Commonwealth v. MontanezCommonwealth v. Montanez
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The defendant, Rufino Montanez, was convicted of distribution of cocaine (second offense) and trafficking in cocaine in violation of
On June 3, 1988, the police obtained a search warrant authorizing a search of the defendant’s apartment. The affidavit in support of the application for the warrant described the undercover purchase of February 6, 1988, and the observations gathered in the subsequent surveillance of the defendant. In addition, the affidavit included information provided by two confidential informants. The first informant stated that he had seen the defendant sell cocaine to others on four separate occasions, and that he had personally purchased cocaine from the defendant in May of 1988. All of these sales took place in the defendant’s apartment. The second informant, according to the affidavit, also said that he had seen the defendant sell cocaine from his apartment, and added that “the way to know if Montanez is [doing] business is if the Black Lincoln [Continental] is out side the building” and “the window curtain is pulled back and a lamp is in the window.”
The warrant was executed on the evening of June 3, 1988. As police entered the hallway leading to the defendant’s second-floor apartment, the defendant poked his head out of the apartment door a number of times. When the defendant then came out into the hallway, the police ordered him to lie prpne on the staircase landing outside the apartment. The defendant was arrested, and a search of his person revealed $1,406 in cash. Inside the apartment, the police found a flare
On April 5, 1989, the evening before trial was to begin, the defendant, trailed by a Woburn police officer, went to an airline terminal at Logan International Airport in Boston. There the officer approached the defendant, who was standing with a brown suitcase at the ticket counter. The clerk at the counter gave the officer the ticket that he was processing at the time, a one-way ticket to Puerto Rico issued in the name Rafael Lindt. The flight was scheduled to leave that night. The officer observed various articles of men’s clothing in the brown suitcase when a woman accompanying the defendant opened it to remove certain items. The officer arrested the defendant, placed the suitcase in the police cruiser, and left with the defendant and the woman. The suitcase was admitted in evidence over the defendant’s objection.
1.
Ineffective assistance of counsel.
The defendant claims that the judge improperly denied his motion for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He points to three purported shortcomings in his attorney’s performance: (1) counsel’s failure to investigate a simultaneous search of another resident of the defendant’s apartment building; (2) counsel’s failure to seek suppression of the brown suitcase seized at the airport; and (3) counsel’s failure to present mitigating factors at sentencing and to request concurrent sentences. We reject the first two claims on procedural and
The defendant’s claims of ineffective assistance are barred as a procedural matter because the defendant failed to raise these arguments in a timely fashion.
3
A procedural chronology is in order. Several months after his trial, the defendant moved for a new trial, pursuant to
Upon the denial of the motion for a new trial on April 2, the defendant was permitted thirty days to file either an appeal, Mass. R. A. P. 4 (b), as amended, 378 Mass. 928 (1979), or a motion for reconsideration. Commonwealth v. Cronk, 396 Mass. 194, 197 (1985). 4 The defendant filed his motion for reconsideration thirty-six days later, on May 8, and his appeal more than sixty days later, on June 7. In addition, the defendant has made no showing of “good cause” that might justify our extending the thirty-day deadline. Mass. R. A. P. 14 (b), as amended, 378 Mass. 939 (1979). Thus, the defendant’s motion for reconsideration and his appeal from the denial of the motion for a new trial are time barred. 5
Nevertheless, we address the merits of the defendant’s claims. We discuss the first claim because we reject it for
The standards governing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are well established. The defendant must demonstrate that his attorney’s performance fell “measurably below that which might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer” and that counsel’s conduct “has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of de-fence.” Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974). See Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 (1977) (requiring a “showing that better work might have accomplished something material for the” defense”). Where the defendant challenges counsel’s tactical or strategic decisions, he must establish that such decisions are not merely unreasonable, but “manifestly unreasonable,” Commonwealth v. Adams, 31A Mass. 722, 728 (1978), in order that we may “avoid characterizing as unreasonable a defense that was merely unsuccessful.” Commonwealth v. White, 409 Mass. 266, 272 (1991). 7 The defendant’s claims do not meet these tests.
If we assume for purposes of analysis that counsel’s decision not to investigate the neighbor’s arrest was “manifestly unreasonable” (though we do not so decide), the defendant clearly was not prejudiced thereby. The defendant suggests that, had counsel obtained the affidavit and return attached to the warrant authorizing the search of the neighbor’s apartment, he would have learned that the neighbor was also known to sell cocaine and that cocaine packaged in paper folds was found in the neighbor’s apartment. The persuasive value of this evidence, however, is negligible. The discovery of paper folds in the neighbor’s apartment carries little weight given the fact that similar paper folds were discovered in the defendant’s apartment, considerably closer to where the cocaine was hidden. In addition, the revelation that the neighbor was known as a cocaine dealer, according to a confidential informant cited in the affidavit, was critically flawed: in form, because the information was inadmissible hearsay and, in substance, because the same informant alleged that the neighbor “got a lot of his cocaine from [the defendant].” Even if counsel had found a way to overcome the admissibility problems, he undoubtedly would not have offered that evidence at the risk of revealing the defendant’s role as the neighbor’s supplier.
