321 Mass. 294 | Mass. | 1947
The complaint alleged that on June 30, 1946, the defendant in a public street "did accost and annoy one Margaret Russo, a person of the opposite sex, with certain offensive acts and language.” The defendant has insisted throughout that this complaint alleges no crime, and that his conviction was unlawful.
The statute involved is G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 272, § 53, as it appears in St. 1943, c. 377. So far as it relates to the crime apparently intended to be charged this section reads "... persons who with offensive and disorderly act or language accost or annoy persons of the opposite sex . . . may be punished . . . .” It will be noted that the complaint charges only offensive acts and language, whereas the statute in its present form, if literally construed, requires that the acts or language be both offensive and disorderly.
Section 53 has had a long history through the times of the
But whatever would have been the construction of the word “offensive” and of the word “disorderly” in the part of the section with which we are now principally concerned before the enactment of St. 1943, c. 377, it is plain that the act of 1943 accomplished a revision of the entire section, and that its purpose was to simplify, to clarify, to modernize, and to make more precise an ancient statute some of the terms of which were difficult to define and had come to have a flavor of obsolescence. To this end the new statute omitted all reference to “rogues and vagabonds,” to “persons who use any juggling or unlawful games or plays,” to “common pipers and fiddlers,” to “pilferers,” and to “persons who neglect their calling or employment or who misspend what they earn and do not provide for themselves,” and although it retained the general class of “idle and disorderly persons,” it no longer expressly defined that class as including “persons who neglect all lawful business and habitually misspend their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses
We are therefore of opinion that the defendant is right in his contention that the complaint, which charges him only with acts and language which were “offensive” but does not allege that such acts and language were “disorderly,” does not charge him with a crime. The exceptions must be sustained, and the complaint dismissed. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 211, § 8. Commonwealth v. Andler, 247 Mass. 580. Commonwealth v. Bracy, 313 Mass. 121. Commonwealth v. Akmakjian, 316 Mass. 97, 100, 103.
So ordered.
None of these three was previously a distinct statutory crime. Commonwealth v. Harris, 101 Mass. 29. Commonwealth v. Goodall, 165 Mass. 588. Commonwealth v. Broadland, 315 Mass. 20. But see forms of indictments in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 277, at page 3250.