Commonwealth v. McNeelyCommonwealth v. McNeely
Lead Opinion
The instant appeal follows the judgment of sentence in which Appellant received six to fifteen years imprisonment for Rape, Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse, Incest, Statutory Rape and related offenses.
Appellant requests this court to grant him appellate relief in the form of a new trial. Appellant attempts to substantiate this claim by advancing three counts of error allegedly committed by the trial court. They are:
1. the trial court erred in allowing a clinical social worker to testify as an expert witness as to factors in assessing the credibility of victims, and in regard to the effects of intrafamilial sexual relations on victims;
2. the trial court erred in denying defense counsel the opportunity to question a Children and Youth Service worker concerning the identity of the person who reported the abuse; and,
3. the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for a mistrial when a witness made reference to Appellant’s prior incarceration.
Initially, Appellant challenges the expert testimony of Maddi-Jane Sobel which concerned the dynamics of intrafamily sеxual abuse and behavorial patterns of the victims.
We begin with our appellate scope of rеview. It is axiomatic that the admission or exclusion of expert testimo
After entertaining arguments by the attorneys for Appellant and the Commonwealth, the trial court permitted Ms. Sobel to testify. This decision was grounded on the trial judge’s interpretation of Commonwealth v. Baldwin,
Expert testimony is relevant if it tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable and doеs not confuse, mislead, or prejudice the jury. Gallagher, supra, at
The record indicates that the trial court afforded Baldwin an overly broad reading in applying its holding to the case at bar. In overruling defense counsel’s оbjection to Ms. Sobel's testimony, the trial court held that such testimony was sanctioned under Baldwin simply because of its general informational value. (N.T., 4/22/86, 130-131).
In Baldwin, the proferred testimony by the social worker was found to be relevant to a material fact at issue since the jury could infer that certain gaps and inconsistencies in the victim’s testimony stemmed from the psychological dynamics of incest rather than from fabrication or fantasy. Baldwin, at
Most recently, in Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 364 Pa.Super 477,
We find it necessary to distinguish Rodgers from the case sub judice. In Rodgers, the proffered testimony concerned the physical manifestations of the battered child, including the nature and extent of injuries as observed and classified. Such testimony was offered to challenge the appellant’s “claim that the child ‘bruised easily’, ‘would throw a fit’, and that some of the bruises were caused by the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation on the child.” Id. at
The aforementioned cases are consistent on one point: the expert testimony sought to be introduced was found to
In the instant case, it cannot be said that the relevance оf Ms. Sobel’s statements was established either before or during her testimony. When offered as an expert witness, the prosecutor did not demonstrate how Ms. Sobers testimony was relevant to a central issue at trial.
This particular use of expert testimony concerning intrafamily sexual abuse was not envisioned by our holding in Baldmn. It is beyond cavil to suggеst that testimony of this nature is automatically relevant, and therefore admissible, in every child sexual abuse case. Rather, we emphasize that expert testimony discussing the general dynamics of child sexual abuse must be offеred to further its propo
Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. The dissent would hold that Appellant has waived this first issue insofar as it was not raised with the specificity required in
. We note that there is a major distinction between the “battered child syndrome” and the "behavorial patterns of child sexual abuse victims”. Testimony relating to the “battered child syndrome” concerns the physical manifestations of the abuse. By comparison, testimony with respect to the “behavorial patterns of child sexual abuse victims” deals with the psychological dynamics of child sexual abuse and the behavorial traits of its victims.
. By its appellate briеf, the Commonwealth now argues that “Ms. Sobel’s testimony was proper and served to aid the finder of fact with understanding sexual abuse.” (Appellee’s Brief, 5). However, the record does not support the contention that the jury’s understanding of sexual abuse was a central issue at trial. Thus, the purely informational value of the witness’ testimony cannot alone establish its relevance.
. Because of the decision we reach today on Apрellant's first issue, we need not address the remaining two arguments.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that a new trial is warranted in this case.
First, I find appellant’s claim concerning the admissibility of the Commonwealth’s expert to have bеen waived. Appellant’s post trial motion, in raising this issue, states only that “the trial judge failed to sustain the defendant’s objection to all the testimony of the Commonwealth’s witness Maddie-Jane Sobel.”
Next, the majority has relied upon the relevance, or its absence, of the proposed testimony as justification for reversal. At no time has appellant advanced this theory, arguing rather that the testimony preempts the jury’s function as the assessor of a witness’ credibility.
Accordingly, I would affirm.