Commonwealth v. Mannion

Super 25 1999 PA Pennsylvania,

COMMONWEALTH

Appellant, MANNION, Appellee.

Winifred Pennsylvania.

Superior Court

Argued Sept. 1998.

Filed Feb. Suss, Atty., B.

Stuart Asst. Dist. West Chester, Com., appellant. Walsh, Pottstown, appellee.

Francis M. McEWEN, Judge, Before President KELLY, CAVANAUGH, SOLE, DEL JOYCE, STEVENS, EAKIN, SCHILLER LALLY-GREEN, JJ. LALLY-GREEN, J.: appeals 1 The Commonwealth court’s order entered from 6, 1997,1 Mann- granting Winifred October clarity, as "order we refer to this order 1. We note that the court's order on the dated October but entered entered October 1997.” purposes For docket on October had received allegations, and stated that she suppress oral and written ion’s motion civilly against Pennsylvania sue filed her to a notice of intent to statements made Flaxenburgs. and remand for She also stated Troopers. State We reverse neu- viewed the trial.2 that because she tral, help explain they her she believed could ¶ reviewing an 2 When Flaxenburgs. Mannion the situation to decision, we suppression from a court’s must willingness to discuss the mat- expressed her supports the record first determine whether troopers, them into with the and invited ter findings. the court’s factual time, Trooper told home. that Sauers her At Williams, 539 Pa. 650 A.2d arrest; under that she: was not Mannion appeals the Commonwealth When troopers; required speak to with was decision, we suppression a court’s con from anytime; troopers to at leave could ask the only the of the defendant’s sider evidence attorney present. an and could have prosecution’s much of the witnesses and so uncontradicted when ¶ that remains evidence troopers Mannion 5 The interviewed a fairly context of the record as read approximately hours. living Vh her room Prosek, 700 A.2d whole. time, Milligan During Trooper reviewed this (Pa.Super.1997). bound We are de- tally with Mannion. Mannion sheets factual theft. She stat- any involvement nied findings; supports those when the evidence sloppy from book- that error resulted ed however, may reverse to keeping use of cash versus checks and the it conclu court when draws erroneous suppliers to take pay certain that refused Williams, findings. from factual sions those During and after French Creek’s checks. 71-72, at 426. Pa. 650 A.2d at interview, trooper was convinced this neither theft, accounting opposed to an that ¶ following reflects 3 The record occurred, error, or, occurred; if one had had 24, 1996, Pennsylvania State On facts. June perpetrator. that Mannion was the to Milligan Trooper John David traveled Company Sheep and Wool French Creek ¶ interview, 6 At the conclusion of the Creek”) (“French alleged investigate to Troopers Milligan and informed Sauers $200,000 taken from approximately theft of to return of their intention to Mannion Flaxenburg, Eric and Jean French Creek. explanation further to obtain French Creek Creek, alleged that of French owners Flaxenburgs. from and documentation Mannion, bookkeep- French former Creek’s they tele- troopers that would The stated er, During perpetrated this inves- the theft. spoke they with phone Mannion after tigation, Trooper Milligan obtained from the meeting. Flaxenburgs arrange for another prepared by French Flaxenburgs tally sheets if she troopers informed Mannion The bookkeeper. tally These Creek’s current meeting, it take could agreed to another a theft. purported sheets to demonstrate home, office, attorney’s her her place at 26, 1996, Trooper Milligan 4 On June expressed barracks. Mannion her Pennsylvania Trooper State John V. agreement arrangement. with this clothes, Sauers, both dressed street trav- 27, 1996, Trooper 7 On June Sauers County residence. eled to Mannion’s Chester additional documentation from the obtained Trooper Milligan weapon had a concealed gave Flaxenburgs, Trooper Milli- which troopers under suit knocked coat. Trooper telephoned gan. Milligan then door, on Mannioris identified themselves as arranged meeting Mannion and second police troopers, they state and stated that her home on a.m. June 10:00 alleged approx- investigating an theft of $200,000 imately Troopers Sauers, Milligan taken from French Creek. both clothes, familiarity expressed Mannion her with dressed street arrived at Mann- good Dugger, order. 