Commonwealth v. McGeeCommonwealth v. McGee
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Saylor
OPINION
We allowed appeal to consider whether constitutional double jeopardy principles barred a prisoner’s criminal prosecution predicated upon misconduct for which he previously had been subjected to disciplinary confinement.
On September 25,1996, prison officials conducted an аdministrative search of the person of Appellant Ferman McGee (“McGee”), an inmate at the State Correctional Institution at Rockview, during which they discovered an eyeglass stem, the tip of which could be removed to reveal a sharp wire. Pursuant to prison regulations, corrections authorities initiatеd administrative misconduct proceedings, charging McGee with infractions related to possession of a weapon and tampering with property. Following a hearing, a prison hearing examiner adjudged McGee guilty of the possession offense and imposed a disciplinary sanction of sixty days of “disciplinary custody consecutive,” which entails, among other things, segregation from the general prison population in a restricted housing unit, as well as restrictions upon visitation and access to televisions, radios and telephones. McGee’s subsequent administrative appeal was denied.
On December 6, 1996, the Pennsylvania Stаte Police charged McGee with possession of a weapon or implement of escape under Section 5122(a)(2) of the Crimes Code,
On appeal, thе Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence in a memorandum opinion. By reference to United States Supreme Court decisions articulating a framework for evaluating whether non-prison-related civil and administrative penalties equate with criminal sentences for double jeopardy purposes, as wеll as its own prior decisions specific to the prison disciplinary context, see Commonwealth v. Bryant, 346 Pa.Super. 475, 499 A.2d 1099 (1985); Commonwealth v. Brooks, 330 Pa.Super. 355, 479 A.2d 589 (1984), the Superior Court concluded that the sanction imposed on McGee was not in the nature of criminal punishment and thus did not preclude his subsequent prosecution. We granted allocatur to address the double jeopardy question in the prison disciplinary context.
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that no “person [shall] be subject for the same offense to be twice in jeopardy of life or limb____”
Focusing upon the facet of double jeopardy jurisprudence protecting against multiple punishments, McGee maintains that, having been previously subjected to disciplinary sanction, he cannot be made to suffer again for the same conduct through formаl criminal proceedings. Although McGee acknowledges that his position contradicts the Superior Court’s long-standing precedent, he argues that such decisions are no longer valid in light of the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994). The Commonwealth and amicus curiae, the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and the Pennsylvania Prison Wardens Assоciation, distinguish disciplinary sanctions from criminal punishment, emphasizing the civil, administrative nature of misconduct proceedings, as well as their essential role in the safe, orderly and effective management of correctional facilities.
The United States Supreme Court has made clear that not all forms of gоvernmental sanctions or punishments implicate double jeopardy concerns; rather, it has determined that the Double Jeopardy Clause “protects only against the imposition of multiple
criminal
punishments for the same offense” occurring in successive proceedings.
Hudson v. United States,
522 U.S. 93, 99, 118 S.Ct. 488, 493, 139 L.Ed.2d 450 (1997)(empha-sis in original). Culminating with
Hudson,
the Court has issued a series of decisions outside the prison disciplinary setting establishing a framework for distinguishing such criminal punishments from civil or administrative sanctions, which, although capable of being described in common parlance as punishment, do not foreclose subsequent prosecutions. The construct entails evaluation of two primary criteria: 1) legislаtive intent, and, in particular, whether the legislative body intended the particular sanction to be civil or criminal in character,
see Hudson,
522 U.S. at 99, 118 S.Ct. at 493 (stating that “[wjhether a particular punishment is criminal or civil is, at least initially, a matter of statutory construction”);
Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the applicability of double jeopardy principles to the prison misconduct setting, a multitude of federal and state courts have universally recognized that administrative discipline imposed by corrections authorities for infractions of prison regulations does not generally bar subsequent criminal prosecutions. 4 With respect to the initial determination of legislative purpose pursuant to Hudson, all jurisdictions have found, expressly or impliedly, that such proceedings are intended to be of a civil/administrative nature. See, e.g., Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1223; Vasquez, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870, 678 N.E.2d at 488 (collecting cases). Where the legislative body has not specifically expressed suсh an intent, courts often infer it from the vesting of disciplinary authority in an administrative body, as well as the administrative structure and scope of systems for imposing discipline. See Hudson, 522 U.S. at 103, 118 S.Ct. at 495 (“[t]hat such authority was conferred upon administrative agencies is prima facie evidence that Congress intended to provide for a civil sanction”); see also Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1223.
In examining the second primary
Hudson
criterion (the purpose and effect of the statutory scheme), courts have characterized the objective of prison discipline as non-criminal and remedial in nature, emphasizing its central role in the maintenance of safety, discipline and order in the prison setting.
See Newby,
11 F.3d at 1145-46 (describing the government’s remedial goal as “to encourage good conduct and to maintain order in the prison, given that the prison is a place where good order
Courts have also factored into the analysis the importance of affording some flexibility and deference to corrections authorities in establishing the terms of discipline, see, e.g., Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1224; Newby, 11 F.3d at 1146; Garrity, 41 F.3d at 1153; Vasquez, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870, 678 N.E.2d at 488; Forte, 671 N.E.2d at 1220, and have expressed the view that double jeopardy should not be imposed in a manner that would inhibit safe, orderly management. See Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1224; Newby, 11 F.3d at 1146; Brooks, 330 Pa.Super. at 365, 479 A.2d at 594-95. Additionally, they have frequently couched their analyses in terms of other, practical considerations unique to the prison environment and setting. See Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717, 722 (7th Cir.1996) (stating that “ ‘disciplinary proceedings take place in a highly charged atmosphere [where prison officials] must often act swiftly on the basis of evidence that might be insufficient in less exigent circumstances’” (citation omitted)); Brown, 59 F.3d at 104 (“as a practical matter applying the prohibition against double jeopardy to prison disciplinary proceedings would effectively compel the government to сhoose between remedial and punitive goals”); Russo, 737 A.2d at 187 (“[pjrisons are dangerous places, and the courts must afford appropriate deference and flexibility to administrators trying to manage this volatile environment”); see also Vasquez, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870, 678 N.E.2d at 488. Finally, specific application of the “guidepost” factors identified in Hudson is not always viewed as necessary or appropriate to the prison disciplinary context. See Mayes, 158 F.3d at 1224; Jones, 234 Ill.Dec. 894, 703 N.E.2d at 996-97.
