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Commonwealth v. Krasner
427 A.2d 1169
Pa. Super. Ct.
1981
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*1 tо the is that Mrs. did not know about the argument Kelley lien because the had not returned to her a Company Patz of the lien which she knew copy signed. contract She balance was still owing the contract and that this was This not fully reported the Kibbes. was sufficient to lien, bring knowledge home to Mr. Kibbe of a and a subse- Hence, quent search of the records disclosed none. Kibbe lien, did not have the knowledge although actual of a Mrs. had she Patz Kelley disclosed all knew about the fully circumstances, transaction. Under the jury quite justified exonerating Mrs. from to the Kelley any liability appellants.

Appellant objections makes several to the refusal of the find, Court to make specific charges certain to the We jury. however, that the subject matter of each was adequately covered the Court’s charge supple- and that its refusal to ment its charge or to submit to the interrogаtories were jury matters well within its discretion.

Affirmed.

427 Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH of KRASNER, Appellant. John Superior Pennsylvania. Court of

Argued June 1980.

Filed March *5 Burns, Pittston,

Francis P. for appellant. Kostelaba, Michael C. Assistant District Wilkes- Attorney, Barre, Commonwealth, appellee. PRICE, CERCONE, Judge, President

Before CAVANAUGH, and WICK- SPAETH, HESTER, BROSKY *6 ERSHAM, JJ.

PRICE, Judge: on March a trial commenced

Following jury 10, 1975, mur- was to commit found solicitation appellant guilty was and appellant der.1 Post-verdict motions were denied He imprisonment. to a term of year sentenced one to two error, none which we instances of alleges now numerous the judgment find meritorious. We therefore affirm sentence.2 or summarized, facts are these. On the salient

Briefly and appellant, operator November owner about 3, 1972, and Jersey, eastern New Pennsylvania adult bookstores in competitor one Flood to murder appellant’s solicited James appel- Flood informed partner, former Allen Morrow. and eliminated, it have Morrow lant that would cost to $20,000 $10,000 following the balance due paid to be in advance with appellant, between subsequent meeting the murder. At a Bobrowicz, Flood, appellant and Flood’s Catherine girlfriend, $10,000 in a and told paper bag in cash brown delivered You bargain. keep yours. “Here’s of the part Flood: my him August Morrow On or about quick.” Hit and hit 19, Morrow, him that appellant Flood contacted informed 1973, to killed, appellant wanted him offered instead murder and Morrow, met the Flood, Morrow’s son price. and at reiterated that following appellant which time Flood day “hit” him Morrow offered to again had hired to kill and Flood, Morrow to recorded appellant. Unbeknownst 1963), 24, 1939, 1101, (Purdon Act of June 18 P.S. § § 1482, P.L. 6, 1972, repealed § December P.L. No. Act of charged (Purdon 1973). appellant was Pa.C.S. The offense § 6, 1973, committing prior date of the effective with occurred June Pennsylvania’s statute is solicitation the new Crimes Code. criminal 1973). (Purdon presently § codified at 18 Pa.C.S. panel appeal originally argued three-judge of this 2. This was before court, importance questions raised but of one of because of cases, among reargument potential before the and a conflict our court en banc directed. conversation with a cassette tape upon recorder concealed thereafter, his Morrow the Penn- person. Shortly contacted Police, information informed them of sylvania State Flood’s offer, and and produced tape August Morrow meeting. agreed cooperate with the police Flood was arrested on 1973 as he ultimately August received a from purported payment During Morrow. inter- rogation, Flood informed the hired police had him November, to kill Morrow and recounted the events of investigation narrative, 1972. Further corroborated Flood’s and appellant was arrested on October 1973 and charged with solicitation to commit murder. first

Appellant’s principal contention is that appeal the trial court erred in his denying motion to dismiss timely the charge him against pursuant 1100(a)(1).3 Pa.R.Crim.P. *7 We conclude that appellant’s unqualified right waiver of his to a prompt trial, which waiver he executed a during lengthy conducted the trial court in the colloquy by presence and with the consent of both of his his attorneys, renders contention meritless.

The facts to our Rule pertinent disposition appellant’s arrest, 1100 claim are as follows. his criminal Following complaint was filed on against appellant October The 6,1974, Commonwealth thus had 270 until days, July or bring appellant Appellant’s trial. trial was originally scheduled to 1974. At a begin May pretrial hearing on that date motion for a continuance was de- 3, 1974, nied. Trial was nonetheless until June postponed because the trial was unavailable. the judge morning On June for Application filed an Writ of Prohibi- tion with this court to direct the trial court to the grant the requested 11, 1974, argument, continuance. On June after 12, 1974, we decline to following issue the writ. On June appellant’s appearance before the trial court on an unrelated 1100(a)(1) provides 3. Pa.R.Crim.P. in a court case in “[t]rial complaint against which a written is filed the defendant after June 1, 1974, July 1973 but before shall commence no later than two seventy (270) days complaint hundred filed.” from the date on which the is case be that the instant matter, asked attorney the district thereupon requested counsel to trial. Appellant’s called continuance, place: took following colloquy and the the about position All what is right, your

THE COURT: waive that? rule, satisfied to are you two-seventy-day Yes, Honor. your [Appellаnt’s MR. MIELE Counsel]: Mr. Levy? THE COURT: No problem. LEVY [Appellant’s

MR. Counsel]: Krasner? THE COURT: Mr. Yes, sir.

