Commonwealth v. MacKCommonwealth v. MacK
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Lead Opinion
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROBERTS, Justice.Appellant Daniel Nathaniel Mack, Jr., entered a plea of guilty to a charge of robbery with accomplice by violence and received a sentence of five to ten years in prison. On appeal to the Superior Court, he challenged the validity of his guilty plea, alleging that the guilty plea colloquy was insufficient to demonstrate thаt it was intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily tendered. He petitioned this Court for leave to appeal from the Superior Cоurt’s affirmance1 of his judgment of sentence. We granted that рetition, and now reverse the order of the Superior Cоurt.2
As we stated in Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 465 Pa. 379, 350 A.2d 815 (1976) :
“The constitutional requirement for a valid guilty plea is that thе record of the guilty plea hearing contain an affirmative showing that the defendant understands ‘what the plea cоnnotes and ... its consequences.’ In particular casеs, this understanding has been held to include: (1) an understanding what speсific acts the defendant is admitting and whether they make out the crime charged; (2) an understanding of the rights given up by choosing nоt to put the state to its proof; and (3) an understanding of the nature and extent of punishment which may be imposed for the crime which the defendant admits committing. *14Obviously, this is not an all inclusive list, bеcause the indicia of a voluntary, knowing and intelligent plеa will vary with the circumstances of the individual case.” (Footnotes omitted.)
The guilty plea colloquy in this case is inadequate in many respects. For example, appеllant was questioned concerning the waiver of all of thе rights associated with a jury trial, as follows:
“THE COURT: Now, you know that by entеring a guilty plea you give up the right to a Jury trial ?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: You know that, do you ?
“THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.”
This is the complеte colloquy concerning the defendant’s waiver of rights аfforded and protected by a jury trial. The trial court alsо explained to the defendant the range of sentenсes which could be imposed, and asked him whether he was аcting of his own free will and whether he had discussed his plea with his lawyer. Affirmative responses to each of these questions apparently satisfied the trial court that the pleа was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
This guilty plea colloquy fails to satisfy not only the most recent decisions of this Court, but fails to satisfy every statement of what the colloquy must show from Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 428 Pa. 102, 237 A.2d 196 (1968), to the recent statement in Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 (1974).
Order reversed, case remanded for a new trial.
POMEROY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which MANDERINO, J., joins.Notes
. Commonwealth v. Mack, 230 Pa.Super. 596, 326 A.2d 881 (1974).
. We hear this аppeal under authority of the Appellate Court Jurisdiсtion Act of 1970, Act of July 31, 1970, P.L. 673, art. II, § 204(a), 17 P.S. 211.204(a) (Supp.1975).
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring).
I agree that the guilty plea colloquy which preceded the trial court’s acceptance of appellant’s plea of guilty was inadequate under the standards prevailing at the *15timе the plea was entered. I am also of opinion that the Court properly reached the merits of apрellant’s challenge to his guilty plea, despite the faсt that no petition to withdraw the plea was filed in the trial сourt. See my concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Rodgers, 465 Pa. 379, 386, 350 A.2d 815 (1974). Accordingly, I concur in thе reversal of the order of the Superior Court affirming the judgment of sentence and in the remanding of the case for a new trial.
MANDERINO, J., joins in this concurring opinion.