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Commonwealth v. McSorley
485 A.2d 15
Pa.
1985
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*2 Before CAVANAUGH, McEWEN and CIRILLO, JJ. OPINION ANNOUNCING THE JUDGMENT OF THE COURT:1

This appeal is an from the lower court’s denial of a motion to dismiss the charges grounds jeopar- double A dy. pre-trial order denying motion to dismiss on grounds of final, appealable order. Buechele, Commonwealth v. 298 Pa.Super. 418, 444 A.2d *3 This presents case a difficult question that arises out of an unusual fact pattern. Appellant, John Jr., J. McSorley, was arrested on 14, November 1981 and charged with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.2 After arraignment 14, on December 1981 McSor- ley received a letter 18, dated January 1982 from Dr. Vincent F. Miraglia.3 Miraglia Dr. was the Director of the Main Line Council on Alcoholism. The Council operated a safe driver clinic for Montgomery The County. letter di- opinion 1. The "Opinion Announcing entitled Judgment of the Court" majority because not panel agrees while a judgment, with majority does join opinion. in the Pennsylvania 2. § 3731 of Appellant closely. Motor Vehicle charged Code. was also with violating 3310(a) following § too Code— parts provided: Relevant of the letter McSorley: Dear Mr. by Montgomery County Attorney’s are directed District Office to attend You Driving the Safe Clinic. report Montgomery County following You are to to the Court House on the dates and time for classes and interview. 1, Monday, February p.m. p.m. at 1982 at 7:30 8:00 Interview/Class 8, Monday, February p.m. 1982 at 8:00 15, February Monday, p.m. 1982 8:00 22, Monday, February p.m. 1982at 8:00 classes; required pay $50.00 You are a fee of for the interview and four make money payable check or order to the Main Line Council on Alcoholism. rected appellant that he was required to attend the driving school. The testified interpreted that he letter as him directing to report for the Montgomery Coun- ty Accelerated Disposition (herein- Rehabilitative Program after, “ARD”). In addition to the wording, 2, see infra note the letter came under the letterhead of the District Attor- ney’s (driving ARD/DUI influence) under Division. The letter also stated that McSorley required to pay a Fifty ($50.00) Dollar fee for the program.

Appellant then received a letter dated January Iacovitti, from Joseph M. Chief of the ARD Division of the Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office. This letter gave general description of the ARD alterna- tive. The letter instructed McSorley complete an en- questionnaire closed to determine his eligibility and to re- (10) turn it within ten days in order to be considered for the It is not clear from the record exactly when However, received this letter. appellant complet- ed questionnaire and hand delivered it on February 1982—the same evening appeared he for his first session of the safe driving clinic.

Thereafter, appellant attended the remainder of the classes of the safe clinic. 22, 1982, On February session, after the last McSorley received a certificate signed Dr. by Miraglia stating that he had successfully completed

the requirements of the clinic. Appellant next received a letter dated February 1982 from Mr. Iacovitti. This correspondence stated that McSorley was ineligible *4 ARD because of prior in Philadelphia two arrests County. The case was then scheduled for trial.

The record demonstrates appellant that attended the safe driving believing clinic in he was ARD. He felt that suc- cessful completion of the clinic would result dismissal of the charges against him. Before appellant’s each of four sessions at the county courthouse he jotted down “ARD” on the visitors’ log under “Nature of Business.” McSorley acting was under his own understanding of the situation since he did not consult a lawyer during any aspect of the

526 25 letter receiving February until after proceedings program. him for the rejecting dismiss, Mr. on this motion to hearing appellant’s At the district attor- that testimony demonstrated Iacovitti’s McSorley intended to recommend office never ney’s directing McSor- Nevertheless, 18 letter January ARD. Miraglia after Dr. only sent at the classes was appear to ley attorney’s office from the district notification received into the This was accepted program. had been McSorley the clinic informing method of usual administrative indication why There was no ARD participants. about office. There- attorney’s the district sent from notice was error. it an administrative fore, assume was we dollar fifty his of a payment contends that Appellant driving program safe was attendance at the ($50.00) fee and liberty. of his deprivation freedom and on his a restriction deprivation maintains appellant Accordingly, pur- jeopardy for double an order of sentence amounts to necessary Therefore, of the case would be dismissal poses. multiple punishment. from protect attendance appellant’s maintains that The Commonwealth part. on his voluntary act driving program at the safe to enter not “direct” did The Commonwealth is without clinic the Commonwealth because safe to enter the defendant any to direct power punishment Therefore, subjected was never did not attach. and jeopardy a conviction flowing from jeopardy protects against The prohibition prose for successive punishments multiple from States, v. United Abney same offense. cutions for the (1977). Jeopardy 52 L.Ed.2d 651 651, 97 S.Ct. U.S. v. and sworn. Crist empaneled jury attaches when In a L.Ed.2d Bretz, 98 S.Ct. U.S. begun the court has trial, attaches when non-jury Klobuchir, 486 Pa. hear evidence. States, 420 U.S. v. United (1979); 241, 405 A.2d 881 Serfass