MR. KRASNER: Krasner, please? swear Mr. you THE COURT: Would sworn, as herein- testified being duly JOHN KRASNER: after appears. know what Krasner, you I presume

THE COURT: Mr. room, so court but because were transpired you has spe- the Court misunderstanding there would not be any Toole, now that Mr. or instructs you directs cifically this Court of Com- Superior been informed having writ of is prohibition your request monwealth that denied, today, to start requested your Court now. immediately, Procedure and the Rules of Criminal

In accordance with Court and the Supreme holdings United States Commonwealth, are entitled to of this Supreme you Court hundred and seventy to trial within no later than two go complaint written from the date in which the days filed, was November just which Mr. Muroski stated 1973.[4] *8 know, have asked the Court

Both your lawyers, you If the in the future. to continue this case until sometime has been made by your does that grant request Court case, seventy days in more than two hundred сounsel this trial. your date fixed prior will have to the transpired under any The Court will not a continuance grant rights to waive any circumstances if don’t you agree both the United States have to a trial under you speedy complaint parties agree was the criminal 4. The record and the filed October and Pennsylvania constitutions and under the Rule 1100of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Do you understand what I am about'? talking Yes, do,

MR. KRASNER: I your Honor. THE COURT: Do have you any questions want to you ask me about it?

MR. I just KRASNER: make a statement? May THE COURT: Yes.

MR. It pertains KRASNER: to this. THE COURT: well. Very MR. I go KRASNER: want to to trial. wants No one togo right me, now faster than I’ve any had it. All right?

Now, all office, we asked that day Judge Brominski’s Honor, your incarcerated, I was I had no isn’t a way—this cop out, I trial, want this I’ve had it and I’m tired of being accused of looking for continuances. And all I have asked is, in this if exculpatory thing you’re justice, interested in are why you so аdamant in denying ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍us what have. you trial, I would set, like a I like would trial date your Honor, so I can have witnesses here. I have to ask witnesses to take off from work to be here. There are some witnesses that are incarcerated in the Luzerne Coun- Jail that I ty would like to have here and I want to make sure that I have witnesses. my trial,

The I would like to start if I immediately prepared it, for it. If you can set a date for I would be perfectly happy.

I do waive that two hundred and seventy day require- ment.

THE COURT: Because it is possible that case your may not be scheduled within that two hundred seventy day period. waive,

MR. I KRASNER: That your Honor. THE COURT: The Court doesn't want misunder- standing now. represented You are by competent counsel who understand, I’m positive understand, I they but don't want any with misunderstanding you connection with *9 sir; I take that this, you do it I you this. And ask may this continuance requesting join lawyers now with your said, as I to right, waive you your and that specifically is the Rule 1100 which under rights trial and speеdy your rule? two-hundred-seventy-day do, That I Honor. your MR. KRASNER: I’ll the continuance right, grant THE COURT: All you trial date is set date will set and when the a trial be be notified. notified, counsel will will be or your added). 12-14, 12, 1974) Appellant (emphasis June (N.T. it waiver, that claiming of his challenges validity now the refused to grant the below because court involuntary Rule rights. he his the continuance unless waived that if the waiver was volun- even Alternatively, argues not as a it was of limited duration and thus effective tary, in toto. disagree his Rule We relinquishment rights both with contentions. 360 A.2d 598

In Commonwealth v. Myrick, requirements the for (1976), supreme analogized our court to the prompt valid waiver of an accused’s to a right aor requirements (e. g., colloquy formal an on-the-record counsel) accused and signed written waiver the by detailed court rights. for a valid of other The important waiver observed a waiver intend- are requirements these formal

[a]ll to these dеcision waive thing—that ed assure one act of the defendant voluntary is the informed and rights record. can be to be such reference shown record, indication, on the long So there is an is decision of voluntary waiver the informed and Ab- defendant, facie prima validity. it will be accorded will be validity, sent this indication of waiver record Moreover, formal indica- merely ineffective. these are situation, In waiver the defendant tions validity. waiver is invalid by still that the may attempt prove unintelligent or involun- showing unknowing, that it was tary.

Id., 160-61, 468 Pa. at 360 A.2d at 600. The court refined its Waldman, in Commonwealth v. position 217, 484 Pa. 398 A.2d 1022 (1979), holding that a formal on-the-rec- although ord is not essential to the colloquy validity a waiver of the 1100, protections of Rule the Commonwealth bears the bur- den of that an establishing accused’s waiver of the to a right prompt trial was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. the detailed