The defendant’s second claim of ineffective assistance stems from counsel’s failure to move for suppression of the brown suitcase found in the defendant’s possession at the airport on the eve of trial. Again, even if counsel’s failure to
Finally, the defendant argues that counsel’s performance was deficient in that he failed to present certain mitigating factors at the defendant’s sentencing or to argue for concurrent sentences. At the sentencing, counsel noted only that the defendant “has two children [whom] he has been supporting” and “has worked many years in Woburn where his roots are.” Counsel failed to mention the defendant’s involvement in various community groups and did not elaborate on relevant points in the defendant’s work or family history. See Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 Mass. 135, 145-146 (1989). The- Commonwealth suggests that counsel described these factors to the judge only a few days before sentencing, at a hearing on a motion for a review of bail, and that it would have been redundant to repeat them. See Commonwealth v. Mamay, 407 Mass. 412, 425 (1990). Counsel’s comments at the prior hearing, however, were scarcely more detailed. More importantly, counsel never requested concurrent rather than consecutive sentences. See Lykus, supra at 146; Osborne v. Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 104, 113 (1979). Counsel’s performance in this regard was deficient, and we cannot conclude that his performance did not affect the judge’s sentencing decision.
We conclude, therefore, that the defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance at the sentencing, alone among the grounds
2. Denial of the motion to suppress evidence. The defendant claims error in the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized during the search of his apartment and the adjoining hallway. He contends that the affidavit in support of the search warrant, which relied in part on information supplied by confidential informants, failed to set forth sufficient facts to support a finding of probable cause. He further suggests that the search of the hallway exceeded the scope of the search warrant. Neither argument succeeds.
a. The search warrant affidavit. In Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 374-376 (1985), we held that, under art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution, the determination whether an affidavit that incorporates information supplied by unnamed informants establishes probable cause is governed by the principles developed under Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Thus, such an affidavit must inform the magistrate of “(1) some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the contraband was where he claimed it was (the basis of knowledge test), and (2) some of the underlying circumstances from which the affiant concluded that the informant was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable’ (the veracity test)” (citation omitted). Upton, supra at 375. If the informants’ tips do not satisfy both elements of the Aguilar-Spinelli test, other statements in the affidavit that corroborate the tips may support a finding of probable cause. Id. The affidavit in this case satisfies the Aguilar-Spinelli standard.
The affidavit relied on two confidential informants. According to the affidavit, both informants saw the defendant sell cocaine from his apartment on several occasions. In fact, one informant had himself bought cocaine from the defend
The affidavit also established the informants’ credibility in a number of ways. The first informant, according to the affidavit, had provided information that led to the conviction of two named men for distribution of cocaine. This assertion was sufficient to support a magistrate’s conclusion that the first informant was reliable. Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 515 (1990). The second informant had assertedly provided information leading to the arrest (but not the conviction) of two others for distribution of marihuana. This information without more would not establish the second informant’s reliability. Commonwealth v. Rojas, 403 Mass. 483, 486 (1988). The second informant’s story, however, was substantially corroborated by the police officers’ own observations.
The affidavit related the February 6, 1988, undercover purchase of cocaine from the defendant, and numerous details gathered by police officers during the surveillance of the defendant. In addition, the informant stated that, when the defendant was open for business, his distinctive automobile would be parked outside the apartment building, a lighted lamp would be set in a designated window, and a lookout would be posted. The police observed the same activity during their surveillance of the defendant. Thus police corroboration bolsters the second informant’s credibility. See Upton, supra at 376. We hold, therefore, that the informants’ tips satisfied both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli standard, and that the affidavit contained ample evidence to support the magistrate’s finding of probable cause.
b.
The search of the hallway ceiling.
The defendant contends that, even if the search warrant was valid, the officers’ search of the area above the dropped ceiling in the common hallway outside his apartment exceeded the scope of the war
When a defendant has standing under our rule for State constitutional purposes, we then determine whether a search in the constitutional sense has taken place. Commonwealth v. Frazier, supra at 244 n.3. This determination turns on whether the police conduct has intruded on a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy. See Sullivan v. District Court of Hampshire, 384 Mass. 736, 742 (1981); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J„ concurring). The measure of the defendant’s expectation of privacy is (1) whether the defendant has manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the search, and (2) whether society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable. See Ciraolo, supra; Commonwealth v. Mamacos, 409 Mass. 635, 638 (1991); Commonwealth v. Panetti, 406 Mass. 230, 231 (1989). The defendant bears the burden of establishing both elements. Mamacos, supra. In examining the expectation of privacy question under art. 14, we do not necessarily reach the same result as under Fourth Amendment analysis. Commonwealth v. Panetti, supra at 234.