2. The Commonwealth has certified in faith 537, 546-47, substantially (1985); handi- that the order effectively prosecution caps 311(d). terminates its Pa.R.App.P. permits appellate this case. This review the approximately ion’s home at lying thought 10:30 a.m. on believed Mannion was 28,1996. Trooper Milligan weap- June money had a help she took the children. jacket. on concealed under his suit When point, began cry At this Mannion arrived, troopers neither was convinced Flaxenburg and stated that: the children had occurred; or, that a theft had if had one spoiled brats; so much and were she took the place, taken perpetra- Mannion was the money help they her children because tor. The knocked on Mannion’s life; Trooper deserved a better Sauers door, Trooper and she invited them in. right. stopped crying, When Mannion Sauers then told Mannion she: was not agreed give statement, written which required them; speak with was free to pages Troop- she wrote on blank taken from stop time; speaking any with them at and Milligan’s er notebook. Mannion then asked any could ask them to leave at time. troopers going “drag whether the were troopers 9 The and Mannion com- her Trooper out of the house in cuffs.” room, menced their living conversation in the responded Sauers Mannion would be later dining but moved to Mannion’s room day. explained arrested that He that a com- table to better examine the additional docu- plaint justice’s would be filed with the district by mentation Flaxenburgs. furnished office and that Mannion would be notified During meeting, this Mannion offered the given opportunity and to turn herself in. troopers tea or coffee and moved about free- Trooper explained Sauers further Mann- ly cigarettes. as she smoked her When tele- only physically ion would be from removed phone rang, permission she asked to answer. her respond home if she failed to the response, Trooper In Sauers told Mannion complaint. criminal Approximately one that she was free to do as she wished. later, July 22, 1996, month on Mannion was telephone Mannion then answered the and formally charged with theft tak- unlawful engaged in a for roughly conversation five ing disposition receiving prop- or stolen minutes. erty. Approximately two hours into the interview, paid Mannion stated that she trial, 12 Prior to Mannion moved to French postage Creek’s electric and bills in suppress troopers, her statements to the al- cash. This statement caused both Miranda3 leging given that she was not credibility. Trooper doubt Mannion’s warnings prod- and the statements were the told Sauers Mannion that he did not believe a uct a interrogation. custodial After a company the pay size of French Creek would hearing, granted court utility postage bills in cash because re- Mannion’s motion. ceipts necessary purposes. for tax ¶ 13 The Commonwealth a filed motion to Trooper Sauers stated that he believed response, In reconsider. lying, Mannion things were not order, original accepted court vacated its looking good her, going and that she was counsel, written submissions from heard point to be arrested at some Troop- time. reargument, and up er Sauers issued a second order that then stood and walked beside essentially original Trooper along- Mannion. As reinstated its Sauers stood order.4 Mannion, side appealed, panel said a low The Commonwealth and a voice that he did not believe French pay Creek would its this Court affirmed electric bills in cash. granted He also said that he order. We thereafter the Common- Arizona, 436, 1997, 6, 3. sup- Miranda v. 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. In its order entered October 1602, (a (1966) 19, pression August 16 L.Ed.2d 694 defendant court reinstated its subject interrogation opinion, custodial must be ad- order and memorandum and corrected right vised her August opinion. of his or constitutional remain one word its The right lawyer silent or and his in clear order entered October also contains unequivocal language); arguments Commonwealth v. footnote that addresses minor certain Johnson, reargument. A.2d raised the Commonwealth on (citations (1988) omitted) (a person change reasoning in- must be The order did not warnings prior analysis original formed of her Miranda to custo- Au- court's interrogation by police). gust dial order. appropriate test petition reargument for de wealth’s erabane termining a situation involves custo previous This whether appeal withdrew our decision. dial is as follows: followed. determining The test for whether a sus- ¶ 14 The frames issue its being subjected to custodial pect is interro- on as follows: gation' Miranda warn- so to necessitate deprived of ings physically he is is whether Did the court commit an law lower error of way significant his freedom by suppressing defendant’s statements placed in which he in a situation reason- utilizing legally while incorrect definition of action or ably believes that his freedom custody, concluding erroneously interroga- by such movement is restricted person, that a reasonable under the cir- n tion. defendant, confronting cumstances this Busch, perceived could have herself to be custo- (Pa.Super.1998) quoting dy? Rosario, Appellant’s Brief at 4. denied, (era (1994) banc), appeal 365-66 (other (1996) 668, citations Pa. 685 A.2d 547 first the 15 We address Com omitted). way, deten- police another Said claim the monwealth’s when, total- under tions become custodial legally used court a incorrect definition of circumstances, ity conditions of the “custody” determining when whether Mann- so become duration of detention and/or product ion’s statements of were the custodi equiv- functional coercive as to constitute interrogation require al so to Miranda Ellis, 379 v. alent of arrest. Commonwealth warnings. A law enforcement officer must (1988), 1323, 337, 1332 Pa.Super. 