Instantly, colloquy conducted by trial court establish, facie, was more than sufficient to prima that Com waiver was informed and appellant’s voluntary. Evans, monwealth v. 85, 489 413 (1980); Pa. A.2d 1025 Commonwealth v. 155, 598; Myrick, Com monwealth 211, Thompson, 262 396 720 Pa.Super. Wareham, Commonwealth v. 23, Pa.Super. Furthermore, A.2d 581 (1978). we are not persuaded that these circumstances waiver was appellant’s rendered invol untary merely because the trial court grant conditioned its ing of the requested continuance a upon waiver of Rule 1100. We have held that when an previously accused re quests continuance near the end Rule 1100 period, court may approval condition its on the accused’s agreement to a trial date See Commonwealth period. beyond Shields, affirmed, 74, 371 A.2d 1333 (1977), Hickson, Pa. 397 A.2d 790 (1979); Commonwealth v. Pa.Super. 496, Moreover, the record reveals that both of appellant’s attorneys knew as of May that begin trial would on 1974. When trial May could not оn begin that date because of the unavailability the trial judge, postponed case several until days 3, 1974, June with the consent of counsel. At point, appellant obtained a de facto continuance of nine days by for petitioning a Writ of Prohibition. and his Appellant counsel thus notice of a fixed received trial date over one month before the trial court indicted that it was to going call the case to trial on June 1974. Notwithstanding their notice, receipt were they allegedly unprepared to proceed circumstances, June 12. In such we cannot agree with that he would have been appellant “forced” to trial on June 12 had he not waived his Rule rights. therefore, claim, Rule of

The success his June of the duration of interpretation turns on our his notwithstanding argues that Appellant 1974 waiver. the 270 waiving day statements unqualified three successive duration rule, be of limited the waiver to intended days to a continuance several because he desired only claim, support for To this his trial. subpoena witnesses he made remarks which following refers us to the No one go “I trial. waiver want during colloquy: me, I’ve had now faster than go right wants to to trial if prepared I was immediately it.... I would like start I be it, perfectly it. date for would If can set a you happy.” *11 context, were they in we believe these remarks

Viewing appellant’s request the trial court persuade intended to not, and were purpose a not in dilatory for continuance was of the therefore, scope as a limitation the contemplated ascribed to purpose waiver. of the Regardless to limit however, insufficient remarks, plainly were they As 1100. unrestricted waiver Rule appellant’s otherwise indicates, appel- colloquy waiver quoted the of the portion occasions that on three successivе lant stated unequivocally rule. None of these day of the 270 protection waived the solely waiver confining statements contained the language period. time any the the or to other period continuance waiver collo- during remarks the other Similarly, appellant’s restricting the language specifically were devoid of quy Furthermore, order of of the waiver. operative duration recom- “Upon the case continuing provided: the trial court defendant, Case is counsel & mendation' of both defense record no There is on this Continued until a later date.”5 Absent evi- time restriction. indication of a definite limitation, we to read into the waiver dence of such a decline plaintiff waived his qualification a not and hold there case, in instant We note that on the date continuance supreme the benefit of our June court did not have Coleman, 400, 406, v. Pa. 383 Commonwealth 477 court’s directive 1268, 1271 granted (1978), requiring be A.2d that all continuances specified period. a 402 rights

Rule 1100 Cf. v. indefinitely. Commonwealth Gard- ner, 282 Pa.Super. 70, (1980) (defendant A.2d exe- cuted a limited waiver of Rule when only his counsel form, noted at bottom of waiver “Please relist for February 7,1977”).

We have upheld the waivers previously validity general of Rule gave unqualified 1100where the defendant respons to questions es the waiver during colloquy, Commonwealth 211, 396 Thompson, Pa.Super. and where signed defendant form that waiver did not confine the duration of length time, the waiver any specific Com Scott, monwealth v. Lee, Pa.Super. 495,

Commonwealth v. A.2d 59 contrast, In our court that an supreme recently concluded accused’s purported waiver of his Rule 1100 rights toto In was invalid. Manley, (1980), the defendant’s first trial in a terminated mistrial when the trial became judge ill. When the Com monwealth failed to a new commence trial within the pre scribed ninety 1100(e), see day period, Pa.R.Crim.P. defendant duly filed an to dismiss application pursuant to (f) section of Rule which application was erroneously denied. One week after his motion to dismiss had been rejected, the requested defendant a continuance because his attorney was case in litigating federal court. The trial *12 court to agreed continue provided the case the defendant and, waived his Rule rights 1100 accordingly, executed the following waiver:

I hereby certify, 1974,] that Honorable [December ALEX BONAVITACOLA orders case cont. to January 1974in 625. Def. on trial in Fed. Court .. . atty. [Room] I, the defendant waive the 270 and day rule as to speedy trial.

A of this majority court held that the thereby defendant executed an unqualified waiver of his to a right prompt and thus could not complain that the trial court erred in denying the to application ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍dismiss. Commonwealth Man- 252 77, 380 lеy, supreme The limited to the however, was concluded, that the waiver court continuance. length the December 9 that the record, cannot conclude

On this we intelligent appellant decision evidences an waiver in toto .... statement his rights Rule 1100 waive [T]he he under- no indication that contains signed by appellant which he right scope stood the nature and not is neces- Although colloquy an on-the-record waiving. understood that the defendant require proof we do sary, his act. consequences here the waiver confirm surrounding The circumstances of his Rule waiver did intend a blanket appellant that not 1100(d) Rule 90-day period prescribed by The rights. exe- waiver was date the had run already prior earlier, on December Just one week cuted. had been erroneously 1100(f) recent Rule application

most a defendant “difficult to believe denied .... is [I]t would bargaining position of his with an appreciation before period right waive his to include knowingly computations.” in his Rule continuance requested Pa. at Manley, Commonwealth at v. Manley, quoting in (emphasis original), (Hoffman and Spaeth, A.2d at Pa.Super. at JJ., dissenting). Manley the circumstances in and signed

