28 Mass. App. Ct. 979 | Mass. App. Ct. | 1990
On July 3, 1987, the defendant, while awaiting trial, became involved in a melee at the Hampden County house of correction. As a result, the
The defendant claims that G. L. c. 127, § 38B, has no application to persons in custody awaiting trial because of the concluding words of the statute which read that upon conviction “[sjuch sentence shall begin from and after all sentences currently outstanding and unserved at the time of said assault. . . .” He argues that this wording restricts application of the statute solely to those already serving a sentence at the time of the offense. In particular, the defendant points to the statute’s command that such person, if convicted, be given a “from and after” sentence.
General Laws c. 127, § 38B, clearly extends to persons in custody awaiting trial as well as those serving a sentence. The Legislature defined “prisoner” in G. L. c. 125, § 1 (m), as appearing in St. 1972, c. 777, § 8, as “a committed offender and such other person as is placed in custody in a correctional facility in accordance with law.”
There was no error by the judge in denying the defendant’s motion for a required finding of not guilty.
Judgment affirmed.
General Laws c. 127, § 38B, as appearing in St. 1966, c. 279, provides:
“A prisoner in any jail or house of correction, or in any correctional institution of the commonwealth who commits an assault or an assault and battery upon an officer, guard or other employee of such jail, house of correction or institution shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than five years. Such sentence shall begin from and after all sentences currently outstanding and unserved at the time of said assault or assault and battery.”
Also see Black’s Law Dictionary 1075 (5th ed. 1979), which defines “prisoner” as “[o]ne who is deprived .of his liberty. One who is against his will kept in confinement or custody. . . .”
In Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 936, 937 (1979), we refused to distinguish for purposes of G. L. c. 268, § 16 (the escape statute), between persons who had been convicted and sentenced to a correctional facility and individuals awaiting trial who were placed in custody awaiting trial.