necessarily de- section and far removed zoning process ment in the is pends, specifically contemplates the com- group ... to a or class “promise from the bribery based on a defendant’s mission The specified by the statute. of voters” “anything re- acceptance or solicitation of merely was not Goldenberg Group beneficiary gain or ad- garded by the voters,” but a commer- “group or class vantage, including any to other benefit or fortunes would rise cial interest whose entity or in whose he is person welfare substantially fall relative to decisions The extent to which Moran’s statements Township’s board of commis- made solicited benefit as “[a] consideration thereby particularly and was decision, vote, sioners made oth- recommendation or overreaching. susceptible government er exercise of official discretion in zoning Nor can favorable treatment be recipient in a judicial, administrative or as a legitimate public described measure legislative proceeding” could not be more quid quo. when it comes is pro with It Accordingly, clear.4 the evidence more is in among many fact of the public abuses than sufficient to establish the benefit ele- sought trust that the legislature to elimi- bribery charge. ment framing prohibitions nate in of section testimony The same establishes Moran’s 4701 and the related definitions section Arguably, intent.5 the measure of intent necessary finding culpability under accordingly We conclude the evi- implicit section in the readily dence adduced was sufficient to applicable statute. As to the conduct sustain Moran’s Bribery conviction for 4701(a) at specifies issue here section Official Political Matters. Both of the guilty “[a] ... he if parties to the December 2005 confer- solicits, ... agrees or accepts accept” an expressly ence call attested that Moran unlawful benefit as defined in section 4501. proposed Lawry Michael Gold- Each of the foregoing terms indicates that enberg Group pay Haverford depends upon statute $500,000 for privileged treatment mind, evidence of a conscious en- actively process of zoning development. the new gaged retaining the prohibited benefit. (“And N.T., 11/19/07, Mr. Moran Solicitation, acceptance, agreement extortion, it you call it ‘Call what will. volitional; are accept inherently one can- $500,000, We need and we’ll accelerate the not be said to engaged any have of them zoning. get you zoning approv- We’ll knowledge without of the benefit be you als need pro- and accelerate the ”) conferred and intent to retain benefit. ear, cess.’ To discerning such a Heritage Compare might suggest statement The equally that Amerioan Dictio- (4th ed.2001) (“solicit nary, To payment process absence Vv. n % obtain.”) seek or expeditious, (accept be with id. at 5 likely increasing less Gold- enberg’s holding, legal, To receive development willingly) and id. 18 (“agree n u accede.”). scarcely consent; costs. We can grant conceive a more 1. To Never- theless, government audacious power. abuse of acknowledge we previ- this Court’s assertion, Contrary million.”). to Moran's the evidence $17.5 was addition to the suggest fact, does sustain even not the notion point of Moran did offer not additional arm-twisting that Moran’s exercise in official land for sale did propose not that Golden- merely bargain effort to drive a hard berg should advance future real estate taxes. *9 sale for the of the land and enhance the sale N.T., 11/20/07, at 5. price the public. benefit of the Moran’s proposal, as recounted both his fellow sufficiency 5. We consider the of the evidence developer's representa- commissioner and the conjunction establish Moran’s intent tive, was couched one as for the sale of favor- question appeal, with Moran’s second on zoning able treatment —not for an increase in challenges which the trial court's determina- price the of the land sold or the sale of tion not to instruct the the of on measure N.T., 11/19/07, additional real estate. at See specified § intent in 18 Pa.C.S. which ("Mr. said, Lawry, 112 for clarification 'is provides culpability generally when no this, $500,000, million, part the of $17.5 the specific is standard otherwise established. or is it in addition it?’ And Mr. Moran said 282 sustain unequivocally sufficient to intent “the stat- that pronouncement