549 A.2d warnings prior administer Miranda cus 601, denied, A.2d 824 Pa. 562 522 interrogation. todial v. Commonwealth Beheler, (1989), U.S. v. 463 citing California Johnson, 332, 312, Pa.Super. 541 373 A.2d 3520, 1125, 3517, 1121, 77 L.Ed.2d 103 S.Ct. (1988). determining for 336 standard (1983). 1275 police whether an encounter with the is a utilizes court 17 The factors police a deemed “custodial” or have initiated cir determine, totality of the under the interrogation objective custodial an one is cumstances, has become a detention whether circumstances, totality based on a of the functional so constitute coercive as to given with due to the consideration reason equivalent the basis arrest include: of conveyed impression person able in location; detention; whether length; its — its terrogated. Gwynn, v. Commonwealth or his transported against suspect -, (1998). -, 143, Pa. 148 723 A.2d re will, far, why; whether how interrogation been defined as Custodial has used; law enforce whether the straints were “questioning initiated law enforcement of showed, or used ment officer threatened person into ficers after a has been taken force; em investigative and the methods deprived custody [or her] or otherwise of dispel suspicions. ployed or to confirm significant way.” freedom action fact that a Busch, at 101. The A.2d Johnson, quoting at 336 Miranda particu a police investigation has focused on Arizona, 444, 1602, v. 384 U.S. 86 S.Ct. automatically trigger lar not individual does (1966). 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d “Interro warnings. “custody,” requiring Miranda thus to, gation” police is “calculated ex conduct Fento, v. Commonwealth . to, pected likely Id to evoke admission.” (1987). 526 A.2d Simala, quoting Pa. (1969). suppres- that the 219, 226, 18 The record reflects 252 A.2d When following definition of sion court utilized the inculpatory made person’s statement is not “custody” purposes: for Miranda interrogation, response to custodial gratuitous, custody[,]” is a person statement is classified as In order to “in be leave, subject not free to for lack warn must believe that is “interroga- ings. Id. order to be considered tion[,]” questioning by police purposes determining must whether Mannion’s to, “expected to, likely be calculated product inculpatory were the statements evoke admission.” require custodial so toas Mi- Brantner, 518, 527, Pa. 406 A.2d warnings. randa In order to answer the Con argues 19 The Commonwealth that cus- questions stitutional that are raised in this tody triggered only suspect when the is motion, therefore, necessary it is first subject comparable to “restraints to those person determine whether a reasonable arrest,” Appellant’s associated with Brief Mrs. situation would have Mannion’s felt 10,15, supports argument by its refer- free to leave and whether the questioning involving ence to stops.5 cases traffic As the of the interrogation. amounted to reflects, police above discussion detentions in person A interroga deemed in custodial Pennsylvania when, become custodial under placed tion if he is in a situation in which circumstances, the condi- he reasonably] believes that his fi-eedom tions duration of the detention become interrogation. action is restricted and/or so coercive as to constitute the functional Zogby, (1997) ([ac Busch, equivalent of arrest. See 713 A.2d at Ellis, knowledging Pennsylvania’s Thus, 100 and standard A.2d at 1332. conduct is more restrictive than reviewing particular court is to consider the Constitution.) that of the Federal facts of each case order to determine whether detention is custodial. While we Opinion, 8/19/97, Trial Court reinstated and agree 10/3/97, corrected Commonwealth’s articulation 6. Since the suppres- accurate, not, however, sion court’s the law is standard is consistent with do above, law set out factually court did conclude that what is deemed a err custody not when it defined it comparable as did for “restraint to those associated Amendment, 5. The Commonwealth following they relies on typically Fourth because are cases, traffic-stop all of are brief, which cases: Com- opposed prolonged as to station house in Gonzalez, 116, monwealth v. 519 Pa. 546 A.2d 26 terrogation; they commonly public occur in (defendant-motorist’s (1988) statement made in view, atmosphere police far less dominated response police questioning to at accident scene surrounding interrogation than that the kinds of warnings without