The statement stronger support much surrounding provided its execution sub do the circumstances for limited waiver than finding a waivers of Rule general not preclude judice. Manley does be some Manley Rather, requires there only the accused understood indication in the record that colloquy recorded of the waiver. The scope nature Hav- requirement. than satisfies that instant case more of the protec- waiver ing unqualified executed a valid now be heard to com- cannot tion of Rule 270 days. to trial within brought that he was not plain the trial court erred next contends that Appellant venue, thereby change refusing his motion grant *13 404 him

denying a fair trial because of “massive” prejudicial pretrial disagree. We publicity. for a of venue application change is addressed

[A]n court, sound discretion of the trial and its of exercise discretion will not be disturbed an appellate court discretion. Commonwealth v. the absence of of an abuse Casper, Commonwealth 143, 481 A.2d (1978); Pa. 392 287 Scott, v. Commonwealth 258, 469 (1976); Pa. 365 A.2d 140 v. Hoss, Commonwealth 195, 469 364 (1976); Pa. Kichline, v. 265, 468 Pa. 361 282 (1976). impor- A.2d The course, tant of is whether has inquiry, any juror formed a fixed or opinion appellant’s guilt of result innocence as a of the pretrial See Casper, Commonwealth v. publicity. Kichline, supra; Commonwealth supra. Normally, v. one who claims that he has been denied fair trial because of prejudicial pretrial show publicity must actual prejudice Florida, v. jury. See Murphy empaneling 421 794, 2031, U.S. Common (1975); S.Ct. 44 L.Ed.2d 589 wealth v. Hoss, Cаsper, supra; supra; Commonwealth Pierce, Commonwealth v. cert. 190, 209, 451 Pa. 303 A.2d denied, 164, (1973). U.S. S.Ct. L.Ed.2d 124 However, be publicity where is found to “inherently e., i. prejudicial,” sustained, so pervasive, inflammatory appellant will be inculpatory, relieved the burden of showing a nexus between the and actual publicity jury Sutton, Commonwealth prejudice. 485 Pa. v. Casper, Common supra; Frazier,

wealth v. 471 Pa. A.2d 1224 (1977). Lohr, Commonwealth v. A.2d Nevertheless, 691-92 neither the mere existence of pretrial publicity nor the possibility potential jurors have formed an based on news accounts will opinion suffice prejudice.6 Commonwealth v. establish presumption Casper, 287 (1978). however, required, totally It jurors ignorant is not be swift, days widespread the facts and issues In involved. these communication, important and diverse methods of can an case be expected public vicinity, to arouse the interest of in the scarcely qualified jurors of those best will to serve not have *14 viz., the factors, whether look to more discrete

We instead hand, factual and was, the one on pre-trial publicity sensational, hand, of or, consisted the other objective, convic demanding “slanted articles and inflammatory (4th v. 423 F.2d tion,” Sawyers, United States the revealed publicity the 1970); pre-trial Cir. whether record; whether criminal prior the existence of accused’s admissions, of reenactments confessions, or it to referred defendant; informa whether such and the crime the and police prosecuto the reports by tion is the of product found, be above elements of the rial officers. Should whether such of is to determine step inquiry the next the extensive, perva and so so sustained has been so publicity to have been be deemed sive the must community it.[7] with saturated omitted).

