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Commonwealth v. McFarlin
587 A.2d 732
Pa. Super. Ct.
1991
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*1 A.2d 732 COMMONWEALTH MсFARLIN, Larry Appellant. Pennsylvania. Superior Court Argued 1990. Oct. March 1991.

Filed *2 Lancaster, Defender, Public Quinn, Chief J. Vincent appellant. *3 Com., Lancaster, for Chudzik, Dist. Atty., Asst.

Brian E. appellee. CAVANAUGH, CIRILLO, Judge, and President

Before OLSZEWSKI, McEWEN, DEL WIEAND, ROWLEY, TAMILIA, SOLE, JJ. BECK and OLSZEWSKI, Judge: ap- discretionary aspects challenging

This whether us to determine requires sentence pellant’s guaranteed violates Pa.C.S.A. § Constitution. 9 of the Article by 2119(f) and Rule statement appellant’s reviewed We have to the question as raise a substantial it does not find that Further, hold we imposed. sentence аppropriateness to upon regulation reasonable is a that § Pennsylvania Constitu- not violate the and so does appeal, of sentence. affirm judgment tion. We seventy- wrote Larry McFarlin period, Over a two-month ac Unfortunately, merchants. checks to various five closed; had been drawn the checks were upon count the checks. he wrote of this when was aware McFarlin pled McFarlin to guilty seventy-five counts of by theft and deception two counts of to сonspiracy commit theft deception.1 Following guilty plea to all counts and a pre-sentence investigation, McFarlin was to sentenced period of incarceration one and one-half to five years. McFarlin was also to sentenced consecutive and concurrent probation periods totaling seventeen years, him subjecting supervision up twenty-two years. McFarlin was fined and ordered to pay restitution the amount $500.00 $8,058.70. A to modify motion sentence was filed аnd dismissed; this timely appeal followed. 2119(f)

McFarlin’s appeal contains a Rule statement as asserting well as that we should challenge consider his discretionary aspects his sentence should we find that the statement not present does a substantial question appropriateness as to the of the sentence It is imposed. well settled that questions constitutional will ad- not be dressed unless absolutely necessary. Krenzelak v. Krenze- lak, (1983) (citation omitted). we will first Accordingly, sufficiency еxamine 2119(f) of McFarlin’s Rule statement.

McFarlin’s statement enumerates the numbers of counts to which he pled guilty categorizes those counts as twenty-two first-degree misdemeanors, forty-two second-de- gree misdemeanors third-degree and five misdemeanors. The statement also probation lists incarceration which McFarlin was sentenced. McFarlin claims the sen- tence imposed is not under the Code appropriate Sentencing *4 (42 seq.) Pa.C.S.A. as it is excessive. manifestly et § misdemeаnors; McFarlin notes that all of his crimes were his prior involving criminal record is one incident aggrava- threats; ted supervision assault terroristic and the total imposed greater is more than four times than the maximum sentence which could one imposed any single have been pled of the offenses to he McFarlin also guilty. which checking belonged 1. The account wife. had to McFarlin his co-conspirator. wife was McFarlin’s his of his product committed were the that the offenses assеrts brief, 12.) page (Appellant’s abuse. drug and alcohol 2119(f) state a Rule of whether The determination made on a must be raises a substantial ment Losch, 369 Pa.Su v. basis. Commonwealth case-by-case (1987) (citations 115, 119, n. 1 7, A.2d 192, 201, n. per. the discre inclined to examine omitted). This Court will the state sentence where appellant’s of an tionary aspects judge’s that the trial argument a ment “advances colorable specific provision a 1) inconsistent with actions were: fundamental norms Code, 2) to thе contrary or Sentencing (citations omit sentencing process.” Id. underlie the ted). argument a colorable has not advanced

McFarlin specific provision any violates imposed that the sentence fact, no mention of Code; in McFarlin makes Sentencing has McFarlin Nor Code. any specific provision norms under from the fundamental deviation specified any in 42 Pa.C.S.A. as outlined sentencing process lying that his crimes were 9721(b).2 arguments McFarlin’s § insignifi minor, criminal record prior that his rеlatively crimes, his without cant, his induced dependency and that more, question. a do not raise substantial (1989) 16-17, 919, 924 Hall, 6, 554 A.2d denied, (1990). According alloc. 2119(f) state McFarlin’s Rule determined that ly, having 9781(b), the consti we examine is insufficient under ment § of that section. tutionality challenge to the any principles apply

