In Commonwealth v. Lattimore,
The Commonwealth argues that the “gatekeeper” restrictions in G. L. c. 278, § 33E, apply to all “capital cases,” and that a “capital case” is defined as “a case in which the defendant was tried on an indictment for murder in the first degree and was convicted of murder in the first degree.” G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The Commonwealth argues that because the defendant was indicted, tried, and convicted of murder in the first degree, this court’s subsequent reduction of the verdict to murder in the second degree does not exclude this case from the statutory requirement. According to the Commonwealth, “conviction” refers only to the jury’s rendering of the verdict. We disagree. After this court reduced the verdict, under our power under § 33E, the defendant stood convicted of murder in the second degree. Nor are we persuaded by the Commonwealth’s assertion that the Legislature intended that, where a defendant has received plenary review under § 33E, the gatekeeper provisions should be a condition of any further appeal. See Commonwealth v. Adrey,
Therefore, we conclude that the single justice of the Appeals Court properly exercised jurisdiction over the defendant’s motion to appoint coun
So ordered.
