Case Information
*1 PRESENT: All the Justices
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
OPINION BY v. Record No. 122053 JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS
September 12, 2013 PAUL ANTHONY LEONE
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH H. Thomas Padrick, Jr., Judge
In this appeal we consider whether the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach ("circuit сourt") erred when it restored Paul Anthony Leone's ("Leone") right to ship, transport, possess or receive firearms pursuаnt to Code § 18.2-308.2(C).
I. Facts and Proceedings
Leone was convicted of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute on December 4, 1994. Because of that conviction, Leone suffered certain political disabilities. On January 9, 2012, Governor Robert F. McDonnell restored all of Leone's civil rights except his right to ship, transport, possess or receive firearms. On June 20, 2012, Leone filed a petition in the circuit court to have his right to ship, transport, possess or receive firearms restored in acсordance with Code § 18.2- 308.2(C). The Commonwealth filed an answer and motion to dismiss, and argued that the circuit court lacked venue to grant Leone's petition for restoration because Leone resides in North *2 Carolina, and not in the City of Virginia Beach ("Virginia Beach"). [1]
The circuit court held a hearing on the petition on July 10, 2012. On August 30, 2012, the circuit court granted Leone's petition and by order restored his right to ship, transport, possess or receive firearms. The order specificаlly noted that the restoration did not include the right to carry a concealed weapon.
The Commonwealth filеd a petition for appeal and we granted an appeal [2] on the following assignment of error:
1. Did the court err by granting the petition when the рetitioner did not reside in the City of Virginia Beach and Virginia Code Section 18.2-308.2(C) specifically requires the petitioner tо reside in the jurisdiction where the petition is filed?
II. Analysis
A. Standard of Review
Well-settled principles of statutory construction guide our analysis in this case.
[A]n issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law which we review de novo. When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain *3 meaning of that language. Furthermore, we must give effect to the legislature's intentiоn as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity. If a statute is subject to more than one interpretation, we must apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the statute.
Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc.,
B. Code § 18.2-308.2
Code § 18.2-308.2(A) states that anyone who has been convicted of a felony may no longer possess or transport a firearm or ammunition. Code § 18.2-308.2(C) provides that any person prohibited from possessing, transporting or сarrying a firearm under subsection A
may petition the circuit court of the jurisdiction in which he resides for a permit to possess or carry a firearm or stun weapon; however, no person who has been convicted of a felony shall be qualified to petition for such a permit unless his civil rights have been restored by the Governor or other apprоpriate authority. A copy of the petition shall be mailed or delivered to the attorney for the Commonwealth for the jurisdiction where the petition was filed who shall be entitled to respond and represent the interests of the Cоmmonwealth.
Code § 18.2-308.2(C) (emphasis added).
There is no dispute that Leone was convicted of a felony, and that he had his civil rights restored by the Governor. There is also no dispute that Leone resides in North Carolina, *4 and that he filed his petition for restoration in the Circuit Court of the City of Virginia Beach.
As we have stated on numerous occasions, it is well-settled
that when the language of а statute is unambiguous, we are bound
by the plain meaning of that language. Conyers,
Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of Virginia
grants to the General Assembly the power to determine the
jurisdiction of the courts of the Commonwealth. In Gallagher v.
Commonwealth,
However, when the General Assembly granted circuit courts
the jurisdiction to restore those rights, it limited the
*5
territorial jurisdiction of circuit courts to adjudication of
petitions for restoration filed by persons who reside within the
territorial jurisdiction of the circuit court. See Code § 18.2-
308(C). Territorial jurisdiction is synonymous with venue.
Kelso v. Commonwealth,
Leone admits that he does not currently reside in Virginia Beach, and did not reside in Virginia Beаch when he filed his petition for restoration. Because Leone is not a resident of Virginia Beach, the circuit сourt lacked territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate Leone's petition for restoration of firearms rights.
III. Conclusion
We hold that thе circuit court erred when it granted Leone's petition for restoration of his right to ship, *6 transport, possess or receive firearms. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and dismiss the petition.
Reversed and dismissed.
Notes
[1] There is some discrepаncy as to the date of the conviction. The circuit court order and Leone's petition state the conviction was December 4, 1994, but the Governor's executive order and the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss list the conviction date as December 4, 1995. The original conviction order is not part of the record.
[2] No constitutional challenges to the statute were presented in the trial court and, consequently, are not before us on appeal.