OPINION OF THE COURT
Thе issue presented in this case is whether remand for the appointment of new counsel is required when a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is made on direct appeal and it is clear from the record that the claim is meritless.
On July 1, 1976, John Meеhan was killed during the course of a robbery in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. On August 18, 1976, Darryl McBee (appellee) was arrested in Virginia while visiting his brother and sister-in-law. Subse *258 quent to his arrest, appellee had the benefit of advice from his brother, sister-in-law and Attorney John Garland, a friеnd of the family. All “essentially advised [appellee] to make no statement to the police concerning the charges.” Appellee’s brief at 2. At the extradition hearing on August 19, 1976, appellee was again advised by his brother, Garland and a court-appointed attorney to remain silent. Court of Common Pleas Slip op. at 29-30. On August 23, 1976, appellee was transported from Virginia to Philadelphia. During that trip, after being advised of his Miranda rights, appellee gave an inculpatory statement to the police.
Prior to appellee’s trial in Philadelphia, appellee’s then-counsel filed a motion to suppress the inculpatory statement given by appellee, alleging,
inter alia,
that the statement was given by appellee involuntarily. Prior to the suppression hearing, apрellee was appointed new counsel.
1
Appellee’s suppression motion was denied. In January, 1977, appellee was found guilty of murder in the second degree, robbery and criminal conspiracy. On appellee’s first appeal to the Supеrior Court, that Court,
en banc,
reversed appellee’s judgment of sentence and remanded the case for a new trial.
2
Commonwealth v. McBee,
Appellant [appellee] contends that the lower court erred in admitting his confession to police because it was involuntary. Specifically, he claims that this confession resulted from physical abuse, threats, and cajolery by the police. However, testimony of the interrogating officers *259 refuted this claim and was credited by the suppression court. Because the evidence supports the suppression court’s findings, we conclude that this claim is without merit. See Commonwealth v. Sparrow,471 Pa. 490 ,370 A.2d 712 (1977); Commonwealth v. Walker,470 Pa. 534 ,368 A.2d 1284 (1977); Commonwealth v. Washington,259 Pa.Super. 407 ,393 A.2d 891 (1978).
Appellant [appellee], a 17 year old juvenile at the time of arrest, also contends that the lower court should not have admitted his confession because it was takеn (a) in the absence of a consultation with an interested and informed adult, Commonwealth v. McCutchen,463 Pa. 90 ,343 A.2d 669 (1975), and (b) contrary to an agreement that appellant’s [appellee’s] counsel be present, Brewer v. Williams,430 U.S. 387 ,97 S.Ct. 1232 ,51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Commonwealth v. Bullard,465 Pa. 341 ,350 A.2d 797 (1976). Because appellant [appellee] failed to raise the McCutchen issue pre-trial and the Brewer issue in post-verdict motions, we hold that he has waived those issues. See Commonwealth v. Baylis,477 Pa. 472 ,384 A.2d 1185 (1978); Commonwealth v. Blair,460 Pa. 31 ,331 A.2d 213 (1975).
On June 14, 1980, appellee’s third and final trial, at which his inculpatory statement was introduced as evidence resulted in a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree and robbery. Appellee filed post-trial motions in which he alleged, among other claims, ineffective assistancе of his prior counsel and ineffective assistance of his present counsel, in their failure to raise the issue, in the 1976 suppression motion, that appellee was a minor at the time he gave the inculpatory statement, and that he did not have accеss to an “interested adult” during the time he gave his inculpatory statement; thus his inculpatory statement was
per se
not knowing and intelligent. This
per se
rule was established by the case
Commonwealth v. McCutchen,
On appeal to Superior Court from appellee’s final trial, appellee’s counsel raised various claims, including his own ineffectiveness as trial сounsel at the first trial in failing to raise and preserve a
McCutchen
issue. The Superior Court, by
per curiam
order filed January 4, 1985, remanded appellee’s case for appointment of new counsel.
Commonwealth v. McBee,
This appeal is from a judgment of sentence for second degree murder and robbery. We are unable to address appellant’s [appellee’s] arguments on appeal because, through appellate counsel, whо also represented appellant [appellee] at trial, appellant [appellee] claims, among other things, that trial counsel was ineffective. See Commonwealth v. Fox,476 Pa. 475 ,383 A.2d 199 (1978); Commonwealth v. Serianni, [337] Pa.Super. [309], [486] A.2d [1349], (1984) (filed December 19, 1984). Appellant [appellee] argues, however, that we may entertain this appeal since trial counsel’s ineffectiveness is clear on the face of the record. See Commonwealth v. Fox, supra. We cannot agree. See Commonwealth v. Williams,504 Pa. 511 ,475 A.2d 1283 (1984) (no rebuttable presumption that juvenile is incompetent to waive Miranda rights without first having opportunity to consult with interested adult); overruling Commonwealth v. Christmas,502 Pa. 218 ,465 A.2d 989 (1983) (interested adult rule of Commonwealth v. McCutchen,463 Pa. 90 ,343 A.2d 669 (1975), replaced with presumption that juvenile is incompetent to waive Miranda rights).