Conceding for present purposes that the defendant may have had a subjective expectation of privacy in the space above the hallway ceiling, we conclude that that expectation was not reasonable. In evaluating the reasonableness of an individual’s expectation of privacy, we look to a number of factors, including the character of the location involved.
Commonwealth
v.
Pina,
406 Mass. 540, 545 (1990). Thus,
3. Denial of the motion to sever. The defendant next contends that the judge erred in denying his motion to sever the trials of the distribution and trafficking indictments. He argues that the distribution charge (stemming from the February 6, 1988, undercover purchase) and the trafficking charge (stemming from the subsequent surveillance and the evidence seized in the June 3, 1988, search) were unrelated, and that he was unfairly prejudiced by the joinder. We disagree.
Joinder is governed by
The determination whether joinder is appropriate is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. See Commonwealth v. Todd, 394 Mass. 791, 794 (1985); Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 (1982). This court has stated that joinder is appropriate where the offenses “constitute a single line of conduct, grow out of essentially one transaction, and would be proved by substantially the same evidence.” Commonwealth v. Gallison, 383 Mass. 659, 671 (1981). Severance is required, however, where these criteria are not satisfied and the defendant would be prejudiced by the cumulative evidence of different offenses. Id. Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that joinder was proper.
Further, the defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating prejudice requiring severance. See Gallison, supra. This burden is not satisfied by a showing merely that the defendant’s chances for acquittal would have been better had the two indictments been tried separately. Id. at 672. Rather, the defendant must establish that “the prejudice resulting from a joint trial is so compelling that it prevents [the] defendant from obtaining a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 (1982). In this case, however, there was substantial evidence to support both charges, and no indication that the jury inappropriately applied evidence of one charge toward the other. It is also relevant that the judge instructed the jury to consider the two indictments separately. There is no indication in the record that this instruction was inadequate to offset any possible prejudice from the joinder. See Gallison, supra at 671.
There was no abuse of discretion in the judge’s denial of the motion to sever.
4.
Denial of the motion for required finding of not guilty.
At the close of the Commonwealth’s evidence, the defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty on the trafficking
The standard of review on the denial of a motion for a required finding of not guilty is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (emphasis in original). Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). See Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 408 Mass. 533, 545-546 (1990). In this case, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to justify sending the indictment to the jury under this standard.
In order to convict the defendant on the charge of trafficking in cocaine, the Commonwealth was required to prove that the defendant knowingly or intentionally possessed twenty-eight or more (but less than 100) grams of cocaine with the intent to distribute the drug. See
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
The second offense element of the distribution charge was based on the fact that the defendant had pleaded guilty to the charge of possession of cocaine in 1987. See
A police officer testified that the bag contained 29.51 grams of 86-91 % pure cocaine.
The Commonwealth does not contest the timeliness of the defendant’s remaining claims.
Under Cronk, supra, quoting United States v. Cook, 670 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 456 U.S. 982 (1982), a motion for reconsideration must be brought within a “reasonable time,” which, in criminal matters, is construed as the period allocated for noticing an appeal. Rule 4 (b) requires that such appeals be filed within thirty days.
This case does not present the situation in which a motion for reconsideration timely filed may stop the appeal period from running until the motion is denied. See Commonwealth v. Powers, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 570, 573 (1986), quoting United States v. Dieter, 429 U.S. 6, 8 (1976).
We are precluded from resolving these claims more definitively under
The defendant bases his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on both the State and Federal Constitutions. We have stated that, if the Saferian test is met, then the requirements of the Federal Constitution are necessarily satisfied as well. See Commonwealth v. Haggerty, 400 Mass. 437, 438 n.2 (1987); Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 Mass. 251, 256 n.3 (1985). Therefore, we analyze the defendant’s claims under the Saferian standard only.
The defendant also argues that the prosecutor’s failure to produce the warrant application in response to a discovery request violated his right to a fair trial under the Federal and State Constitutions. Ordinarily the prosecution is required to disclose exculpatory, material evidence to the defense.
Commonwealth
v. Gregory, 401 Mass. 437, 441 (1988). Assuming arguendo that the warrant papers contained exculpatory evidence, see
id.
at 442, the question then becomes whether that evidence was “material.”
Commonwealth
v.
Wilson,
381 Mass. 90, 107 (1980). The definition of “material” varies with the specificity of the defendant’s discovery request. In this case, the defendant requested that the Commonwealth provide “any facts of an exculpatory nature within the possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor,” pursuant to the mandatory discovery requirement of
We express no opinion as to the legality of the police officer’s “seizure” of the suitcase or the likelihood of success on a motion to suppress it.
The judge accepted the motion on both the distribution and trafficking charges. On appeal, however, the defendant offers no argument that the evidence on the distribution charge was insufficient to submit to the jury. Therefore that argument is waived. Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as amended, 367 Mass. 919 (1975). Commonwealth v. Bongarzone, 390 Mass. 326, 348 (1983).