Id., 152-53, (footnotes 392 A.2d at 481 Pa. at case, we in instant the these Applying principles in its discretion the court did not abuse conclude that a of venue. At change motion denying appellant’s 2, 1974, plaintiff held on October hearing on the motion the to demonstrate articles produced newspaper thirteen ex to which he was pretrial publicity level of prejudicial 30,1974 articles, May between posed. published Ten of the impression opinion of the case. merits or the formed some the mere particularly To hold that This is true in criminal cases. any preconceived guilt of or innocence presumption of notion as the existence more, accused, to rebut the an without is sufficient impossi- prospective juror’s impartiality be establish an would a impres- lay juror his It if the can aside ble standard. is sufficient present- opinion on the evidence or and render a verdict based sion ined court. 1639, 1642, Dowd, 717, 722-23, 6 L.Ed.2d v. 81 S.Ct. Irvin U.S. (1961) (citations omitted). determining the com- warranting whether 7. Factors consideratiоn publicity munity pretrial in- prejudicial with has become saturated (2) (1) the the area concerned: clude: the and character of size (3) coverage; has been pervasiveness whether there of media and publicity cooling period com- between the sufficient off may publicity prejudicial of the effect mencement of trial so that the Sutton, dissipated. 485 Pa. be deemed to have Commonwealth Casper, 13, 1974, and June were simply disposition narratives pretrial various motions filed in the case instant of the disposition appellant’s application for Writ briefly Prohibition. Six of those ten stories ap mentioned pellant’s prior convictions for violations of obscenity laws. stories, published Of three remaining Septem between ber 1974 and September two noted the past view, In convictions. our all thirteen articles were highly objective preliminary aсcounts of this proceedings case. It defies reason to were posit they somehow *15 Furthermore, sensational and inflammatory. any potential of prejudice created the mention convic by appellant’s prior tions was erased of time passage the between publication of the stories and the commencement of trial. Ten the stories printed eight were months trial the before and re maining three published were five months before the trial. This time to was sufficient span dissipate any prejudice Commonwealth v. Kich engendered by the publicity. See line, 265, 468 Pa. Commonwealth v. 361 A.2d (1976); 282 Nahodil, 301, Commonwealth v. (1975); 462 Pa. 341 A.2d 91 Dobrolenski, 460 Pa. 630, Common (1975); 268 Hoss, wealth v. 98, 445 A.2d 58 (1971).8 Pa. 283 claim, analogous 8. In an unrelated but contends he appellant’s judge was request fair denied a trial because the trial refused Specifically, appellant that he recuse himself. maintains that judge previously appel- because the trial had entertained and denied motions, dismiss, pretrial including 1100(f) lant’s a Rule motion to impartially 1100(f) argued could not rule on a second Rule motion 10, immediately prior to the commencement of trial March Green, argument groundless. This is See Commonwealth v. 464 Pa. 557, Christman, 455, (1975); 347 A.2d 682 Commonwealth v. 432 Pa. Smith, (1968); 280, Pa.Super. 247 A.2d 451 Commonwealth v. 274 (1980); Lee, Pa.Super. 418 A.2d 406 v. Commonwealth 262 396 (1978). Appellant judge A.2d 755 have also asserts that trial the should disqualified attorney himself because the assistant district who the tried instant case the an in Commonwealth was associate the judge’s years appellant’s disagree. law firm three before trial. We judge formerly attorney The mere fact that a associated with an years appears patently who three later before him is to insufficient require more, Appellant’s allegation, sup- recusal. to without fails port Co., charge Bumpus Uniroyal F.Supp. v. bias. See Tire 385 (E.D.Pa. Fairbanks, 1974); Co., Towing 711 Marine Co. v. Morse & (E.D.Pa. F.Supp. 1963). 225 467 See also ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, 3(C)(1)(b). Canon

407 the court further contends that Appellant Com for mistrial based on the his motion denying erred certain allegedly exculpatory disclose monwealth’s failure to two Commonwealth credibility the concerning material After the Catherine Bobrowicz. witnesses, James Flood and sworn, made counsel was selected and jury following request: would, ask prior testimony, this time we

At and police the state records produce the Commonwealth of the Commonwealth possession any tapes any prior interviews of witnesses summaries of oral in order study of the case the commencement prepare. 1975). The denied

(N.T. 90, properly March trial court v. Commonwealth request premature, Grayson, Kontos, v. (1976); Commonwealth Pa. 353 A.2d 428 (1971); Youngkin, Commonwealth v. Pa. Cowell, Pa.Super. 417, Appeal A.2d 1356 (1981); (1976), appel- A.2d 718 and informed ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍be for the information could rеquest lant’s counsel that was called.9 Commonwealth renewed as each witness Hamm, *16 v. (1971); A.2d 851 Commonwealth

Morris, 444 Pa. The Robinson, (1974). 324 A.2d Pa.Super. request to renew his indicates failed appellant record that to request after his initial prior for the material time any at a neglected thus to make taking Having the testimony. trial, appellant at cannot timely request for the evidence of his for court’s denial motion challenge now the trial requests made several The record discloses that counsel requests prior material trial. Those for disclosure this same to then-applicable Pa.R.Crim.P. in with the were refused accordance pretrial discovery. provided, pertinent pertaining in to Rule 310 discovery pretrial part, no shall order that event ... the court “[i]n possession inspection in witnesses the or of written statements of Youngkin, Pa.Su- the Commonwealth.” See Commonwealth Robinson, per. 417, Commonwealth it make These authorities discovery appellant pretrial apparent or was not entitled to that inspection requested material. based, mistrial apparently, prosecution’s on the failure to produce on its evidence own initiative.

Appellant next that below argues court erred in denying his motion after prosecution for mistrial had twice elicited testimony revealing that wit- ness Catherine Bobrowicz had appellant identified from a photographic shown to her array by Pennsylvania State Trooper William Koscinski. direct examination of During Trooper Koscinski, the following exchange occurred:

Q. Attorney Did do to you anything [District Muroski]: determine credibility? [Mrs. Bobrowicz’s] A. [Trooper By? Koscinski]: Q. Did test way? her you A. Yes, sir. I pictures. had group Q. whose pictures And were they?

A. were men They approximately the same age [ap- as I I pellant] and think had about six or seven of those pictures I had on the . placed table...

(N.T. 10, 1975). March objection No at interposed Thereafter, that time. during direct examination of Cather- Bobrowicz, ine following place: took Q. Attorney And when Trooper Kos- [District Muroski]: cinski took a statement from did he you, do with anything you to if you determine knew who was? [appellant] A. Showed me a few quite pictures. [Mrs. Bobrowicz]: He put them all out my counter and asked me pick him out.

Q. were And able to out a you pick picture? (N.T. 404, March 1975). Appellant’s counsel objected and, bar, at side that, moved a mistrial on ground combination, the testimonial references to the photographic array were prejudicial they allowed the jury infer had a criminal prior record. The court denied the motion.

