376 Mass. 148 | Mass. | 1978
The defendant was convicted by a jury of six of wilfully and maliciously burning a motor vehicle (G. L. c. 266, § 5) belonging to his mother. Before us, he challenges the admissibility of certain evidence and the denial of his motion for a directed verdict presented at the close of the Commonwealth’s case.
1. Given this evidence, the testimony concerning the damaged mailboxes was relevant as bearing on the defendant’s possible motive to burn the Matador in order to conceal the fact that he had damaged his mother’s automobile by hitting the mailboxes. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 373 Mass. 1, 8-9 (1977); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 352 Mass. 311, 320-321 (1967), cert. dismissed, 390 U.S. 511 (1968).
2. The defendant’s motion for a directed verdict was properly denied. A motion for a directed verdict in a criminal case should not be allowed when the evidence most favorable to the Commonwealth is sufficient to war
The jury could also have found that the defendant set the fire wilfully and maliciously in that the defendant drove the burning Matador from the gas station and abandoned it, making no effort to extinguish or report the fire. The jury were entitled to consider that conduct as evidence of the defendant’s intent. Commonwealth v. Vellucci, 284 Mass. 443, 445-446 (1933). Commonwealth v. Cali, 247 Mass. 20, 24-25 (1923). The case of Commonwealth v. Shea, 324 Mass. 710 (1949), on which the defendant relies, is distinguishable for reasons stated in Commonwealth v. Rand, 363 Mass. 554, 561-562 (1973).
Judgment affirmed.