Commonwealth v. ManeraCommonwealth v. Manera
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Lally-Green
OPINION BY
LALLY-GREEN, J.:
¶ 1 Appellant, Marie Ann Manera, appeals from the judgment of sentence dated August 22, 2002, having been convicted of violating
¶ 2 The trial court set forth the facts of the case as follows:
[On August 2, 2001,] Ms. Manera was driving a vehicle with an expired inspection sticker and was stopped by a police officer. She failed to produce an operator’s license. Her license had been suspended effective November 30, 1996, for five (5) years, based on Ms. Manera’s status as a habitual offender due to her conviction on November 30, 1995, of driving under the influence.
Ms. Manera takes care of her daughter’s children. On the date in question she started feeling ill at home, because she hadn’t taken her medicine for arrhythmia, which she realized she left at her daughter’s home. She contacted that daughter, another daughter, and her mother, in an attempt to get her medicine, and to prevent it from falling into the hands of her one year old and three year old grandchildren. At her wit’s end she took a vehicle that was on her property awaiting an insurance appraisal and drove toward her daughter’s house, when she was arrested.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/2002, at 1-2.
¶ 3 On December 5, 2001, a District Justice found Appellant guilty. Appellant filed a timely appeal with the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. On August 22, 2002, the trial court held a trial
de novo
and concluded as a matter of fact that Appellant’s conduct would have fallen within the defense of justification afforded by
¶ 4 Appellant’s sole issue on appeal is: 4
I.Did the trial court err by finding the justification defense of emergency inapplicable to the charge of violating 75 Pa.C.S.A § 1543(B) , operating a motor vehicle while under suspension for a DUI-related offense?
Appellant’s Brief at 5. Because the issue before this Court involves a purely legal conclusion involving the interpretation of statutes, we review for an error of law. See, Panea v. Isdaner, 773 A.2d 782, 788 (Pa.Super.2001) (en banc).
¶ 5 “Justification” is defined in
Conduct which the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable if:
1. the harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged;
2. neither this title nor other law defining the offense provides exceptions or defenses dealing with the specific situation involved; and,
3. a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear.
1. that the actor was faced with a clear and imminent harm, not one which is debatable or speculative;
2. that the actor could reasonably expect that the actor’s actions would be effective in avoiding this greater harm,
3. that there is no legal alternative which will be effective in abating the harm; and,
4.that the Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the values at issue.
. Id. at 809.
¶ 6 The question in the instant case is whether the defense is generally available for prosecutions under
¶ 7 The trial court held that the justification defense does not apply to any violations of
¶8 We disagree. Simply put, we fail to see a clear connection between increased penalties and the absence of a justification defense. The Legislature could have amended the text of
¶ 9 We conclude that the learned trial court erred as a matter of law by precluding Appellant from attempting to assert the justification defense. Therefore, we must remand for a new trial. On remand, the court should consider the elements of
Capitolo
and apply them to the underlying offense of
¶ 10 Judgment of sentence vacated. Remanded for a new trial. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Notes
. Operating a motor vehicle while under suspension for a DUI-related offense.
. The trial court found that Appellant faced a clear and imminent harm and that her actions reasonably could be expected to avoid that harm. In addition, the court found that she exercised the available legal alternatives by telephoning family and friends to avoid driving. Trial Court Opinion, 12/13/2002, at 4.
. Appellant‘s sentence was postponed pending appeal.
.The Commonwealth agrees that Appellant is entitled to a new trial. The Commonwealth did not explain its reasoning. Moreover, the Commonwealth did not raise any argument concerning the trial court’s application of the justification defense to the facts of this case. Thus, we are constrained to address only one issue: namely, whether the justification defense is generally available for violations of
. The Official Comment to this section states that
. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wall, 372 Pa.Super. 534, 539 A.2d 1325, 1329 (1988) (defendants charged with criminal trespass for demonstrating at an abortion clinic could not claim the justification defense in part because abortions are expressly made legal under Pennsylvania law and United States constitutional law).
. Of course, the fact that a defense is theoretically available for a given crime does not mean that the Commonwealth must disprove justification in every case. Because justification is an affirmative defense, the defendant has the burden of asserting an appropriate offer of proof in order to be entitled to a jury instruction on justification. Capitolo, 498 A.2d at 810.
.We recognize the trial court’s factual finding that the justification defense would have been successful if it could have been asserted. In light of this finding, it is likely that Appellant will be discharged on remand. We decline, however, to order a discharge. Rather, we will remand for the trial court to take whatever action it deems appropriate.