Although it is that well-settled testimonial reference to a photograph constitute errоr may reversible if a jury could reasonably prior infer therefrom activity criminal

409 Carlos, Pa. v. accused, Commonwealth part Allen, 448 Pa. v. Commonwealth 262, 341 A.2d that it is well-established 177, (1972), equally 292 A.2d 373 necessarily requires to a photograph not reference every reversal. Id. could juror or not a is whether controlling question

[T]he the accused that presented from the facts infer reasonably mere passing A activity. criminal prior engaged had infer- a reasonable from which photographs reference to be drawn properly criminal cannot activity ence of prior been since there has proceedings does not invalidate the reference.... no as a result of the prejudice A.2d at 375. Id., 448 Pa. at link ap did not the challenged testimony Instantly, The photo criminal specific prior activity. pellant never dis witnesses were the two graphs by mentioned trial, to at marked, referred admitted or otherwise played, shots” or as “mug “photo nor were characterized as they Smith, v. file.” from a Commonwealth graphs police See words, aside “In other the photo displayed detective police from the fact that It is it to the linking police. else nothing there was graph, alone from this would conclude juror that highly unlikely conduct.” criminal prior had [appellant] engaged In A.2d at 73. Carlos, 462 Pa. at v. Commonwealth reason that should circumstances, nothing “there was such were obtained the photographs to a ably suggest jury crimi prior the defendant’s as a result of by police officials Allen, 448 at v. Pa. nal activity.” Commonwealth Rivera, 470 Pa. at Cf. did not “junkie” (1976) (reference A.2d 719 accused Com activity); criminal prior inference of create reasonable (1977) Hodge, monwealth that he knew testified when officer (no prejudice police con prior a result of nickname as defendant a certain motion denied tacts). properly The court below for a mistrial. *18 also

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his six motions for a mistrial during cross-exami nation of prosecution witness James Flood. Specifically, appellant complains that a mistrial should have been grant ed because Flood’s behavior on cross-examination was “openly deceptive, sarcastic and insulting to the defense counsel, defendant;” sarcastic and insulting to the and that court; Flood “used profanity evaded questions; argued counsel; with defense refused to questions, answer made unresponsive and humorous responses and retorts . . . and ... turned a serious court into a humorous side show ” ... . Brief for at Appellant

A motion for a mistrial is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, it and is within primarily the trial judge’s discrеtion to determine whether an accused was prejudiced by misconduct in the courtroom. Commonwealth v. Gard- ner, Pa. Commonwealth v. (1980); A.2d 1007 Werts, 483 Pa. 395 A.2d 1316 (1978); Commonwealth v. Craig, Pa. Defense counsel’s cross-examination of Flood lasted more than a and day covered 175 pages transcript. Without each detailing instance of alleged misconduct, our examination of those of Flood’s responses that occasioned appellant’s six requests for a mistrial satisfies us that the court below did not abuse its discretion in denying motions. While it is true that Flood’s replies were at times caustic that he displayed certain amount of disrespect counsel, for appellant’s we agree with the trial court that none of the com- responses plained of prejudiced Indeed, appellant. it is arguable, particularly view of defense counsel’s exhaustive efforts Flood’s dеstroy and to credibility him as a con portray artist buffoon, that Flood’s cavalier attitude on the witness stand benefited appellant.10 10. We are not persuaded, moreover, that the trial court erred in refusing appellant’s requests contempt giving to hold Flood in unresponsive presence answers. While conduct in the of the court justice punishable by obstructs the administration of is a con- tempt citation, Johnson, In re 467 Pa. 359 A.2d 739 Caplan, (1973), Tenenbaum v. 309 A.2d 428 the conduct its the court below abused next complains Appellant evi- from presenting his counsel preventing discretion maintains Flood. Specifically, James impeach dence Rob- defense witness Leonard that the trial court prevented had never statement that he from Flood’s rebutting erts no basis This has allegation from Roberts. money extorted in fact. testified, indig- Flood somewhat

On cross-examination *19 Roberts. To extorted from money that he had never nantly, cаlled Roberts and the rebut this the defense statement examination: following occurred on direct event, associa- during In Q. your [Defense Counsel]: Flood, you any way? did he ever threaten tion with Mr. once. A. Just [Mr. Roberts]: What he to

Q. say you? did Well, I him a week. giving A. was $400.00 Q. What was the threat? Well, didn’t, if I the first time it would be

A. he told me time it’d be a box. leg, a broken the second about that? Q. you Were concerned Yes, was, I about it. A. concerned very thereafter, defense 14, 1975). March (N.T. Shortly in which the counsel asked Roberts to describe manner from Roberts to Flood. The Com- extortion money passed sustained, and question monwealth’s to the was objection his now trial court appellant thereby prevented claims the denial of the extortion. attacking counsel from Flood’s testi is clear of Robert’s quoted portion It from without permitted, objec counsel was mony tion, Flood’s state testimony directly contrаdicting to elicit When from Roberts. money ment he never extorted disrupt judicial proceedings. significantly A must interfere with and actual, proceeding showing prejudice or to the imminent to a fair of authority required, preservation is the court’s Garrison, (1978), danger of and the 386 A.2d 971 probable disruption merely perceived or even substantial must not be Little, ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍proceedings, immediately imperil In re but rather must behavior on 30 L.Ed.2d 708 Flood’s U.S. S.Ct. considerably meeting standard. the stand falls short of this counsel went beyond impeachment attempted mere extraneous develop wholly collateral details of the ex- scheme, tortion the trial court sustained the properly prose- objection. cution’s contends