Having considered the reasoning employed by our Superior Court as well as in other jurisdictions, we now join in the collective assessment. Applying the first primary
Hudson
criterion, it is clear from the structure and function of the administrative scheme for prison discipline that the Pennsylvania General Assembly intended it to be civil and administrative in nature. The legislative delegation of authority to administer, manage and supervise
Thus, we hold that where, as here, prison disciplinary action is imposed for infractions of prison regulations within the confínes of the authorized administrative scheme, and such discipline falls within the range of predictable punishment under the original sentence and can be justified on the basis of safe, orderly or efficient institutional administration, it does not implicate the constitutional proscription against subse quent criminal prosecution based upon double jeopardy. 7
Accordingly, the order of the Superior Court is affirmed.
Notes
. McGee was initially charged with this offense on October 6, 1996; however, those charges were dismissed without prejudice following a preliminary hearing on November 27, 1996. The basis for such dismissal is not apparent from the record presented.
. McGee’s arguments before (his Court are premised exclusively upon the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution. Nevertheless, this Court has recognized that the сorresponding proscription contained in the Pennsylvania Constitution,
. Those factors are as follows:
(1) “[wjhether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint”; (2) “whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment”; (3) “whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter (4) “whеther its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence”; (5) “whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime”; (6) “whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it”; and (7) “whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned.”
Hudson, 522 U.S. at 99-100, 118 S.Ct. at 493 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Mardnez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963)).
. While many of these decisions precede Hudson and therefore apply constructs containing some marginal variances, see, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 87 F.3d 676 (5 th Cir.1996); United States v. Galan, 82 F.3d 639 (5 th Cir.1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 867, 117 S.Ct. 179, 136 L.Ed.2d 119 (1996); United States v. Brown, 59 F.3d 102 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d 802 (2d Cir.1995); Garrity v. Fiedler, 41 F.3d 1150 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1044, 115 S.Ct. 1420, 131 L.Ed.2d 303 (1995); Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347 (10 th Cir.1994); United States v. Newby, 11 F.3d 1143 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1087, 114 S.Ct. 1841, 128 L.Ed.2d 468 (1994); People v. Vasquez, 89 N.Y.2d 521, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870, 678 N.E.2d 482, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 846, 118 S.Ct. 131, 139 L.Ed.2d 80 (1997); Commonwealth v. Forte, 423 Mass. 672, 671 N.E.2d 1218 (1996); State v. Harlin, 260 Kan. 881, 925 P.2d 1149 (1996); State v. O’Connor, 681 A.2d 475 (Me. 1996), others post-date Hudson and have either applied its analysis squarely or wholly reconciled it with reasoning unique to prison disciplinary sanctions. See United States v. Mayes, 158 F.3d 1215 (11 th Cir.1998), cert. denied sub nom., 525 U.S. 1185, 119 S.Ct. 1130, 143 L.Ed.2d 123 (1999); Russo v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections, 324 N.J.Super. 576, 737 A.2d 183 (1999); People v. Jones, 301 Ill. App.3d 608, 234 Ill.Dec. 894, 703 N.E.2d 994 (1998).
. We find particularly apt the following elaboration by the New York Cоurt of Appeals:
Prisoners, by virtue of their status (resulting from a prior violation of the Penal Law) are subject not only to criminal laws, aimed at vindicating societal interests, but also to a whole array of internal prison rules and regulations, which serve the separate, legitimate and important institutional purposes оf preserving prison order and safety. A prisoner who commits a crime in prison breaks both sets of rules, and may thus be sanctioned both internally to carry out the goals of the penal institution, and through criminal prosecution to vindicate public justice, so long as the disciplinary sanction does not stray so far beyond the bounds of the separate State interest in maintaining prison order and safety that the sanction can only be viewed as constituting criminal punishment.
Vasquez, 655 N.Y.S.2d 870, 678 N.E.2d at 486.
. McGee‘s argument that our disposition is controlled by the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 767, 114 S.Ct. at 1937, is premised solely upon the holding in that case that administrative sanctions implicate double jeopardy protections if they are criminal in nature. While the general legal proposition for which Kurth Ranch is cited is correct, as discussed above, McGee‘s argument fails on the basis of our holding that his administrative punishment was not in the nature of a criminal sanction.
. Cf. Hernandez-Fundora, 58 F.3d at 807 (stating that “subsequent prosecutions will be barred only in those exceedingly rare circumstances where the disciplinary sanction imposed is grossly disproportionate to the government’s interest in maintaining prison order and discipline”). There is no credible suggestion here that the sanction of restrictive confinement for sixty days imposed upon McGee for a weapons violation is grossly disproportionate either to his offense or to the remedial purposes of the system of prison discipline.