Miranda held in admissible itself; therefore, at issue in Miranda and de influence, prosecution driving for under the two and two tained motorist’s freedom of action not curtailed involuntary manslaughter, counts of degree arrest) (citing to a associated with formal by driving of counts homicide vehicle while un- Bruder, 9, relying onPennsylvania and v. 488 U.S. der the influence because: defendant was not 205, (1988)); 109 S.Ct. 102 L.Ed.2d 172 Com arrest, under only defendant’s freedom was restricted Sullivan, 124, Pa.Super. monwealth v. 399 581 statutory obligation stay to extent of to (1990) (defendant-motorist A.2d 956 not in custo provide required scene and information and de- dy subject purposes for Miranda when to an fendant failed to demonstrate that he was sub- arrest, ordinary stop placed traffic and not under jected comparable to restraints to those associat- car, patrol police subjected to forced coercion, enter a to arrest); Proctor, ed with Pa.Super. v. Commonwealth 441 subject 176, prolonged questioning); (1995) (defendant- to 657 A.2d 8 Haupt, Pa.Super. question- Commonwealth v. 567 motorist detained at accident scene for (1989) ing (traffic custody stop purposes not for A.2d 1074 constituted investi Miranda detention, only where: motorist remained at gative opposed scene for short to custodial deten period police complete and, therefore, time tion; to allow officer to warnings Miranda not re investigation; motorist was not informed that quired because basis for was traffic detention temporary; single troop- detention would be not violation; stop approximately to endured defendant; questioned sobriety er field test con- minutes; street; public location was defendant- plain passing ducted in view of motorists failed used; transported; motorist not no restraints activity equivalent to constitute coercive sta- to show, threat, police officer made no or use duty interrogation; tion house motorist un- had force); Toanone, v. 381 Pa.Su der state law to remain at accident scene and (1989) (defendant-motor per. 553 A.2d 998 cooperate with because his freedom of warnings prior ist not entitled to Miranda to any significant movement was not inhibited in way); regarding questioning background educational Leib, Pa.Super. request alphabet to recite because motorist (1991) (defendant-motorist’s state- unreasonably long interrogated period, not noncoercive, suppressed ments not because tem- car, patrol subjected forced to enter to porary aspects ordinary stops detention traffic coercion). form of undue custody purposes are not for Miranda even though stops meaning such are seizures within n with case-by-case stop poses auto- 'must be evaluated on a an arrest” traffic cases is regard particular settings. due to the facts matically applicable other factual basis with involved. stop con usual traffic ¶ 23 The Commonwealth next ar investigative stitutes an rather than a custo gues that even if the court cor detention, unless, under the dial custody, rectly articulated the definition circumstances, the conditions and dura from the conclusions drawn facts the functional tion the detention become were because Mannion’s statements incorrect equivalent of arrest. Commonwealth interroga product not the of custodial Haupt, record, Following tion. a review of we (1989). ordinary stop Since an traffic is argu find merit the Commonwealth’s to typically pub brief duration occurs ments. view, stop lic such a is not custodial Leib, above, purposes. are bound Miranda 24 As while we noted 588 A.2d 922 factual evidence, may supported which are ¶21 Also, a has certain motorist suppression court when it draws reverse the obligations stop, statutory remain at the to from those factu- legal conclusions erroneous accident, provide of an informa scene 71-2, Williams, findings. al statutory duty to tion. A motorist has Here, record A.2d at 426. bring stop his vehicle when clearly reflects that custodial 3733(a). § officer so directs. 75 Pa.C.S.A. made her had occurred when Mannion accident, in an When a motorist involved prior The record reveals statements. statutory immediately duty stop, he has a Milligan meeting, Trooper the June scene, provide remain at certain speak- permission Mannion’s before obtained §§ information. 