Appellant finally that the assistant dis trict attorney scope permissible exceeded the argument when, address, in his closing remarked that allegedly was man wealthy capable sрending large sums of money defend himself.11 The prosecutor’s closing argument was not but following recorded pertinent placed on the record: colloquy Objection. MR. NEFF [Defense Counsel]: THE COURT: Overruled.

MR. you NEFF: we see at side May bar?

THE Yes. COURT: Honor, MR. BURNS Your I think [Defense Counsel]: counsel is too this his going point far at with relationship them, what defense available had the money were they expending, what were and mak- they providing *20 ing the inference is wealthy that a man and to [appellant] spend extreme of that money amounts and he had it available to prove himself not We move for guilty. a mistrial.

THE COURT: Motion Denied.

(N.T. 635, 17, March 1975). prosecution’s

When the is closing argument recorded, not it is well-settled that order to avail himself of the right object to to improp-

[i]n er remarks or a an misstatement of fact or unfair com- ment, counsel must and move object for the withdrawal of Appellant alleges prosecutor 11. also the committed reversible when, summation, purportedly jury error in his the informed family strangers members of were to the not courtroom they because had been in courtrooms all across the Commonwealth. Appellant objection post-trial failed to raise this his written mo- tions, however, is, therefore, precluded raising and from it for the appeal. Blair, first time on Commonwealth v. 460 Pa. 213 stenog the the court should direct juror,[12]whereupon, understanding the the record court’s rapher place upon to if assigned be may properly remarks so that error the if the denied.... is juror the motion to withdraw the the stenographer upon direct to place court refuses to the made, has the to which been objection record remarks remarks the record by counsel the on opposing may place affidavit. King, 168, 172, 323 A.2d

Commonwealth Pa.Super. See omitted) added). (1974) (citations (emphasis Perkins, 10, 373 also Commonwealth v. 473 Pa. 133 n. Melnyczеn Commonwealth v. (1977); A.2d 1084 n. 10 ko, 317, 325, (1975) (Jacobs, A.2d Pa.Super. J., in although appellant’s counsel concurring). Instantly, to the comment terposed timely objection prosecutor’s mistrial, moved court did not its under place for a on It was comments the record. challenged standing im place allegedly thus upon incumbent appellant affidavit. failed Having remarks on record proper adequate insure preservation take the measures necessary remarks, their challenge propriety cannot Allen, 15, 276 See appeal. Howard, Commonwealth v. (1968).13 is affirmed. judgment of sentence Accordingly, SPAETH, J., files a in which CER- dissenting opinion CONE, Judge, joins. President replaced by jurors been

12. to withdraw have abolished Motions 1118. motions for a mistrial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. error, Appellant all of which are cites three instances additional unworthy He first devoid of merit and thus of extensive discussion. *21 decidedly a hostile attitude maintains that the trial court exhibited Neff, attorney thereby depriving appellant of a fair toward defense single premised upon wherein the trial. a This contention is incident learning reprimanded lunch with court appellant Neff that he had eaten after during prosecution a recess. and witness Allen Morrow presence reprimand the TTie indicates that occurred out of record this jury hardly prejudiced appellant. of See Com- the and could have Whitson, 101, 334 A.2d monwealth v. 461 Pa. SPAETH, Judge, dissenting: agree I do not voluntarily knowingly that defendant and waived for an indefinite and unlimited his to a period right speedy provided trial Pa.R.Crim.P. 1100. An by abiding is temptation to bend the rules when the case is nasty. Here, I suggest, bent, the rules been Once rules bent. have don’t work well. Coleman,

In Commonwealth 400, Pa. (1978) (plurality opinion), Justice O’BRIEN wrote the that defendant’s waiver was invalid because the form he signed no what еxplanation of the trial right speedy “offer[ed] 406, 477 Pa. at 383 A.2d 1271.1 form at The involve[d].” was: Appellant twenty-nine delay next contends that the month between filing post-trial his disposition motions on March and the trial court’s 30, 1977, August of those motions on violated Pa.R. Pa.R. punishment. Crim.P. 302 and Crim.P. cruel constituted and unusual 1122, provided since renumbered that Pa.R.Crim.P. post-trial judgment motions for a new and in of be arrest must thirty days argument except decided within stances. in after unusual circum- Appellant’s allege, brief fails to examination the and our disclose, appellant’s post-verdict record does not date on the which argued. Additionally, motions were circumstances does the record not reveal all the note, surrounding delay. the unfortunate We how- ever, trial consumed one and week covered pages transcript, transcript prepared which was and not filed until Appellant’s alleged post-trial twenty March raised motions occasion, argument errors and on at least was one October delayed appellant’s request due for a On continuance. this record Appellant’s we decline to hold that violated. Pa.R.Crim.P. punishment assertion that he and suffered cruel unusual as a result delay is untenable in view of the fact that was free jury’s sentencing. on bond entire time between the and verdict Finally, appellant illegal contrary insists his sentence was alleged stipulation by appellant

