427 Mass. 564 | Mass. | 1998
A jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree by reason of deliberate premeditation for the killing of his father, mother, and sister. The defendant was fifteen years old when he committed the murders and confessed to having done so.
He drove the automobile to an area behind the house and moved his mother’s body into his sister’s room, locked the door, attempted to clean the bloodied areas, showered, and changed. With the bodies out of view he invited a female friend to visit him, which she did, and they spent the night together in his room.
The next day the defendant, his two aunts, and several cousins went to the Rochester police department to report the missing family members. Two hours later, the police went to the family’s house, noticed a broken window and numerous red stains throughout the house, which the defendant explained as being caused by his sister’s painting birdhouses red. After several hours the police found the victims’ bodies and soon thereafter the defendant admitted to being involved in the killing of his family and was placed under arrest.
2. The defendant’s statements. At a suppression hearing, the judge found the following facts. At approximately 9 p.m. on October 10, 1993, Chief Walter Denham introduced himself to one of the defendant’s aunts, and at his request she agreed to act as the defendant’s guardian.
Chief Denham advised the defendant and his aunt of the defendant’s Miranda rights. They both indicated they understood the rights and signed forms acknowledging their understanding. The defendant was relaxed, calm, coherent, and responsive to all police questioning. The questions were asked one at a time and the defendant understood the questions. His aunt was present throughout the questioning and understood the questions. The questioning lasted approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes. During this period, the defendant made no admissions. There was no demonstration of animosity, hostility, or arguments between the defendant and his aunt.
State Trooper Paul Petrino also questioned the defendant for
After a break at approximately 11:15 p.m., the questioning was resumed by State Trooper Leonard Coopenrath, who again administered Miranda warnings to the defendant and his aunt. Both said they understood and signed the forms. The defendant’s aunt listened carefully to the questions asked of the defendant.
At approximately 12:30 a.m. on October 11, 1993, State police Lieutenant Bruce Gordon interrupted the questioning. Gordon spoke with the defendant’s aunt and told her that something bad had happened to her family and that he wished to speak with the defendant. She indicated her willingness to continue to act as guardian and displayed no animosity toward the defendant nor had any reservations concerning her guardianship. Gordon did not seek her aid or assistance in the questioning, nor did she act as an agent for the Commonwealth.
Gordon told the defendant that something bad had happened to his family and that the defendant was involved. The defendant responded that he knew his rights and, when Gordon restated and emphasized the Miranda warnings, that he did not have to say anything.
At that point, Gordon and the defendant heard a police officer state in a loud voice that the bodies had been found. The defendant told Gordon that he wanted to talk to only one person. Gordon got up to leave because he thought the defendant was indicating a desire to speak alone with his aunt. The defendant then stated to Gordon, “No I want to talk to you.” His aunt agreed to leave the immediate area but remained close by. She was not asked to leave by Gordon. She knew she did not have to leave and believed she could have stopped the interview if she wanted or could have remained in the room.
Gordon then asked the defendant whether he wanted to talk with him, and the defendant responded, “Yes.” The defendant then made a statement involving himself in the killing of his mother, father, and sister. The defendant was not upset and showed no emotion. He was placed under arrest and again given Miranda warnings.
3. Motion to suppress. The defendant’s principal contention on appeal is that the motion judge erred in failing to suppress the statements he made to police at his house and at the police barracks because he was deprived of the opportunity to consult with an interested adult. In reviewing the motion judge’s decision, we accept the judge’s subsidiary findings of fact. Commonwealth v. Berry, 410 Mass. 31, 34 (1991). We proceed to make an independent determination of the correctness of the judge’s application of constitutional principles to the facts found. Id. “ ‘[Cjourts must proceed with “special caution” when reviewing purported waivers of constitutional rights’ by juveniles . . . and certain procedures are to be followed in obtaining a juvenile’s waiver of his rights against self-incrimination” (citations omitted). Commonwealth v. Philip S., 414 Mass. 804, 808-809 (1993), quoting Commonwealth v. Berry, supra.
A juvenile defendant over the age of fourteen may properly waive his constitutional rights if, after having been advised of those rights, he was afforded an opportunity to consult with an interested adult who was informed of and understood those rights. Commonwealth v. Berry, supra at 35, citing Commonwealth v. Guyton, 405 Mass. 497, 500-502 (1989), and Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 131-134 (1983). “It is not necessary for such a juvenile actually to consult with the interested adult, for it is the opportunity to consult that is
4. Interested adult. In this appeal, the defendant argues that he was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to consult with an interested adult because of his aunt’s close relationship to the victims and her concern over what happened to them. We disagree.
The purpose of our requirement that a juvenile defendant have an opportunity for a meaningful consultation with a parent, or an adult acting in loco parentis, is to ensure that the juvenile defendant has understood his rights and the consequences of waiving them. See Commonwealth v. Berry, supra at 35; Commonwealth v. MacNeill, supra at 77, 79.
The motion judge found the defendant’s aunt to be “an intelligent young woman,” having a friendly relationship with the defendant, and who acted “in the best interest of the defendant.” See Commonwealth v. Berry, supra at 36 (juvenile’s father was able to fulfil role as interested adult despite emotional distress over seriousness of minder charge against son); Commonwealth v. Tevenal, 401 Mass. 225, 227 (1987) (juvenile’s mother was
The judge properly concluded that the defendant was given an opportunity to have a meaningful consultation with an interested adult before voluntarily waiving his Miranda rights.
5. General Laws c. 278, § 33E. The defendant killed his
Judgments affirmed.
The defendant was tried as an adult pursuant to G. L. c. 119, § 61.
Juveniles under the age of fourteen, however, must actually consult with an interested adult in order for their Miranda waiver to be valid. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128, 134 (1983).
An “interested adult” does not act as defense counsel. There is no merit to the defendant’s argument that the police were first required to determine whether his aunt could “provide the defendant with the necessary advice regardless of any conflicting interests.” Nor does our rule impose a burden on police officers to make such an inquiry, especially given that the rule does not require investigating officials either to force the adult to speak with the juvenile, or to proscribe the content of whatever discussion takes place. Commonwealth v. Philip S., 414 Mass. 804, 812 & n.6 (1996). The “interested adult” rule strikes a balance between protecting a juvenile’s rights and the legitimate need of law enforcement officials to question juvenile suspects. Id.
We reject the defendant’s argument that his aunt’s presence in the face of the police questioning was “psychologically coercive” to him. Although we have indicated that a defendant may offer evidence to show that the presence of a relative may have affected the voluntariness of a confession, we have not adopted a per se rule suggesting that the mere presence of a relative at questioning would be inherently coercive. See Commonwealth v. Adams, 416 Mass. 55, 60-61 (1993) (forensic psychiatrist’s testimony should have been considered for purposes of voluntariness ,of confession for humane practice rule).
The defendant concedes that the police properly advised him of his Miranda rights.