Certain An of the General Assem of a act constitutionality statute. constitutionality; a strong presumption bly carries heavy presumption bears seeking to rebut party v. Common Party Consumer persuasiоn. burden (1986) 323, 331-32 wealth, 158, 175-76, 507 A.2d Pa. sentencing guidelines promulgated judge 2. The trial considered (Trial opinion imposing sentence. pursuant before 9.) makes no mention McFarlin’s statement N.T. at at 11/2/89 sentencing guidelines. *5 also, (citations omitted). See 1922(3). Pa.C.S.A. “Leg- § islation will not be invalidated unless it clearly, palpably, Constitution, plainly violates the and any doubts are to be resolved in a Id., favor of of finding constitutionality.” (quoting, Liquor Control Board The Spa v. Club, ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‍Athletic 364, 370, 506 Pa. A.2d (1984)). statute, When a reviewing a court must exercise evеry reasonable effort to uphold v. provisions. its Tracy Chester Bureau, Tax County Claim 288, 296, 507 Pa. n. 1334, 1339, n. 2 With mind, these precepts we consider McFarlin’s claim.

The Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees right a of ap- peal from a court of record: right

There shall be a of in all appeal cases a court of from record; record a court not of and there also shall be of right appeal a from a of court record from or administrative to a of agency court record or to an court, appellate the selection of such as to court be law; provided by and there rights shall be such other as may provided be by law. CONST, PA. 9. art. Code provides Judicial § procedure for exercising right this on appeal when issue aspects imposed the sentence follow- ing proceedings: criminal petition

The defendant or may Commonwealth file for allowance of discretionary aspects sentence for a or felony misdemeanor to thе appellate that appeals. has jurisdiction such Allowance of appeal may granted appel- at the discretion of the appears late court where it there is that a substantial question that imposed sentence is not appropriate under this chapter. 9781(b). on the Focusing phrases Pa.C.S.A. “allow- appeal” “granted

ance of at discretion court,” section, argues McFarlin this ef- fect, renders this type appeal discretionary in violаtion of agree. the constitutional We do not recognize We that this has been construed as Wilkerson, absolute. *6 477, (1980). 9781(b)

416 A.2d 479 are also that We aware § Com upon right. has been construed as a limitation that Jones, monwealth v. 138, 142-43, 732, 523 Pa. 565 A.2d 734 Tuladziecki, v. (1989); 513 Pa. 17, (1987). Nonetheless,

522 A.2d 19-20 the existence of an not, itself, to does in and right appeal absolute render all limitations the exercise of that unconstitut governing right ional.3 It has the law that the long legislature been both authority and the courts have the to enact reasonable regulations controlling the exercise of the constitutional Commonwealth, 291, Sayres appeal. 88 Pa. (1879). are, extent, 306-08 All regulations to some limita 9781(b) tions. If the imposed by limitation is a reasonable § control of the it appeal, exercise to is constitu tionally valid. 9781(b) hold is today regu

We a reasonable § lation of the right only applies The section where an accused the appeals discretionary aspects of his sentence; imposes it no burden on an accused asserting other errors by trial court. The discretionary aspects a sentence are left normally undisturbed on as the trial is in a advantageous position weigh court more determining sentence. Common factors appropriate Martin, 118, wealth v. 131, 650, 466 Pa. 351 A.2d 657 if Only manifestly the trial court its discretion abuses will Plank, the sentence be disturbed. Commonwealth v. 498 145, 491, 144, (1982) (citation omitted). Pa. 445 A.2d 492 facts, of discretion consists of overlooking pertinent Abuse evidence, disregarding the forcе of the error committing an law, or a sentence exceeds imposing statutory Townsend, maximum. Commonwealth v. 604, 606-07, 1139, (1982) (quoting, Common- 443 A.2d here, that, passing 3. We note in while not at issue provides governing promulgation Constitution itself for the of rules procedure, practice, long and conduct of courts so as these rules abridge, enlarge, modify rights litigants. do not or the substantive CONST, 10(c). PA. art. § Edrington, wealth v. 251, 255-56, 455, Pa. 416 A.2d (1980)). effect, In merely requires an accused to indicate how the trial possibly court abused its discretion befоre the court will consider the merits of his as contentions to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. discretion, Unless trial has abused its discretionary aspects of a sentence will remain undisturbed on If an appeal.4 point accused possible can to a abuse by court, the trial a substantial question exists him entitling Absent review. such an court, abuse the trial defendant’s meritless. Section acts as a threshold burden which a defendant must meet. Common Chilcote, wealth v. 106, (1990).5 Adoption оf McFarlin’s contention would inun *7 courts; date the appellate criminal would defendants auto the matically appeal discretionary aspects every of sentence imposed. This Court would be required to consider the every merits of such challenge no matter obviously how meritless.