527 377, 1055, (1975)(with 95 S.Ct. 43 L.Ed.2d 265 the swearing witness). of the first research,

After extensive it appears jeopardy- provisions yet have to be applied Pennsylvania’s diver- Indeed, sion program. our search has not revealed any case where a criminal defendant prosecuted after suc- cessfully completing ARD.

When a criminal defendant agrees to diversion the pro- ceedings are deferred reserving right with the state if prosecute any defendant violates of the conditions the program. Pa.R.Crim.P. 184. Where the defendant successfully meets the program, conditions of the charges against the defendant will be dismissed and he is usually entitled to have his arrest expunged. record Pa.R. 185; Crim.P. 506, Armstrong, 495 Pa. (1981). 434 A.2d 1205

Nevertheless, the give pic caselaw does not a clear ture of how effects the status of a criminal defendant. In McDevitt, 589, Commonwealth v. Pa.Commw.Ct. (1981), A.2d 280 the court held that by accepting ARD a defendant knowingly right prove waives his his innocence or risk conviction by entering plea. The court also held that admission into ARD is an offense for purposes of classifying the defendant an offender though habitual even formal convictions cannot be obtained under 591, Id. at hand, 427 A.2d at 282. On the other the fact of a witness’ admission into ARD is not a “conviction” for impeachment purposes. Krall, 290 Commonwealth v. Pa. Super. 434 A.2d 99 Knepp, Commonwealth v. 307 Pa.Super. (1982), 453 A.2d 1016 this Court went as far to say admission into equivalent ARD is not to a conviction any “under charges circumstances” since are deferred.4 Additionally, lower court has held that suc cessful of ARD completion is not to a equivalent finding was a “conviction” for habitual offender or Ct. Interestingly, 453 A.2d at 1018. Knepp court did cite McDevitt, purposes. Knepp, supra, supra, as holding Pa.Superi that ARD *6 McKellin, v. 9 D. & C.3d

innocence. ruled that the lower court background, this Against had not in and put prior jeopardy had not been McSorley ARD or other criminal any from any punishment suffered any not valid Also, the court held that there was penalty. into the accepted had been McSorley that evidence appellant’s double appear it would glance, At first yet had not jeopardy fail claim should because jeopardy sister state of However, find the law of our we attached. Urvan, 446 N.E.2d State helpful. to most Ohio5 be a (1982), the court faced with 1161, 4 was App.3d Ohio case, defendant In that claim. similar double under an allied offense County, in Medina Ohio charged The defendant was receiving property. stolen statute6 with the diversion successfully completed for recommended and result, receiving As a County. in Medina program later, defendant was dismissed. One week charge was to the grand relating for theft County in Cuyahoga indicted charge.7 The County as the Medina same events charge grounds Cuyahoga to dismiss the filed a motion jeopardy. out that pointed The court with their war processes of diversion

Any view (when suc- of them conception must include a purposes or pro- of served equivalent as the cessfully completed) of the crime---- consequent expiation time with the bated sense and Moreover, logical is to make program if the election to treatment, the state’s at all in fair traffic right forecloses its property crime of stolen pursue charge through grand of the theft pursuit undertake 2935.36, Pennsylvania's. virtually program, R.C. identical 5. Ohio’s diversion seq. et Pa.R.Crim.P. import.” An allied offenses of "similar The statute refers to 6. R.C. 2941.25. both, only may may one. be convicted and sentenced be tried for but accused Urvan, pursue. supra, 446 prosecutor offense to has the choice of which The at 1166. N.E.2d sequence, county Medina the entire but could have had venue over 7. Either County acted first. agent second (Cuyahoga County). must Jeopardy attach (Medina as a result the activity of the first County).” Id. N.E.2d at

The interpreted court process diversion in terms of a relationship contractual between the state and the defend- ant. Id. at 1167. as in Commonwealth, partic- Just ipate program diversion a defendant must any waive statute of limitations and any constitutional or statutory rights. speedy trial Pa.R.Crim.P. 178. The defendant agrees to whatever conditions the state establishes with the expectation charges will be when dismissed he *7 meets those conditions.