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3742-44. time, only ing Mannion not with her. At this Thus, custody is not in for Mi a motorist troopers in agreed with the to meet purposes randa when freedom restrict home, Once also chose that location. but she statutory obligation to ed to the extent of his arrived, they informed Mannion provide required remain at scene and required speak with that she was not information. See Commonwealth Gonza anytime, them, speak at and could refuse to lez, any time. Mann- ask them to leave could troopers into the her ion nevertheless invited stop ordinary 22 An traffic voluntarily herself to and submitted home stop the involves becomes “custodial” when questioning. conditions, including, not limited coercive but ¶25 to, being patrol During meeting, Mannion of- suspect the into a ear the forced being or and moved transported troopers from the fered the tea coffee and scene cigarettes. infra, freely smoked restrained. n. 5. Such about as she physically See rang interrupted telephone and the conditions constitute “restraints When the coercive meeting, permission an- comparable to transform the Mannion asked arrest” so time, ordinary Trooper informed At Sauers investigative nature of traffic swer. this Thus, she to do as stop interrogation. Mannion that she was free into custodial engaged in a tele- statutory obligations pleased. Mannion then where a motorist has approximately five phone of action conversation necessarily that restrict his freedom times, free movement, Mannion was stop is minutes. At all reliance on traffic cases home, to do what she con about her free appropriate to determine what coercive move call, wanted, telephone type including taking necessary ditions are to transform this any type police restraint and free into inter free of investigative detention custodial However, statutory At no time no fear of imminent arrest. rogation. where such the Mannion, exist, remove her involving troopers did the search obligations reliance on cases home, any type of restraints. public statutory from her or use stops and obli brief and show, conclusion, Additionally, troopers the made no helpful. In wheth gations is not Moreover, threat, Mannion custody pur- or use of force. person is in for Miranda er Troopers herself had she stated that viewed 28 The dissent asserts that we failed to Milligan by important neutral be- Sauers as and she evaluate factors relied on the they help explain contrary, lieved could her situa- court. To the we were Flaxenburgs. quite tion to the careful to evaluate whether the court’s Also, findings supported the record. It was not until that Mannion stated trial had dissent observes that the court paid postage French electric she Creek’s hearing testimony benefit of troopers bills cash that both her doubted witnesses firsthand and ob- credibility. point, Trooper At this Sauers Yet, serving point their demeanor. we out ly- told Mannion that: he believed she was only suppression that the witnesses were the ing; things her; looking good were not officers, two neither of whom testified going and she was to be arrested at some menacing, that their voices were or that point up in time. He then stood and walked enough Mannion did feel comfortable standing alongside Mannion. beside While phone answer her or to ask them to leave. Mannion, immediately prior to her con- Our record review revealed that the learned fession, Trooper Sauers said in low voice supported by court’s conclusions were not that he did not believe French Creek would record, despite opportunity to ob- cash, pay its electric bills in that believed serve the demeanor of officer wit- lying, Mannion was thought and that he she We nesses. understand Mannion was money help took the her if children. Even place her sixties events took police investigation point did focus way home and we also are sensitive we Mannion, on custodial was not might feel should these events occur to us in automatically triggered. Ellis, 549 A.2d at Nevertheless, our own homes. since our re- Moreover, Trooper the fact view of the record indicates some spoke voice, itself, in a Sauers low in and of lacked record fails to evidence threat of force or coer- support, are not reach able to the dis- Rather, testimony cion. the uncontradicted sent’s “inexorable conclusion that Mannion troopers establishes that Mannion’s did not feel fine to ask the officers to leave.” addition, gratuitous. statements were In ¶ 29 Order reversed and case remanded testimony record no reflects that Mannion for a relinquished. trial. Jurisdiction indicated felt intimidated or that her freedom was restricted. Judge dissenting SCHILLER files a ¶ 27 Under the opinion McEWEN, of these circum- Judge in which President stances, Mannion’s join. conduct was Judges consistent and DEL CAVANAUGH SOLE willing cooperative with a witness. The SCHILLER, J., dissenting: support record does not agree majority’s analysis 1 I with the of court’s conclusions that Mannion was under applied standard to be custodial subject arrest or to coercion from which she however, I interrogations; respectfully must reasonably custody.6 could believe she was in majority’s application dissent from the of Therefore, we hold that Mannion’s state- that standard in the instant case. product ments were not the of custodial in- terrogation, rights attach, legitimacy Miranda 2 did not The issue here is not the of troopers’ suspicions ques- and her statements should been