Nor are we persuaded the by dissent’s claim that the practical of application requirement the question substantial has led to dubious standards and inconsistent It results. is argues discretionary 4. sеntencing power dissent that the is one of and, easily therefore, powers the most abused every of discretionary aspect abuse occurs. required of a is sentence to insure that no such (Dissent 738-39.) agree at While we do not that our likely engage trial court brethren are in wholesale abuse of their powers, tence are Reversal is discretion. discretionary dissent fears. If a emphasize discretionary we must the aspects that of a sen- just that: judge. entrusted only the discretion of the trial indicated where there has been a manifest abuse of Plank, supra. every We to see fail how an examination looming spectre sentence will curb of abuse the present, manifest abuse of discretion is substantial not, grounds If exist. an examination of the merits will not result in discretionary reversal. Examination of all sentence abuse claims will only accompanied more by result in control of the trial courts if it is change in the standard of review. argued complianсe 2119(f) 5. It is also that with § and Rule complicates process adding analytical an additional , upon tier cote, aspects to an attack of a Chil sentence. 130-31, J., supra Pa.Super. 396 (Popovich, at 578 A.2d at 441 concurring). opposite compli We believe the to be true. than Rather cating process, process. the threshold burden that streamlines constitutes a substantial that evaluation of what given Losch, basis. su case-by-case is on a performed 7; 7, A.2d at 119 n. at 201 n. Pa.Super. prа 254, 260, 562 Semuta, 596, omitted) denied, Pa. (citation A.2d alloc. calling that rule any It is unavoidable 568 A.2d 1246 result close case-by-case on a basis will for an evaluation justified. conclusion could be opposite decisions where dubious, ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‍nor the results does not make the standard That inconsistent. logical has some position that McFarlin’s recognize

We however, Court, pursue every obligated This due to the statutory provision to validate a possible avenue attaches to constitutionality whiсh heavy presumption operation say such cannot provisions. We the constitu- palpably and violates clearly, plainly § tion, appeal” “grant- “allowance of despite phrases it There- at the of the court” which contains. ed discretion fore, 9781(b) is hold that 42 Pa.C.S.A. a reasonable we such, as it appeal; of the exercise of the regulation the Pennsylvania does not violate Article Constitution. denied; judgment

Petition for allowance of sentence аffirmed. SOLE, J., dissenting opinion

DEL files a BECK, JJ., join. WIEAND *8 J., McEWEN, concurs in the result. SOLE, Judge, dissenting:

DEL raised question Because review of the constitutional my 9781(b)of the conclusion that Section Appellant demands by Pa.C.S.A., of Code, right 42 contravenes the Sentencing the V, 9 of the Pennsylva- Article Section appeal guaranteed by Constitution, this dissent. compelled I am to write nia Constitution, Article 9 of the Section provides.

511 Right appeal 9 of There shall be a of in all right appeal cases to a of court record; reсord from a court of not and there shall be also right appeal a of a court of from record or from an administrative to a of agency court record or court, the selection such of as be law; provided and there be by shall such other of rights appeal may provided as law.

In this construing provision Supreme the of Pennsyl- Court that, vania has stated “an has an accused right absolute Wilkerson, Commonwealth v. appeal.” 296, 490 Pa. 416 477, (1980). A.2d 9781(b), the “grant” allows for of an allow- оf appeal

ance at the appellate court’s discretion where a substantial question concerning exists the appropriateness of the sentence which imposed, was a curtails defendant’s absolute As supreme our court recognized Jones, Commonwealth v. in 138, 142-143, 732, (1989), “Section provides the defendant or only Commonwealth with a limited in an appeal attack sentence____” upon aspects of discretionary legal a It also has been noted accordance with Section appearance question of a substantial determines “[t]he whether this court may grant allowance of aspects sentence, discretionary of while sound discretion of the court will grant determines whether the court re 277, view.” McLaughlin, 610, A.2d The limitation this section plays upon a appellate rights defendant’s was noted Tuladziecki, Commonwealth v. supra. Commenting on prior practice this court’s of reviewing the on the argument sentencing prior merits mаking issue without deter mination of whether a raised as substantial was so appeal,” to “allow the the court stated: “If this determina prior tion not made ruling to examination on sentence, merits the issue of the appropriateness has in [Appellant] effect obtained an as of Tulad aspects sentencing.” from ziecki, supra., Pa. at 522 A.2d at 19-20. *9 however, is, our constitution what appeal right

