*1 Pеnnsylvania COMMONWEALTH of (two cases). LEE, Frank Pennsylvania. Argued April 1976.
Decided Jan. 1977. *2 appellant. Jr., Philadelphia, for Nichols, K. Edward Atty., Fitzpatrick, Steven H. Gold- Dist. F. Emmett Div., blatt, Chief, Appeals Abraham Asst. Dist. Atty., appellee. Gafni, Philadelphia, for EAGEN, O’BRIEN, ROB- Before and MANDERINO, POMEROY, NIX, JJ. ERTS, and OPINION O’BRIEN, Justice. judge jury Lee,
Appellant, and Frank was tried aggravat- guilty first degree, and of murder found robbery, burglary conspiracy. motions ed Post-trial aрpellant to a term was sentenced denied imprisonment on life institution at a state correctional to concur- the murder conviction. He also sentenced prisоn twenty years rent (aggravated terms ten robbery), twenty years (burglary) ten to two and one May years (conspiracy). The arise from convictions 6,1970, beating death of Selez. Isadorе court on the filed to this direct appealed murder He the other convictions conviction. Superior Court, which on June certified appeals those to this court.
I. Appellant argues failing sup- that the court erred *3 рress confession, as he was not to consult with allowed parents waiving rights. his before his Miranda We agree. surrounding appeal
The facts are as follows. Appellant fifteеn-year-old juvenile was a at the time his arrest. May 8, He was arrested at his home on at 2:00 a. m. Appellant arrived at the Police Adminis Building m., prior any tration at m. 2:07 At 2:25 a. to a. questioning by police, appellant given was his Miranda warnings. He “waived” his rights, constitutional admitted robbery-slaying involvement of Selez. His writing statement was reduced to 3:23 a. m. At point, police apрellant’s parents, called who were taken police parents see their son. The arrived m., at 3:53 a. appellant giv told that had been en warnings. his Miranda was to talk allowed parents to his police alone and at 4:45 a. m. told he give wished a formal statement. The formal state ment, vary original which did not substance from confession, completed was at 8:20 a. m. A.2d Chaney, v. 465 Pa.
In Commonwealth (1975), this court stated: juvenile oppor- showing an . that a had “. . absent a par- tunity informed to consult with an interested and his or counsel before he Miranda ent adult or waived rights, his will be ineffectual.” waiver appellant case, not. consult In the instant allowed original parents given had his with his until after he juvenile concerning сonfession. our decisions Under confessions, appellant’s constitutional waiver his sup rights must be was ineffective and confession pressed. Roane, See Commonwealth Pа. Starkes, (1974); A.2d (1975); Commonwealth v. II. argues appellant should
The Commonwealth decision of the McCutchen not be entitled to benefit appellant’s arrest, trial occurred cоnfession and because agree. prior In Common to that decision. We do (1975), this Chaney, A.2d 829 wealth v. any person case is on direct held that court whose is entitled to the of the MсCutehen decision. Un benefit appellant der rule entitled announced juvenile is before us confession decisions as his case appeal. on direct *4 theory judgment
Chaney is on thе based exhausted, availability until the final of has applicable any judicial changes to a in the law are and Walker, prior judgment. case Linkletter final (1965), 1731, L.Ed.2d Common (1968). The Little, Pa. wеalth appeal” urges us the “direct to overrule of stan rule of Little substitute a “date occurrence” and prospectivity questions involving of our de- for the dard adopt suggested cisions. refuse to the rule the We Commonwealth. dissenting opinion
As Mr. Justice Roberts stated in a writer) (joined by Justice this to Com Mr. Cohen and Jefferson, monwealth v. 243 A.2d (1968): . “. . Court of the United States рros- used at three to anchor the least distinct events pectivity litigation is (1) of its decisions: whether the (Linkletter); (2) final date of commencement of (Johnson); (3) upon the date whiсh the and alleged (Stovall). constitutional violation occurred At two least of these three alternatives available this Court when Dravecz [424 (1967)] was . decided. . . Had we chosen the rule, Johnson Jefferson would not be able to assert rights established in Dravecz for his trial commenced Instead, well before not. this Miranda. We did employed finality concept and, the Linkletter under Linkletter, judgment this (Emphasis is not final.” added.) recognize inequities
We
that various
arise in all three
litigant
standard when one
benefits from a decision and
another, seеmingly similarly situated,
is denied
same
opinion
We
benefit.
are
Little-Linkletter
finality approach, which was first
announced
United
Peggy,
States v.