As the points pre-trial Urvan court out “if diversion programs effective, are to be the state up must live to its obligations.” True, Id at 1167. diversion programs give district attorney discretion over which cases proposed are for ARD. Boerner, Pa.Super. 168, Commonwealth v. 268 (1979). However, A.2d 407 883 the decision to divert a prosecutor “comes after the has fully discharged all discretionary prosecutorial functions and after the die has been State, cast.” Dearborne v. 575 S.W.2d 263 In (Tenn.1980). placing a a pro defendant into diversion gram, the state covenants dismiss the once charges the defendant satisfies the conditions of program. the Unless the defendant one conditions, violates of those the state prosecute cannot him. Just as the of plea bargain terms ing state, arrangement binding are on the Landi, 280 Pa.Super. 421 442 (1980), A.2d so must the terms of a agreement diversion the To bind state. hold otherwise, would create disincentive for defendants to programs. enter diversion “For the state to be allowed to bring prosecution ... a second ... after all the terms of the met, diversion contract have been the spirit violates and the letter of constitutional double the jeopardy policy spirit and of in legislative policy id., the the Urvan, state.” N.E.2d at 1168. hand, to the applying principles these case we in participating

first must determine was whether procedures clear that the the ARD It is outlined seq., et were not Neverthe in Pa.R.Crim.P. followed. in less, justified relying January the appellant was A circum person reasonable faced with same letter.8 Dr. differently. Miraglia’s acted stances would have pursuant Montgom was sent to authorization letter Office. As the Urvan court County Attorney’s District ery its noted, obligations by pretending cannot state avoid Urvan, id, at 1167. What disparately. it acts that in it County “knew and did Medina ... knew Ohio State County in and was legal contemplation Cuyahoga in bound applicable federal and state constitutional places by in both or inadvert acts by design the state principles. Whether (Footnote omitted.) (Emphasis ence makes difference.” no added.) find Id. reasoning applicable at 1167. this We the “inadvertence” occurred within the case where Montgomery County. Office of What Attorney’s District right and its attorney’s district office knew did with could reason (sending the notification hand his into evidencing acceptance interpreted have as ably claiming left ARD), (by it take with its hand away cannot A reading reasonable ineligible). both January might and 25 letters well have January *8 completion a successful appellant indicated to that charges against result in of the would a dismissal program in detrimentally relied on this reasonable Appellant him. circumstances, that appel we hold Under terpretation. into ARD. implicitly accepted lant was prosecut- restrained from Although the Commonwealth is time, proceed- dismiss the at this we cannot ing appellant completed the appellant. Appellant has ings against an ordinarily only phase clinic one safe which to a given that be defendant under agreement ARD would course, attorney the letter to an familiar with Of if had shown 8. However, procedures have been avoided. defendants this confusion would just they so as can counsel for minor offenses should not be forced retain Instead, county bureaucracy. their counties should structure understand the disadvantaged. correspondence lay people will be procedures so not and

531 Therefore, similar charges. we enter an order staying the against proceedings appellant and remanding di- with rections to divert into ARD impose and whatever remaining conditions as would be on imposed a defendant under similar circumstances. Jurisdiction relinquished.

CIRILLO, concurring opinion. J. files McEWEN, dissenting J. opinion. files CIRILLO, Judge, concurring:

I troubled casual majority’s seemingly am reliance as jeopardy grounds double clause jeopardy may reversal. While clause invoked be contexts, in principal protect various its is to design criminal defendants from trials multiple multiple punishments and Wilson, United States v. for the offense. same 420 U.S. 1013, (1975); 95 43 L.Ed.2d 232 Commonwealth S.Ct. Walker, v. 468 Pa. 362 A.2d 227 there is Where no prosecutions pun threat of either successive or multiple ishments, clause is not offended. Com the double Yost, v. (1982); monwealth Pa.Super. 305 451 549 A.2d Beckman, v. Pa.Super. 239, 304 450 A.2d Hecht, United (1982); (3rd States F.2d Cir.Pa.1981). engender does my view case not double jeopardy concerns.

