Commonwealth v. MontanezCommonwealth v. Montanez
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Nolan
In the Chelsea Division of the District Court Department the defendant was charged with breaking and entering a building in the nighttime with intent to commit larceny, larceny of property valued at more than $100 and wanton destruction of personal property valued at less than $100. The defendant filed a written waiver of his right to an immediate jury trial which is required before a defendant may be tried by the court without a jury (bench trial).
In Lydon v. Commonwealth, 381 Mass. 356 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1065 (1980), this court was asked to declare that, on a procedural fact pattern closely similar to this case, a jury trial would constitute double jeopardy. A majority of the court declined to hold this second trial to be double jeopardy. After oral argument of the case before us, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held, by a divided court, that Lydon had a viable claim of double jeopardy. See Lydon v. Boston Municipal Court, 698 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1982).
Though we always treat their decisions with deference, we are not bound by decisions of Federal courts except the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of Federal law.
Commonwealth
v.
Masskow,
362 Mass. 662, 667 (1972). If it were necessary in this case to do so, we would follow the principle which we announced in
Commonwealth
v.
Hill,
377 Mass. 59, 61-62 (1979), and
Commonwealth
v.
Masskow, supra,
and assume without deciding that the Federal
Lydon
decision reached a correct result under Federal law, although we do not accept, even as assumption, everything that is said in the opinion. We would take this course because our decision is reviewable in habeas corpus proceedings in a United States District Court which would be bound by the Federal
Lydon
decision. However, we need not travel this far because the transcript in this case is so deficient that we are in no position to rule on the sufficiency of the evidence. It is the defendant’s burden, as appellant, to bring us a satisfactory transcript.
A majority of the quorum think the issue of waiver should be made firm and, therefore, we declare, “in aid of sound judicial administration, that from the issuance of a rescript upon this opinion, twenty-eight days hence”
(Ciummei
v.
Commonwealth, 378
Mass. 504, 509 [1979]), a waiver of a claim of double jeopardy shall be obtained at the same time as the “written waiver and consent to be tried by the court without a jury” is obtained. See
So ordered.