to an entered into the Common- Appellant’s permit- wealth. ted was well sentence within the maximum any agreement parties length statute and between the as to binding sentencing judge. sentence was not on the majority opinion 1. The states in footnote 5 of that on its the date continuance, our “the trial court did not have the benefit of Supreme Coleman, Court’s directive in 400, 406, (1978), requiring that all сontinuances granted specified (At-, 5) period.” be for a This observation n. justify majority’s does not failure to did follow Coleman. Neither Supreme trial court Coleman our “have benefit of Court’s announcing change A directive.” decision be the law will

415 of the implications have been advised aware and I am (have/do and application the above consequences of and I further am to the continuance. have) objection not that a continuance trial and speedy of to a my right aware dis- criminal charges said having cause a delay shall of the Court. posed by 211, 262 396 Thompson, Pa.Super. v.

In Commonwealth dissenting 720, concurring noted in (1978), 723 it was not be held to have should that the defendant opinion because the rights colloquy, 1100 waived his Pa.R.Crim.P. waiver form in identical to the which was substantially he was period how Coleman, long did specify not trial, inform him that nor did it his waiving right 1100 motion would be Pа.R.Crim.P. result of a successful v. Man- in Commonwealth discharge. recently, final Most Court (1980), Supreme A.2d 636 our Pa. ley, the defend- discharged sentence and of judgment vacated a blanket waiver he “did not intend that finding ant after that a statement signing his Rule 1100 rights” by Alex 9, 1974], Hon. that on hereby certify, I [December 27, 1975 January case Bonavitacola orders [continued] trial in attorney Room 625. [federal] [Defendant’s] [in] Defendant, rule and as day waive the I the court .. trial. speedy record, cannot conclude we this The Court held that “[o]n by decision intelligent an ... waiver evidences As in in toto. rights his Rule 1100 to waive appellant Coleman, signed by the statement supra, v. he understood the indication that contains no appellant appeal, one was when pending as this applied on direct to cases Williams, Pa.Super. v. was decided. Commonwealth Coleman Furthermore, not (1974). that does a decision 331 A.2d 875 statutory cоnstruction change an issue of law rather decides but regarded part previously is an court not decided Daniels of the statute’s enactment. statute from the date Co., Pa.Super. State Farm Automobile Ins. Mutual Products, 356 (1980); Cement See also Buradus General Erb, Harry Inc. v. Schell Construction C. 52 A.2d 205 Pa. Inc., Co., The decision 213 A.2d decision, involving the construction as it did was this sort of Coleman a rule of court. nature scope right which he was Al- waiving. though an on-the record is not we do colloquy necessary, require proof that the defendant understood the conse- quences (491 of his act.” Pa. at 640.) at The in the present case was as as those in colloquy lacking *23 the above-cited cases. There is no indication that appellant understood his statements at the that he was by colloquy waiving his to a trial or to a right speedy discharge for violation of that The record does not but right. suppоrt contradicts the assertion that his statements at majority’s by waived his Rule colloquy, “appellant indefi- rights (At-, nitely. emphasis added.) Appellant’s statements at the colloquy, quoted as make clear majority, he only agreed to trial for a short of time—un- delay period til the earliest possible said, trial date. Thus “I appellant want to go to trial. No one wants to go right now me, and, faster than I’ve had it. All right?” trial, “The I would like to start if I was immediately, prepared for it. If you it, can set a date for I would be perfectly happy.” (6/12/74 N.T 14) Nothing in these statements or anywhere else in the understood, record suggests appellant agreed, that the Commonwealth could delay the trial indefi- nitely, occur, or that the trial might as it did in the present case, eight and one-half months later. most,

At appellant waived his Pa.R.Crim.P. rights 2, 1974, until October the date of the next listing This, however, case.2 leaves from unexplained рeriod October 2 until March when the trial was held. finally The record suggests that a considerable ‍‌‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​​‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌‌‌‌‌‍of part the delay during that period attributable to the court or the Nevertheless, Commonwealth. there may have been periods of to the delay prior waiver that have been might excludable had the lower court reached the issue.

Therefore, I should vacate the judgment sentence and remand with instructions to the lower court to make a new Gardner, Jr., 2. See Commonwealth v. 422 A.2d 832 11(K) (1980) (appellant signs waiver, writing “please Rule relist for 7;” February date). his waiver is limited to that to be had during which the period computation such to enter Pa.R.Crim.P. to trial under brought or dis- of sentence order, reinstating judgment either required. be may charging appellant, joins opinion. this CERCONE, Judge, President Pennsylvania COMMONWEALTH YOUNGKIN, Appellant. F. James Pennsylvania. Superior Court March Argued *24 Jan. 1981.

Filed April Reargument Denied 30, 1981. Denied Nov. Appeal for Allowance Petition

Case Details

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Krasner
Court Name: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Date Published: Mar 6, 1981
Citation: 427 A.2d 1169
Docket Number: 128
Court Abbreviation: Pa. Super. Ct.
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