Commonwealth v. MaguireCommonwealth v. Maguire
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Wilkins
We granted the defendant’s application for direct appellate review of his convictions, in a single trial, of
The defendant principally challenges the admission, for the purpose of impeachment, of the fact of his conviction on May 26,1981, of “open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior” in the presence of four named females. He argues that the judge abused his discretion in admitting the evidence, even though the judge instructed the jury immediately (and again in his charge) that the evidence was admitted solely on the question of the defendant’s credibility. In making this argument, the defendant urges that we make available appellate review of a judge’s determination to admit evidence of a prior conviction. We agree that appellate review should be and is available, but we conclude that the admission of evidence of the defendant’s conviction was not an abuse of discretion. We find no error in the judge’s denial of the jury’s request for a transcript of the testimony of a Commonwealth witness and no reversible error in the exclusion of a written report made by that witness. We thus affirm the convictions.
In
Commonwealth
v.
West,
357 Mass. 245, 249 (1970), this court held that the language in
The reasoning that places discretionary authority in a trial judge to exclude evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction has a logical basis. The admission of evidence of a prior conviction, particularly a conviction of a crime not involving the defendant’s truthfulness and one closely related to or identical to the crime with which the defendant is charged, may well divert the jury’s attention from the question of the defendant’s guilt to the question of the defendant’s bad character. Moreover, the threat of the admission of evidence of a defendant’s prior conviction of a crime may discourage him from testifying. A trier of fact will often be aided rather than impeded in its task by hearing a defendant’s testimony.
We turn to the circumstances of the admission of evidence of the defendant’s conviction, to test whether there was an abuse of discretion, and we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. The judge twice gave appropriate limiting instructions, and the prosecution did not misuse that evidence in its argument to the jury. The judge declined defense counsel’s
Because the crime of which the defendant had been convicted resulted in a fine of only $250, the jury could not reasonably have believed that it was a serious offense. The jury could have inferred that the crime had sexual connotations, but it was not a conviction of a violent crime similar to those with which the defendant was currently charged. As we have noted, the substantial similarity of the crimes is a factor to be considered in deciding whether evidence of a conviction of a prior crime should be admitted. See Commonwealth v. Diaz, supra at 81; Commonwealth v. Chase, 372 Mass. 736, 750 (1977). Here, the conduct implicitly involved in the prior crime was not substantially similar to rape or attempted rape. We conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion by the admission, for impeachment purposes only, of evidence of the prior conviction. 11
Even if we were to assume in the defendant’s favor that the report contained statements that were inconsistent with the neighbor’s trial testimony, its exclusion was not error. The judge would have been warranted in concluding that the police officer’s memory was largely refreshed by reading the report, so that the report was not admissible as past recollection recorded.
Commonwealth
v.
Bookman,
386 Mass. 657, 662 n.8 (1982). If in fact his memory was not refreshed, the police
The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the jury’s request for a transcript of the police officer’s testimony (or for a reading of his testimony). Commonwealth v. Mandeville, 386 Mass. 393, 405 (1982).
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
Guilty verdicts were also returned on indictments charging breaking and entering the apartment of one of the women and for assault and battery on the other woman. These indictments were placed on file with the defendant’s consent. The defendant seeks reversal of the verdicts on these charges as well.
See, e.g.,
See, e.g.,
See, e.g.,
People
v.
Beagle,
6 Cal. 3d 441, 451-452 (1972);
People
v.
Montgomery,
47 Ill. 2d 510, 515 (1971);
People
v.
Jackson,
391 Mich. 323, 336 (1974) (see now
See
State
v.
Marquez,
160 Conn. 47, 51-52 (1970);
State
v.
Knee,
101 Idaho 484, 485-486 (1980);
State
v.
Morgan,
541 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Tenn. 1976). See also 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
supra
at 609-114 (Del.), and 609-134 to 609-136 (Wash.), for rules which were consciously adopted in the face of contrary statutes. Also, compare
The Proposed Rules of Evidence (1980) submitted to this court for consideration contained a proposal that would have modified the result in the
West
case. Proposed
“(a) General rule. For the purposes of impeaching the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime is admissible. In a criminal case, the court shall have discretion to exclude evidence of a prior conviction offered to impeach the credibility of the accused if it finds that its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
There shall be no discretion to exclude a prior conviction offered to impeach the credibility of any other witness. A plea of guilty or a finding or verdict of guilty shall constitute a conviction.”
It appears that, if evidence of a prior conviction is admitted only to impeach the defendant’s credibility, the due process guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States are not violated. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561 (1967); Leno v. Gaughan, 664 F.2d 314, 315 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam); United States v. Belt, 514 F.2d 837, 846-850 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Dixon v. United States, 287 A.2d 89, 93-96 (D.C. Ct. App.), cert, denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).
If a defendant seeks to exclude evidence of his prior conviction, the judge may, within constitutional limits, condition such an exclusion on the defendant’s agreement not to impeach Commonwealth witnesses similarly. See Commonwealth v. Knight, supra at 194 n.l.
The defendant seeks to expand the record to show that during an unrecorded lobby conference, held before the pretrial hearing on the motion in limine, defense counsel explained that the crime charged was not a heterosexual offense but rather was an offer by the defendant to the local football team, sought to be conveyed through some of its female cheerleaders, to engage in colloquially described acts of sexual conduct with each member of the team if it should win its Thanksgiving game against its traditional rival. It has long been the rule in this Commonwealth that, once a record of a witness’s conviction of a crime has been introduced to impeach him, “the conviction must be left unexplained” and thus the proponent of the witness may not undertake in rehabilitation of the witness to show the circumstances of the conviction. Lamoureux v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 169 Mass. 338, 340 (1897). Commonwealth v. Galligan, 155 Mass. 54, 56 (1891). Similarly, the judge considering the defendant’s motion in limine did not have to consider the circumstances of the prior crime. Although the judge in his discretion could have considered the circumstances of the prior conviction, he was not obliged to do so.
The possibility of the jury’s finding the defendant guilty of crimes against one victim and, with that knowledge, then considering the indict ments involving the second victim is obvious. The defendant did not argue below, nor does he argue here, however, that the trial of all indictments together created prejudice “so compelling that it prevents a defendant from obtaining a fair trial.” Commonwealth v. Moran, 387 Mass. 644, 658 (1982). In these circumstances, admission of evidence of the defendant’s prior conviction of a dissimilar crime assumes particular insignificance.