An as provides an Constitution The guarantees. if the to even right appeal as with a Appellant accused such is the sought to be reviewed only matter The does defendant’s sentence. Constitution of the aspects limited therefore, by any it cannot right, this be not limit Sentencing Code. of the provision to has been right appeal concedes that the Majority 9781(b) absolute, suggests and it that Section construed as that right. valid limitation on only constitutionally acts as a 735.) that Although it has been stated opinion at (Majority a personal to review is right appellate “this constitutional knowing, a relinquished only through right may v. Pas- waiver,” Commonwealth vоluntary intelligent 9781(b) saro, (1984), does Pa. 476 A.2d 346 Section pro- The constitution by appellant. concern waiver an not with a to proceeding a defendant in a criminal vides properly pre- all matters which have have reviewed been Barnes, level. served at the trial court Sole, (1989) (Del rules J., concerning Unlike established concurring). an which a perfecting methods and manner for his or obey ignore jeopardizing chose to or defendant can grants appellate apрellate rights, her Section sen- authority particular to determine whether appeal regardless of an tencing worthy matter is defendant. A defendant action or inaction taken bypass orderly procedures chooses to deliberately who which are afforded to challenging judgment for the court’s crime, thereby properly convicted of a fails person relin- voluntarily will have preserve appeal, a matter Nevertheless, it quished or waived the relinquish or aрpellant’s remains the choice whether prevent- acts as a barrier right. waive that Instead it exercising right. places from ing appellants or ability accept reject court the upon concerning filed issues sen- timely raising which is *10 tenting properly which have preserved been at both the trial and appellate levels.

The superior court’s decision to dismiss such an appeal leaves an appellant without recourse. An appeal to the supreme court from such a allowed, decision ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‍is not leaving superior the court’s decision unchecked. This on limitation review is forth in set 42 9781(f). Pa.C.S.A. It provides: appellate

Limitation on additional review.—No appeal of the aspects of the discretionary sentence shall be permitted beyond the court that has initial juris- diction such appeals.

42 9781(f) Pa.C.S.A. § the Accordingly, superior court’s discretionary decision to disallow reviewed, can not be and an abuse that discretion cannot be remedied. ' “right” removal the to ensure that a defendant’s sentence is is particularly reviewable disturbing when one examines the decisions this court which have determined whether to an appeal. Widely allow divergent and incon- sistent views of what constitutes substantial have resulting arisen in nonuniform treatment of a defen- dant’s ability appeal a sentencing matter. See Common- Ziegler, wealth v. 515, 379 Pa.Super. (1988) 550 A.2d 567 (appellant must in 2119(f) include his Rule statement convicted); crime for he Commonwealth v. was Cummings, 341, (an 368 Pa.Super. (1987) 534 A.2d 114 in appellant 2119(f) must include his Rule statement crime for which he was length convicted of the sentence in imposed order to warrant our review of Also compare Com- aspects discretionary sentencing). monwealth v. 392 Pa.Super. 549, Ousley, A.2d 599 (1990) (claim that guideline sentence exceeded recommended aggravated sentence did not raise a question) substantial with Commonwealth v. 194, Burdge, Pa.Super. (1989) (claim A.2d 864 considerably that sentence exceeded aggravated recommended sentence raised a substantial question). As an examination of the will caselaw indicate practical application requirements of 2119(f) led has to the creation of Pa.R.App.P. standards, and allowed for inconsistent results. It dubious unnecessarily also has this court as noted burdened Common- Judge Popovich Concurring Opinion his Chilcote, (1990): wealth Pa.Super. 578 A.2d 429 compliance require- I am that the with the ... convinced 2119(f) judicial ments of ... ... wastes valuable [Rule ] an additional tier to our of a by adding analysis resources aspects attack on the of his defendant’s sentence, (footnote omitted) at 578 A.2d at 441. of this uphold validity provision Sentencing To the mandates of our disregard Code and Constitution will *11 and, appellate process the more complicate importantly, unfair treatment to those potentially provide seeking review their sentences. guarantee particularly The constitution review is vital matters. regard sentencing with to A defendant’s to have his or her sentence ability reviewed operates necessary as a check to appropriate punishment ensure that an has been issued. Barnes, supra, Ct. A.2d at 780. Pa.Superior (Del Sole, concurring). J.