Schooner
1 Cranch
Judgments of sentence for reversed and case remanded a new trial opinion. consistent
NIX, J., joins opinion in Part files a con- curring opinion concerning opinion. Part II of the
POMEROY, J., dissenting opinion files which EAGEN, J., join.
406 concurring.
NIX, Justice, I agree I of the of the Court. am Opinion I with Part concurring opinion I can cоmpelled this because write expressed accept II. the Part views First, in Part II question need for the discussion I the applicability of the has indicated the majority since as 1 аppeal still on the rule to all matters direct McCutchen already by this in Commonwealth has decided (1975).2 407, For v. appel applied to it clear that doctrine reason thе agree I the result reached lant and for that reason with Opinion in the of the Court. disagreement gener-
However,
the
in serious
am
proposition expressed
al
O’Brien
all
by Mr. Justice
changes
one on
law
be available to
di-
new
should
appeal.
by
As noted
States
rect
United
blindly
of
inflexible rule
Court we should not
embrace an
change
determining
aрplicability
of a new
thumb for
in each case
but rather we should make a decision
lawof
upon
purposes sought
depending
be served
offi-
rule, the extent of reliance
law enforcement
new
the adminis-
on the old standards and the effect on
cials
application
justice
of the new
tration
retroactive
States,
standard. Desist v.
394 U.S.
S.Ct.
United
v.
also,
(1969).
See
Williams
22 L.Ed.2d
States,
L.Ed.2d
401 U.S.
United
S.Ct.
(1971);
Alaska,
Fuller v.
(1968).
L.Ed.2d
dissenting.
Justice,
POMEROY,
question of
majority opinion is correct
The
exclusionary
an-
application
rule
the retroactive
343 A.2d
1.
Commonwealth
аrrest,
place
appellant’s
took
before
confession
2. “While
concerning
juvenile’s
of his Miranda
waiver
our decisions
decisions
rights,
to the benefit of those
is nevertheless entitled
he
deci-
at the
our McCutchen
direct
time of
since he
on
Chaney, supra at
omitted)
(Citations
sions.”
409,
In
Johnson v. New
(1966),
“Future from new defendants will benefit our governing in-custody interrogation, standards while past may still defendants avail themselves of the vol- untariness Law enforcement officers test.
courts will have fair notice statements taken (1975). 1. Commonwealth v. A.2d dissenting opinions Eagen (joined by 2. See also the of Mr. Justice writer) Mr. Chief Justice Jones and this Commonwealth Roanе, (1974), Starkes, against may be used not of these standards violation only application be- Prospective to trials accused. an particularly gun the standards were announced after protect attempting appropriate here. Authorities apprised heretofore of privilege have obligatory. Conse- specific safeguаrds which are now which, although be- adopted quently they have devices minimum, not intentional low the constitutional privilege. In these requirements of the evasions pend- upset still cirсumstances, of the convictions all pre- in trials ing were obtained on direct which impose unjus- ceding an Miranda would Escobedo and justice.” Id. tifiable burden on the administration 732-733, at аt S.Ct. 1780-1781. *7 altogether my and is mind, that sound
To rationale applicable now before us. equally to the situation prophylactic rule hold that this Court’s would therefore regarding juvenile limited to cases should be confessions announced. after the rule was whose trial commenced Hence dissent. EAGEN, dissenting J., join in
opinion.