at not have the time the conducted, suppressed. tioning was but rather whether questions 6. We contrast the instant facts from those in come downstairs to answer some with- Zogby, informing v. out him that he could decline (1997) sup- totality A.2d request. stances, wherein we affirmed the Under the of these circum- pression granting defendant-appel- highly unlikely order court’s we held that it was that believed, suppress anyone lee’s defendant-appellee motion to oral statements or that simi- case, believe, physical larly simply evidence. Unlike instant situated would that he could Therefore, Zogby, go defendant-appellee sleep. we held that was in turn over and back to incriminating a custodial detention when law enforcement offi- held that the statements there- he bedroom, cer entered his a aroused him from after made to the officer without the benefit of sleep, requested warnings properly suppressed. sound and "advised” or him to Miranda court are reasonable. Common used coercive tactics to obtain Appellee’s self-incriminating Gommer, statements. wealth n case, denied, (1995), Based on the facts of I this conclude (citation (1996) an that individual Mannion’s situation omit Pa. A.2d 1308 signifi- have felt that her freedom was ted). would drew suppression court the follow curtailed, cantly and that conditions of pre ing legal from the evidence inferences sustained more than hearing: sented prisoner in hours made her a virtual her two judice, although In the case sub Mrs. I troop- home. Because believe that the own home and the Mannion was in her own comport ers’ tactics did not with Miranda two hours had her some detectives told requirements, and .that not answer their prior that she was free to of fact and inferences drawn totality questions, the of the circumstances therefrom are on the rec- reasonable based home having police officers her of two ord, respectfully I must dissent. time for questioning her for the second safeguards procedural 3 The changing their tone over two hours privilege against Fifth Amendment and one’s her from accusatori- with conversational recognized long self-incrimination have been her, menacingly standing close al while in our federal and state courts as the “hall person, espe- have led a reasonable would democracy” mark of our and the “essential age, cially years to believe woman mainstay system”. adversary of our Mi custody. that The fact she that was she Arizona, randa 86 S.Ct. U.S. permission to had to ask felt that she (1966) (citations 1602, 1620, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 phone that even before answer her shows omitted). Despite apparently harsh rem did not accusatorial she became evidence, edy excluding have courts addition, confessing to feel free. In before consistently recognized that “an accused crime, crying, and after con- her she was compelled incriminate him must not be “dragged fessing if she be asked would she Ziegler, self.” Commonwealth v. day. out” Indeed, Tpr. accusation ... we Sauers’ warnings believe [Miranda ] “the were institutioned lying be and would that Mrs. Mannion protect giving an accused from statements immediately arrested, ris- having followed as a result his will overborne close ing from to stand beside coercive tactics.” Id.7 his chair repeat believed in a low voice extent, prosecution pro To it, probably did it adding did that she using inculpatory hibited from statements children, amounted to the classic for her interroga that are derived from “custodial independent will coercion and erosion an warnings tion” unless Miranda are adminis upon Mi- oneself which incriminate Moreover, tered. our courts have consistent warnings randa were founded. objective ly applied an in which the court test consider the nature of the encounter must 8/19/97, Opinion, Trial Court reinstated of the circumstances de 10/3/97, 6-7. Based on thor- corrected would reason termine whether individual record, I independent ough and review ably believe that her freedom action was agree with the court’s conclusion by trigger the interrogation, restricted thus carefully police calculat- that the conduct was ing warnings. v. Miranda Commonwealth a reason- to and that ed elicit admission — 143, 148 Pa. -, -, Gwynn, 723 A.2d person would not able in Mannion’s situation added). (1998) (emphasis troopers felt free to or to ask the have leave ¶ that in therefore find the 5 the of this case are not to leave. I would As facts drawn from dispute, inquiry suppression is to determine court’s inferences our sole legal by legitimate are and reasonable. the drawn the the evidence whether inferences Holmes, escape, opined a less that criminals should As Wendell Jr. in evil some 7. Justice Oliver States, 438, 470, ignoble government play an 48 should Olmstead v. 277 U.S. than that the United 564, (1928) (Dissent), part.” 72 944 "... it S.Ct. L.Ed.

