COMMONWEALTH оf Pennsylvania v. Wayne E. LIDDICK, Appellant (two cases).
370 A.2d 729 | 471 Pa. 523
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued May 6, 1976. Decided March 16, 1977.
Martson & Snelbaker, Richard C. Snelbaker, Marlin R. McCaleb, Mеchanicsburg, for Wayne Liddick.
Before EAGEN, O‘BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.
POMEROY, Justice.
Following a 1974 jury trial Wayne Earl Liddick was found guilty of murder in the first degree for the drowning death of his wife, Sharon Liddick. Post-trial mоtions were filed and argued before a court en banc, and on July 21, 1975, the court issued an order that both granted Liddick‘s motion for a new trial and denied his mоtion in arrest of judgment. From that order, cross appeals have been taken by the Commonwealth and defendant Liddick.
Addressing first the Commonwealth‘s appeal,1 we note initially that, as with a denial of a motion for new trial, so with a grant of such a motion, our review is limited to ascertaining whether the lower court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Commonwealth v. Morales, 458 Pa. 18, 326 A.2d 331 (1974); Commonwealth v. Jones, 455 Pa. 488, 317 A.2d 233 (1974). In this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the court en banc‘s concluding that the admission of two black and white photogrаphs of the corpse of the deceased victim constituted error justifying a new trial.
In Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 459 Pa. 511, 521, 329 A.2d 844, 849 (1974), we held that a trial court must employ a two-stepped аnalysis to determine whether a photograph of a corpse is admissible in evidence by the prosecution. Preliminarily, the court must decide whеther the photograph is inflammatory. If it is deemed not to be inflammatory, the exhibit is admissible, subject, of
One of the challenged photographs in the instant case depicts the nude body of the victim as it appeared upon being retrieved from a lake two to three days after the drowning. The flesh is bloated and discolored, the facial features distorted. See Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 281, 372 A.2d 687, 697 (1977). We cannot say that the court en banc was wrong in concluding that this photograph of the victim‘s partially decomposed body was inflammatory. The Commonwealth argues, nevertheless, that the photograph suppliеd needed evidence of the defendant‘s identity as perpetrator of the crime since it portrays the body bound by rope and chain cоnnected to cinder blocks, the same apparatus by means of which defendant had earlier thought to dispose of his wife‘s body once her dеath was accomplished. This contention, however, overlooks the fact that the testimony of the Commonwealth witnesses who recoverеd the body from the lake adequately conveyed to the jury the substance of the photograph, thus rendering the latter evidence merely cumulаtive. While the picture had a degree of evidentiary value, it cannot be considered “essential“. See Hilton, supra; Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzino, 455 Pa. 378, 383, 317 A.2d 225, 227 (1974); Commonwealth v. Powell, 428 Pa. 275, 279, 241 A.2d 119, 121 (1968).
In his cross appeal, defendant Liddick asks us to reverse the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment
Order affirmed.
JONES, former C. J., did not pаrticipate in the decision of this case.
MANDERINO, J., filed a concurring opinion.
ROBERTS, J., filed a concurring opinion.
MANDERINO, Justice, concurring.
I join in the opinion of the Court except that portion setting forth a two-step analysis to determinе whether a photograph of a corpse may be introduced into evidence by the prosecution. I agree that the two-step analysis is proper in order to determine the admissibility of a photo-
When the issue concerns the introduction of the photograph of a corpse, the first step of the two-step analysis must always result in a conclusion that the photograph is inflammatory at least in a homicide trial where the pеrson depicted in the picture was the victim of the crime for which the defendant is being tried.
As a matter of law the photograph of the corрse is inflammatory. Thus, in such cases there is no need to consider the first step of the two-step analysis.
I have no doubt that some jurors can deliberаte on a defendant‘s guilt or innocence with an open mind after viewing the photograph of the homicide victim‘s corpse. This can not be sаid for all jurors. A very side spectrum is necessary to encompass the varying and inexplicable reactions of people to death and particularly to photographs of dead people. One need not possess a medical or psychology degree to know that photographs of the dead, let alone homicide victims, evoke a wide range of varying responses.
A photograph of a homicidе victim should be considered per se inflammatory. Thus, the first step of the two-step analysis is not needed. Only the second step should be considered. Mr. Justiсe Roberts in his dissenting opinion, in which I joined, in Commonwealth v. Petrakovich, 459 Pa. 511, 521, 329 A.2d 844, 852 (1974) said “[u]nder our decision . . . pictures of murder victims may never be admitted until the trial court decides that the evidentiаry value of the pictures exceeds the likelihood that the pictures will influence the passions of the jury.” This has been and should be the rule.
ROBERTS, Justice, concurring.
I join in the оpinion of the majority except insofar as it suggests that the standard for admissibility of photographs of homicide victims, whether the photographs