A criminal has a “constitutional in interest finality, cognizable in seeing pro- interest that criminal ceedings him against are resolved once and for Wes- all.” Drubel, ten and “Toward a Theory General of Double Jeopardy,” Sup.Ct.Rev. however, Here has no right expect problems his with the Common- wealth have been His resolved. constitutional interest yet not finality has vested. defendant, convicted, may once

Certainly, criminal retried for the same that he will be rest confident *9 however, in ARD is not program, A an participant offense. to confidence. entitled the same Admission to an ARD any equivalent is not to conviction under circum program Pa.Super. stances. Knepp, Commonwealth v. (1982). Rather, A.2d 1016 in a participation pro diversion gram results in a deferral of criminal until charges comple program. tion of the Pa.R.Crim.P. 181. In the event the are program successfully completed, charges the is and no conviction ever results. dismissed Commonwealth the supra. Only program completed v. when Knepp, ARD feel in final of may participant disposition an secure charges, Only then hemay before. shield himself with protection the of the double clause. of case, only phase one appellant completed

In has appel- The Commonwealth removed program. his diversion remaining of appellant while had conditions lant from ARD I should appellant While think yet complete. diversion ARD, not by it is given opportunity complete the be jeopardy. reason of double as the com

Rather, concept I the contract view under District Miraglia’s letter written Dr. pelling analogy. to attend safe letterhead, directs which Attorney an offer of the school, extends driving enroll offer accepted alternative. When clinic, arrangement or agreement an ing in the safe notes: majority into. As was entered the state a diversion program, defendant into placing a once charges dismiss the covenants to the de Unless conditions of satisfies the conditions, cannot one of those state fendant violates plea bargain of a him. as the terms prosecute Just state, binding on the Commonwealth are arrangement (1980), so must 134, 421 A.2d 442 Landi, Pa.Super. (Ma bind state. agreement terms of diversion 19). op. p. jority diversion, other for reasons from removing appellant

By diversion, the conditions comply with failure than a agreement. its has breached *10 Accordingly, I concur in the result reached the majori- ty, appellant should be allowed complete ARD. This disposition is proper, because the Commonwealth’s re- prosecution from ARD is or moval of a double rather, punishment, plainly but it breach agreement.

McEWEN, Judge, dissenting:

Since, unlike I my colleagues, do not perceive such reflec- tions of equity or of contract of protection law or against double jeopardy that would serve bar prosecution of appellant by Commonwealth, I most respectfully dis- sent.

Appellant was arrested on November at the scene of a motor vehicle accident after he failed a field sobriety registered test and breathlyzer. on a As 0.22% result, charged he was with violation of Section 3731 of the Code, 3731, Driving Vehicle 75 Pa.C.S. Under the Influ- § ence of Alcohol. Soon after his preliminary hearing in January, following received the letter: *11 following received thereafter days a few Appellant he was offense with which concerning the letter further charged:

Appellant questionnaire completed enclosed with this letter of 25 and January returned it to the personally Office of the District Attorney February 1, 1982, just hours prior to the first of attending the four safe classes he would eventually attend.

Appellant was thereafter notified by letter on February 25, 1982, that his application for the ARD program had been denied due to prior two convictions in Philadelphia. *12 Appellant entered a guilty not plea 2, 1982, March and then retained counsel for institution of the proceedings at issue.

The finds that opinion principles lead of double jeopardy prosecution. had, however, preclude Jeopardy view, in my never attached. The concurring opinion finds princi- ples of contract law and preclude fairness prosecution but I am unable to agree. appellant attended four

While two and one-half hour driving classes, $50.00, clinic for he charged which was he had been made he aware attended even the first before class, the of by January letter from the District Attor- ney, that he had not been admitted to ARD program complete since it was necessary procedures, first two specifically, appellant complete had an for application program inclusion and the had to Attorney District eligible for the program. was determine whether made that if filed application, The letter clear final carefully then be and a matter reviewed will “[t]he made, of will notified.” you determination which be applica- his after submitted Twenty-five days tion, of his ineligibility he was notified a occasioned as result of confusion hardship The only 18, 1982, January appellant’s letter attend- the initial of payment of ance four classes and safe principles certain circumstances fee. While under $50.00 the facts of might preclude prosecution, operate fairness I, there- such conclusion. compel the instant case do fore, dissent.

485 A.2d Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH HOBURN, Appellant. J. Thomas Pennsylvania. Superior Court of March Submitted 1984.

Filed Nov.

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. McSorley
Court Name: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Mar 26, 1985
Citation: 485 A.2d 15
Docket Number: 1557
Court Abbreviation: Pa.
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