205 majority acknowledges enough phone The that in her home the own to answer the the suppression court used correct test in the to ask the to leave. Had determining whether Mannion’s statements majority along assessed these factors with product interrogation were the of custodial they totality, the have others their would require warnings. so as to Miranda See conclusion, come to the as the inexorable did However, Gwynn, supra. Commonwealth v. suppression court, that Mannion did not feel majority “totality apply the fails to the of the Thus, the free to the to ask officers leave.9 test to the the circumstances” facts of case. majority’s Appellee that not conclusion was Instead, majority singles the out certain of in custody inculpatory when she made state- the court’s factual police ments to is erroneous and inconsistent majority Specifically, discounts others.8 the “totality with the the of circumstances” test that, assuming states even the investi- as enunciated law and out from case borne gation did on Appellee, focus a “custodial judice. the facts in the case sub automatically trig- was not added). gered.” (emphasis majority The fur- Further, experienced the learned and maintains, Trooper ther “the fact that Sauers hearing court had the benefit voice, itself, spoke in a low in and of fails to testimony observing firsthand and the evidence threat of force or coercion.” Accordingly, of the demeanor witnesses. added). (emphasis position court inwas the best person it While is true that neither of these determine whether reasonable factors, alone, triggers viewed Miranda Mannion’s situation would have felt free se, warnings Ellis, per 379 ask the officers to leave her residence. Pa.Super. 337, 1323, (1988), 549 A.2d Moreover, sup- facts adduced denied, 601, 522 Pa. 562 A.2d 824 pression supported by court were the record. (1989),such extremely factors are relevant Court, province It is not within the of this determining interroga whether a custodial record, our based on a cold to substitute place tion took based on the judgment for that court circumstances. See v. Commonwealth absent an error law. v. Commonwealth Busch, 97, 713 A.2d (Pa.Super.1998). Prosek, (Pa.Super.1997); Yet, majority fails to evaluate these im Rosario, v. portant together factors along with the denied, (1994),appeal many upon by other found relied factors (1996). major- 685 A.2d 547 court, including age, the trial Mannion’s ity fails to demonstrate such an error in this menacing accusatorial tone and conduct of case. troopers, duration the second in terrogation, I trooper’s Accordingly, would affirm the order statement lying arrested, granting Appellee’s was entered the trial court she would be suppress.10 fact that she not feel motion did comfortable explaining upper 8. In the rationale behind Miranda re- cer retains the hand and the accouter- stated, quirements, authority. Chief Justice Earl Warren "it That the ments officer lacks necessary proclaimed [is] to insure what license continue detain them unknown citizens, in the ha[s] Constitution not become but a ‘form person and a to most reasonable government words’ in the hands of officials.” away would feel free walk as the officer Arizona, Miranda v. U.S. S.Ct. to address him.” continues (1966) (citation 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (citation Zogby, supra, at 282 Commonwealth omitted). omitted). my particularly justified 10.I does not con- light note conclusion here This conclusion is Zog of our recent decision in flict with our recent decision in Commonwealth Busch, by, (Pa.Super.1998). 689 A.2d 280 In v. Busch, 713 A.2d 97 In Zogby, inherently stressed coercive nature trial court found that officers of an encounter between a civilian and a questioned suspect during a second visit less, officer: suspect his hour or home one-half enough felt it comfortable ask officers ... must be remembered that a officer home, complied. figure leave De- is an officers authoritative that an officer’s spite suspect authority commonly told he reinforced when en- the fact that the was was countering “suspect".... investigation, offi- this Court held that ‘‘The focus McEWEN, Judge Judges 10 President join DEL CAVANAUGH and SOLE Opinion by Judge

Dissenting SCHILLER. POLICE, OF

FRATERNAL ORDER 5, by NO. its trustee ad litem

LODGE COSTELLO, Appellant,

Richard OF PHILADELPHIA.

CITY Pennsylvania.

Commonwealth Court

Argued Oct.

Decided Jan. sup- questioning approxi- granting the second visit lasted the motion to on trial court erred in hours, mately “depriva- Appellee two the focus of press that a became absent additional evidence Busch, supra (citing investigation, reasonably liberty” present. believed tion Thus, McLaughlin, Pa. of movement was restricted. freedom Busch, case, (1977)). supra, distinguishable from case A.2d 1056 In this the evidence judice. hearing established that sub

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Mannion

Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Date Published: Feb 5, 1999

Citation: 725 A.2d 196

Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.