Commonwealth v. MaguireCommonwealth v. Maguire
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Ronan
The defendant has been tried and convicted upon two indictments charging him with manslaughter. There was evidence that the defendant while operating an automobile upon River Street in Haverhill, a four-lane heavily travelled highway leading from Haverhill to Lawrence, at about seven o’clock on a pleasant Sunday evening in September, 1941, struck two persons who were repairing a tire upon their automobile and fatally injured them. There was testimony tending to show that the defendant was driving at about fifty miles an hour and that he was *670under the influence of intoxicating liquor. He was found guilty upon each of these two indictments and was given concurrent sentences in the house of correction. The defendant makes no contention that the evidence was insufficient to justify these verdicts. These two indictments were tried with a third indictment accusing the defendant, at the time and place mentioned in the manslaughter indictments, with operating a motor vehicle negligently, “upon a way or in a place to which the public has a right of access,” so that the lives or safety of the public might be endangered. Full and adequate instructions were given to the jury as to what must be proved in order to show commission of the offences described in the three indictments. The judge, at the request of the defendant, instructed the jury that manslaughter was a more serious offence than operating an automobile so as to endanger the public; that the latter was included in the former; that if they found that the defendant was guilty of manslaughter, then they need not consider the indictment for operating so as to endanger the public and should return a verdict of not guilty on that indictment; but that if they found that the defendant was not guilty of manslaughter, then they should proceed to determine whether or not he was guilty upon the third indictment. The jury found the defendant guilty upon this third indictment and that indictment was filed.
The defendant appealed under
The defendant contends that he could not be found guilty *671upon all three indictments either as matter of law or in accordance with the instructions given to the jury. To sustain the first proposition he relies upon Commonwealth v. Peach, 239 Mass. 575. That decision does not decide that one who has operated an automobile in a wanton and reckless manner and thereby fatally injured another cannot be convicted of manslaughter and also of negligently operating an automobile so as to endanger the public, in violation of the provision now appearing in
The defendant next contends that the jury were bound to follow the instructions in considering the evidence and in determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant. It is plain that the jury could not in accordance with the instructions find the defendant guilty on all three indictments. Low Supply Co. v. Pappacostopoulous, 283 Mass. 633. The importance of first considering the manslaughter indictments was stressed by the judge in the instructions to the jury, and it was only in the event that they came to the conclusion that the defendant was not guilty of that offence that they were to consider the evidence in reference to the other indictment. The rendition of the verdicts on the manslaughter indictments was consistent with these instructions. No contention has or could be successfully made that the evidence did not justify these verdicts, or that the jury did not intend to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. The jury failed to follow the instructions only in reference to the verdict on the statutory misdemeanor. The defendant, however, did not bring that case here and does not seek to set that verdict aside. We need not decide what remedy is appropriate to accomplish this result. See Commonwealth v. Mead, 10 Allen, 396. Marks v. Wentworth, 199 Mass. 44. Commonwealth v. Dascalakis, 246 Mass. 12. If the jury considered the manslaughter indictments first and decided that the defendant was guilty, the fact that they then considered the misdemeanor indictment could not in any way affect the conclusion already reached on the other indictments. On the other hand, if they, in disregard of the instructions, first considered the misdemeanor indictment and found the defendant guilty, then they were not precluded from deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant on the two indictments charging him with manslaughter. The Com*674monwealth was required to prove the essential facts necessary to support each indictment before a verdict of guilty could be returned to the same extent as if each indictment were being prosecuted separately from the others. While the instructions became the law of the trial, it would be pushing this principle too far to hold that the two verdicts for manslaughter, which are just and sound in accordance with well established principles of substantive law, should be set aside because the jury may not have proceeded to consider the indictments for manslaughter before deliberating on the third indictment as they were told to do in the instructions of the judge. The guilt or innocence of a defendant in a criminal prosecution should not depend upon the order in which the jury pass upon the various indictments upon which he is being tried. We see nothing in this record to show that the verdicts on the indictments for manslaughter were in any way erroneously affected by the verdict returned on the third indictment. The situation is somewhat analogous to that presented where an error has occurred in reference to the trial of one of several indictments tried together and has not prejudiced the defendant as to his trial upon the other indictments, and where the verdict on that indictment has been set aside and the verdicts on the other indictments permitted to stand. Commonwealth v. Andrews, 132 Mass. 263. Commonwealth v. Dyer, 243 Mass. 472. Commonwealth v. McCarthy, 281 Mass. 253. Commonwealth v. Mannos, 311 Mass. 94.
Judgments affirmed.