We therefore remand for the appointment of new counsel to represent appellant [appellee]. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
Mem.Op. at 1-2. We granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal and now reverse.
*261
In
Commonwealth v. Serianni,
Our standard of review of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel remains as follows:
This Court recently reiterated the appellаte standards for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel; in Commonwealth v. Anderson,501 Pa. 275 , 286,461 A.2d 208 , 213 (1983) we stated:
We remain guided by the standards first articulated in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney,427 Pa. 599 , 605-06,235 A.2d 349 , 352-53 (1967):
[Cjounsel’s assistance is deemed constitutionally effective once we are able to conclude that the particular course chosen by counsel had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interests.
The test is not whether other alternatives were more reasonable, employing a hindsight evaluation of the record. Although weigh the alternatives we must, the *262 balance tips in favor of a finding of effective assistance as soon as it is determined that trial counsel’s decisions had any reasonable basis.
Moreover, counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to raise baseless or frivolous issues. Commonwealth v. Arthur,488 Pa. 262 , 265,412 A.2d 498 (1980). It is only when the claim which has been foregone is of arguable merit that further inquiry must be made into the basis for counsel’s decision not to pursue thе matter. Commonwealth v. Hubbard,472 Pa. 259 , 278,372 A.2d 687 , 696 (1977).
Commonwealth v. McNeil,
Moreover, implicit in these standards is the requirement that the defendant must demonstrate that he was harmed by his attorney’s alleged ineffective assistance. As we first observed in Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, supra:
Cases such as Commonwealth ex rel. Gallagher v. Rundle,423 Pa. 356 ,223 A.2d 736 (1966) and Commonwealth ex rel. Jones v. Maroney,417 Pa. 567 ,209 A.2d 285 (1965) indicate that, for relief to be granted, appellant must demonstrate that cоunsel’s ineffectiveness worked to his prejudice____ Since our test requires that we examine the approach employed by trial counsel in light of the available alternatives, a finding of ineffectiveness could never be made unless we concluded that thе alternatives not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the tactics actually utilized.
Obviously, then if there is no reasonable basis to support trial counsel’s decision (a finding prerequisite to a conclusion of ineffectiveness), his decisions a fortiori were prejudicial to the client.
Commonwealth v. Griffin,
As to the claim that appellee’s counsel was ineffective in failing to raise and preserve the “interested adult” rule of
McCutchen
in his 1976 suppression motion, both the
*263
Commonwealth and appellee now concede thаt the “totality of the circumstances” rule governs our determination of the admissibility of appellee’s inculpatory statement.
Commonwealth v. Williams,
The order of Superior Court remanding appellee’s case for the appointment of new counsel is reversed and the case remanded to Superior Court fоr disposition of appellee’s remaining allegations of error.
Notes
. Appellee’s present counsel has been his counsel since that time and has represented appellee through all phases of this criminal matter.
. On remand, appelleе's second trial resulted in a finding of guilty on the criminal conspiracy charge. However, a mistrial was declared as to the robbery and murder charges when the jury could not reach a verdict. Appellee was granted a new trial from the finding of guilty on the criminal conspiracy charge, but was never brought to trial on that charge. See Appellee's brief at 5.
. If the “interested adult” rule of McCutchen were applicable, it is clear from the record that appellee was afforded and realized several opportunities to speak with “interested adults” prior to giving his inculpatоry statement. Therefore, the ineffective assistance of counsel claim would be meritless.
Further, throughout the 10 year course of this criminal proceeding, appellee has been classified as a juvenile. In fact, his age, at the time he gave the inсulpatory statement, has been stated as, at various times, 17 years or 17 years 7 months. Appellee’s mother testified that his age at the time of arrest was 17 years. See Transcript of June 12, 1980 at 141. However, a City of Philadelphia Police Department Arrest Report and a City of Philadelphia Municipal Court Hearing List reflect appellee’s age, in 1976 to be 18. Additionally, at the sentencing hearing on September 18, 1981, the birthdate of appellee was stated as February 6, 1958. See Transcript of September 8, 1981 at 8. Review of various papers in the record on which appellee’s date of birth is recorded reflects that his date of birth was February 6, 1958, which would make appellee 18 years old at the time he made the inculpatory statement (August, 1976), and thus void any McCutchen issue.
. Initially, in
Commonwealth v. McCutchen,