Commonwealth v. MetzgerCommonwealth v. Metzger
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Voort
Appellant was convicted of violation of the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64,
Briefly, the facts are that appellant was present in a house trailer on March 1,1975 when an undercover narcotics agent employed by the Pennsylvania State Police and appel
The only issue presented is whether or not appellant’s actions on March 1, 1975 amounted to a violation of the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act,
(a) The following acts and the causing thereof within the Commonwealth are hereby prohibited: (30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered under this act, or apractitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.
Section 780-102 defines “Deliver” or “Delivery” as:
. the actual, constructive or attempted transfer from one person to another of a controlled substance, other drug, device or cosmetic whether or not there is an agency relationship.
The appellant desires the court to read into these sections the elements of a “sale”. In other words, if the defendant does not profit from his delivery, then he cannot be guilty of the crime. However, this position is untenable. The present Act, April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, No. 64, specifically repealed the Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act of Sept. 26, 1961, P.L. 1664, 35 P.S. 780-1 et seq., wherein the word “sale” was part of the definition of the crime. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, P.L. 1664,
With respect to the sufficiency of the evidence, the court in the case of
Commonwealth v. Fortune,
456 Pa. 365, on page 367, 318 A.2d 327, on page 328 (1974) stated the general rule: “In determining whether the evidence is sufficient in law to prove that a defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime or crimes charged, we must,
Affirmed.
Notes
. Appellant was also found guilty of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance (
. Appellant’s brother was not a co-defendant in this case. Appellant’s co-defendant was acquitted of the charges of criminal conspiracy and delivery of a controlled substance. His acquittal of conspiracy was the reason appellant’s Motion for Arrest of Judgment was granted. See lower court opinion, page 2. There appeared to be some confusion on the part of the agent regarding the identity of the person he actually purchased the drugs from on March 1, 1975, and this uncertainty may have resulted in the co-defendant’s acquittal.