ous partici- the his Both of other conviction. culpability the level of specify not ute does related pants in Moran’s conference call of this material elements the applicable to call, express Parmar, language during his the his offense[,]” A.2d at 672 see “extortion,” of his use of the word omission culpa- of the engrafting consequent its including the of any option, purchase § 302 as the of Pa.C.S. bility standard tax- payment land or advance of additional of intent under section measure applicable es, the brevity and the of conversation. intentionally, knowingly or as follows: sions “it is sufficient to show that a ty. Except— bility wise ly with this title Section 302 not respect intentionally, negligently, of an offense is not (a) offense. such element acts sufficient (c) * * § 302. General Pa.C.S. culpability Culpability Minimum clear, guilty intentionally, knowingly or [*] state provided. [*] respect (relating to establish a material element we of an offense unless he each material element of as the as provides, have requirements), requirements its knowingly, recklessly or —When provided thereto. required established requirements face, determining law Finding applied limitations on prescribed in section 305 pertinent part, recklessly unless require, these if culpability person language a person culpabili- reckless- other- provi- culpa- acted scope acted with with law, is will be withstanding it in it’s money from We’ll this extortion expressly with the desire to extract more advance. See id. at 98-105. These sential terms of the (“Mr. creased extortion, need other commissioners N.T., $500,000, Compare The evidence also shows here call.”). was land to be $500,000, parties purchase going addition ... and accelerate Lawry, for get you 11/20/07 not in addition to the expedited. See also I don’t know the exact words. N.T., 11/19/07, call it likely to be. had $500,000, part conveyed to it?’ And Mr. Moran said price we’ll if at 93 already agreed you what clarification pay of the specific knowledge Goldenberg Group N.T., 11/19/07, for the Very zoning approvals accelerate the He said price will, real estate taxes you (“I’m $17.5 at 112 $17.5 and the amount brief but that’s what process.”) zoning process will. property paraphrasing you said, million, warning million.”).6 on the telephone We (“Call can ‘is zoning. acted is need with this, not- you call cir- es- in- If is it elements of the respect to the material own coupled cumstances with Moran’s (cit- Parmar, crime.” A.2d at in- and forceful make his blunt 302(c)). ing 18 Pa.C.S. clear; Lawry re- abundantly tent as Mike trial, you if en- lated it at this extortion Applying “[C]all measure 302(c) will, it’s to be.” going in section but that’s what compassed adopted N.T., Parmar, find the evidence of Moran’s we 11/20/07 back, Moreover, part want no that conver- character the conversation I sufficiently prompt coercive to Commis- not in the sation. Haverford *10 to call the back imme- [Lawry] sioner Lewis selling zoning. He of business diately himself from N.T., afterward distance happened.” like it never See I'll act thing I “The next I did is Moran's demand: 11/19/07, at Lawry picked phone called Mike up the
283 mind, Notwithstanding upon the il of a palpably evidence conscious ac conduct, of he in tively engaged retaining licit nature Moran’s also the prohibited discussion, the trial challenges court’s instructions benefit. See A level infra. jury contending implied the that its omission to of intent so substantive el 4701, charge culpability the modest standard on ements of section which exceeds 302(c) fatally 302, of 18 Pa.C.S. undermines threshold enunciated section requires Thus, his conviction and a new trial. obviously satisfies section 302. ironically, clarity it is the of Perhaps very repeated jury court’s instructions to the surrounding were, the evidence Moran’s activi upon based those elements at least ties renders this claim of specious. that the basis the evidence adduced Hall, 233, here, Commonwealth v. 574 Pa. 830 ample guide the jury’s delibera (2003) 537, Bellis, A.2d 542 tion. (quoting Common See Commonwealth v. 252 Meredith, 303, 15, (1977) 1258, wealth v. 490 Pa. 416 A.2d Pa.Super. 