Pennsylvania’s procedure sentencing, of indeterminate the discretion to the trial granting “necessitates of broad determine, among sentencing who must the alterna- judge, the range permissible penalties, proper tives and Martin, Commonwealth v. imposed.” sentеnce Pa. 351 A.2d 650 Supreme Court importance has stated that the of this discre- tionary power overemphasized, cannot be and has examined Martin, in In supra. potential its role and its for abuse this court has regard supreme stated: it

[M]any argue commentators is one of the most in the important, easily powers and most abused vested Waters, In United States trial court today. [citation court, omitted], for the stated: Judge Wilkey, speaking happens What to an offender after conviсtion is the understood, dis- fraught least the most with irrational in crepancies, improvement and the most need of of any phase in our justice criminal system.

It is true that the sentence is imposed normally left on appeal undisturbed because the trial court is in a far position better weigh the factors involved in such a However, determination. we have ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‍held that the court’s discretion must be exercised within certain procedural limits, including consideration of sufficient and accu- rate informаtion. 131-132, Pa. at (footnotes 351 A.2d at omitted.)

Thus, the important power held by those who impose a discretionary sentence is a pow"erwhich must be exercised within limits. As a on check those limits the citizens of this been provided Commonwealth have with constitutional provision found in Article Section which ensures that a defendant has a of the Sentencing Code eliminates that right, and instead gives the reviewing court the power “grant” or appeal, “allow” discretion, its when the discretionary aspects of a sentence challenged. are

Footnote four of Majority Opinion clearly illustrates how Majority point argument misses in this case. The not whether trial courts will or will not abuse their discretion. We assume members of the bench this Commonwealth will exercise their duty high with the accordance standards for which they are *12 known, recognize however we must that mistakes do occur courts exist to remedy such situations. The issue is legislative attempt real to our permit court to exеrcise our discretion to limit This review.

action, which is subject review, not prohibits what our constitution guarantees—the right own argues The Commonwealth that the decision the Su- Tuladziecki, in preme impliedly Court supra, upheld the 9781(b). constitutionality agree; rather, of Section I do not issue presented was never to the Court. Petition for Allowance of Appeal supreme before the court raised questions: two

I. Did the Superior Court err in entertaining the Com- monwealth’s where the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate a question substantial concerning the propri- ety of the sentence imposed?

II. Superior Did the court err in reversing the Judge- ment of sentence of the Trial Court upon determining that the sentence imposed was unreasonable? Docket, W.D. Allocatur 1985. Allocatur granted was solely to determine these questions. At no time was constitutionality of Section raised or considered: The supreme court has identified as a “well-settled principle” that it “should not deсide a constitu- question tional unless absolutely required to do so.” Krenzelak, Krenzelak v. 503 Pa.

(1983). The constitutional was not raised and not preserved for review in Tuladziecki was not necessary to the court’s decision. Because constitutional questions are not to anticipated, I have no in hesitancy rejecting the view that the issue has been decided by implication.

By my decision I would expressly overrule two prior court, decisions of this Smith, Commonwealth v. Super. 164, (1990) 575 A.2d 150 and Commonwealth v. Chilcote, 396 Pa.Super. 106, 578 A.2d 429 In these cases panels held that the limitation placed on appellate review of sentencing by is de minimis and that a threshold burden requiring this Court to exercise its discretion deciding whether to review a discretionary sentencing question is constitutionally acceptable. As I stated, have I agree do not that this or any limitation placed on a person’s right can withstand analysis under Article Section 9. While I agree that a person may waive their to appeal action, their own I reject the concept that the right may be eliminated by statute. In- stead I agree with our distinguished colleague, Judge Zoran Popovich, who stated his concurring opinion in Chilcote, 9781(b) violates the absolute of a “§ defendant appeal his sentence.” Chilcote, Commonwealth v. supra 396 Pa.Super. at 578 A.2d at 441. *13 I would hold that Section violates the

Although Constitution, therefore necessarily and would Pennsylvania claim, conclude, I after Appellant’s ultimately review would record, a review of the that the trial court did not abuse its sentence. imposing discretion BECK, JJ., join. WIEAND and McEWEN, J., concurs the result.

COMMONWEALTH of McFADDEN, Appellant. Linda M. Pennsylvania. ‍‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‍Superior Court of Sept. 1990. Submitted Filed March 1991.

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. McFarlin
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Mar 7, 1991
Citation: 587 A.2d 732
Docket Number: 3150
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
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