Commonwealth v. LeatherburyCommonwealth v. Leatherbury
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- Before:
- Cercone
This is an appeal from the judgment of sentence of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. We affirm.
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Appellant, a juvenile, was charged with third degree murder, burglary, robbery, and criminal conspiracy in connection with the beating death of a sixty-seven year old man in his residence and removal of money found therein. After entering a plea of not guilty, appellant filed a motion to transfer his case to the juvenile division of the court pursuant to
On September 27, 1988, the lower court, the Honorable Charles Durham presiding, denied appellant’s motion to decertify the case to juvenile court. Thereafter, appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to all charges and the court accepted the plea. On the charge of third degree murder, the lower court, the Honorable Robert Latrone presiding, sentenced appellant to a term of imprisonment of ten to twenty years. A consecutive sentence of ten to twenty years was imposed on the robbery count. Sentence was suspended on the remaining two charges. Appellant then filed the instant timely appeal of the judgment of sentence.
On appeal, appellant contends that the lower court erred in failing to grant his motion for decertification to the juvenile division because the lower court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute due to appellant’s asserted amenability to treatment as a juvenile. We note first that a motion to transfer criminal proceedings to juvenile court presents jurisdictional issues which are not waived for appellate purposes. Commonwealth v. Pyle, 462 Pa. 613, 342 A.2d 101 (1975); Commonwealth v. Zoller, 345 Pa.Super. 350, 498 A.2d 436 (1985). Therefore, appellant’s claim is properly before us.
Generally, the prosecution of criminal offenses charged to juvenile offenders is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court.
To effectuate a transfer to juvenile court in a murder case, the court must apply and the juvenile must meet the criteria for transfer set forth in
In the instant case, at appellant’s decertification hearing, he offered the testimony of two experts. The lower court accurately summarized this testimony as follows:
Roland Lamb [B.A., psychotherapist/family therapist] interviewed the defendant and the defendant’s mother *562 and sister on August 28 and September 7, 1988. He testified before this court that he learned that the defendant had not gone to school beyond the elementary level, had a school record indicating poor attendance [see footnote, infra\ and was illiterate. In Mr. Lamb’s opinion the defendant’s poor home environment required that he be placed in a controlled environment for a long period of time. In his written report, Mr. Lamb elaborated on the inadequacies of defendant’s home life and referred to a prior unsuccessful placement of the defendant in a group home in Easton, Pennsylvania by the Family Court system. The defendant had difficulty adjusting to the home and after his return home reverted to truancy, and drug and alcohol consumption on the streets.
Dr. Russell Floyd testified that the defendant was in need of counselling [sic] and educational development in a juvenile setting.
footnote: Defendant’s school records which were reviewed by this court are replete with notations as to chronic truancy____
In denying appellant’s petition for transfer, the lower court reasoned that because of appellant’s age, he would be under juvenile supervision for only three years, that previous attempts to rehabilitate appellant had proven unsuccessful, that appellant actively participated in the burglary of a home which resulted in the killing of a defenseless victim, and that appellant lacked any remorse for his participation in the crime. The lower court also noted that there was an absence of evidence that appellant suffered from any mental disability, that the interests of society required the application of legal restraint and discipline as an adult to appellant, and that the evidence did not affirmatively demonstrate that appellant would benefit from treatment as a youthful offender.
We find no abuse of discretion in the lower court’s reasoning. The court’s explanation demonstrates that it fully considered the factors set forth in
Appellant’s contention that the Commonwealth had the burden of coming forth with witnesses to rebut the testimony of appellant’s experts is without merit. The Commonwealth does not have to present “live” testimony to assert a juvenile’s nonamenability to treatment; it may rely upon notes of testimony, the juvenile file, and the juvenile’s school record. Commonwealth v. Rush, 522 Pa. 379, 562 A.2d 285 (1989). All of this information was available to the court in the instant case. In addition, much of the expert testimony offered at the decertification hearing supports the lower court’s decision. Furthermore, as we indicated previously, the burden of proof in a transfer petition is on the juvenile to prove his amenability to treatment. Commonwealth v. Pyle, supra; Commonwealth v. Brown, supra.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.