380 A.2d 1264 (1980) (“Where 481, of part grounds, 485 intention rev’d in on other Com itself, Bellis, is obvious from the actor act monwealth 484 Pa. 399 (1979) justified finder of fact is in the A.2d assigning (affirming 397 for conviction suggested by intention that the con bribery statutory predecessor under of duct.”)). section on the reading basis that bribery jury statute to the stating 302(c) above, spec- As we noted section offense, the bribery elements of including culpability ifies that suffi- “[w]hen money received, the fact that must be so cient to establish a material element of licited or as a quid pro taken quo, law, prescribed is not such offense sufficient instruction on the of in issue established if a acts in- element is tent). To extent court knowingly recklessly tentionally, with should have instructed on section 302(c). respect thereto.” not, is, most, did its omission harmless Accordingly, jury an instruction error could which have no demonstrable based it would allow a upon conviction effect on the verdict. See Common behavior, bribery merely reckless as Bullock, wealth v. 590 Pa. A.2d opposed flagrantly con- intentional (2006) (finding trial fail court’s duct evidence demonstrated jurors ure to negli instruct on criminal recognize, course, here. We gence necessary to sustain defendant’s prior view of this Court’s application voluntary conviction manslaughter as the culpability section 302 measure of an unborn child could not have contribut statute, Parmar, see ed to the verdict and therefore amounted trial courts are well- evidence, to harmless error where the instruct the jury advised to accordance light considered instruction provision with in prosecutions gave, court demonstrated jurors Nevertheless, bribery. its omission degree found a least of at far this case is from a source revers- negligence). criminal Consequently, we ible error. The trial court provided a challenge find Moran’s the trial court’s comprehensive charge on the elements of wholly instruction without merit. the offense established section 4701 reasons, For provided foregoing and the definition benefit we affirm noted, judgment Moran’s section 4501. As we al- sentence. supra, though provisions those state do not Judgment of sentence AFFIRMED. culpability directly, they standard of do suggest that conviction Judge must be based KELLY files a dissenting opinion.
284 error, KELLY, warranting grant the BY reversible a OPINION
DISSENTING Id. at new trial. J.: majori- Instantly, culpability from the because the default respectfully dissent I 302(c) applies omis- to the requirement that the trial court’s section conclusion ty’s statute, was entitled explicit bribery Appellant rea instruction of an mens sion he charge concerning harmless error.1 an instruction whether acted jury was from statute, notes, bribery intentionally, knowingly, recklessly. majority As that, 4701, § after the jury does not contain an The record indicates Pa.C.S.A. 18 thus, deliberations, began mens rea it twice asked the express requirement; repeat bribery. forth in culpability requirement set court the definition default 248). 802(c) (N.T. Trial, 243-44, 11/20/07, applies. Af- See Commonwealth section 1083, clarification, Parmar, 318, Appellant’s 551 Pa. 710 A.2d ter the second v. (1998). argued jury counsel have 1088 a culpability been confused the lack of reviewing
It is well-settled that when requirement the definition instruction, we adequacy jury a 258). (Id, Thus, by the court. given I entirety the charge must consider in its beyond cannot conclude a reasonable complete. if it to determine is fair and doubt that trial court’s refusal to in- trial court discretion in The has broad jury require- struct the instruction phrasing charge and ment did not contribute verdict. if, will not be found in error taken as a Bullock, reason, supra. For this I whole, accurately adequately set the judgment would vacate of sentence and applicable forth the law. remand for new trial. 1, Daniels, v. Pa. 963 Commonwealth trial, Because I would for a new (2009). remand 409, Additionally, A.2d “under issue, I would not reach the first whether doctrine, error judgment the harmless the evidence was to establish sufficient will be spite sentence affirmed guilt. Appellant’s only error where con reviewing court beyond cludes doubt that the reasonable
error did not to the verdict.” contribute . Bullock, v. 590 Pa
Commonwealth (2006).
913 A.2d Woosnam, J.C., In the Matter a Minor. (Pa.Super.2003), defendant was convicted involv- jury of accidents P.B., Appeal Legal Guardian. ing personal injury,2 death or which does express require- not contain an mens rea Superior Pennsylvania. Court of ment. Id. at 1204. held This Court Submitted April requirement negligence, the mens rea Filed Aug. 302(b)(4) pursuant ap- to 18 Pa.C.S.A.
plied, trial court’s refusal jury requirement
instruct the on that Appellant preserved instruction the trial court confirmed that it was raised at (See 2/2/09, 2). by objecting Op., Trial at 2 n. claim instruc- sidebar. Ct. to the trial court's tion, 647(B). compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. transcribed, objection Although was not 2. 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3742.