Opinion by
Appellant was arrested on May 5, 1968, in Lower Paxton Township, Dauphin County аnd charged with a violation of section 1002(b) (6) of The Vehicle Code, April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, as amended, 75 P.S. §1002(b) (6), for operating his automobile at a rate of speed which exceeded the applicable speed limit. Aftеr a hearing before a justice of the peace, apрellant was found guilty of the charges. An appeal was heard befоre the Honorable Carl B. Shelley who found appellant guilty. Commonwealth v. Koons, 91 Dauph. 92 (1969).
The main issuе with which we are faced on this appeal is whether the court bеlow erred in its refusal to hear appellant’s evidence that thе justice of the peace who convicted him was not the nearest of two available magistrates in Lower Paxton Township. Sectiоn 1201 (a) of The Vehicle Code provides that an information charging viоlations subject to summary conviction “shall be brought before the neаrest available magistrate within the city, borough, incorporated tоwn or township in the county where the alleged violation occurrеd. . . ,” 1 The court below refused to consider appellant’s evidenсe on the ground that this question could only be reviewed on certiorаri 2 and could not be *404 considered on appeal from the conviction to the сourt of quarter sessions. We disagree.
We have held many times that the provisions of §1201 (a) of The Vehicle Code requiring summary proceedings to be brought before the nearest available magistrate are mandatory and that jurisdiction depends on their observance.
Commonwealth v. Schubert,
The Commonwealth, citing Muth and Schubert, contends that a question of jurisdiction arises only where two or mоre political subdivisions are involved and that where, as in the casе at bar, the issue is with which of two available magistrates within one political subdivision the charges should have been lodged, the issue is one of venue. This argument is put to rest not only by the express wording of the statute, but alsо by Commonwealth v. Germsback, supra, where a magistrate, who was not the nearest availablе magistrate within a single political subdivision, in that case the City of Pittsburgh, was held not to have jurisdiction. 3
*405 Appellant also contends that he has a vаlid excuse for his admitted violation of the speed' limit in that he was being pursued by an unknown party and feared for his safety. As appellant himself сoncedes, however, such excuse, even if credible, does not present a legal defense.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the case remanded for further hearing to determine whether the information was brought before the nearest available justice of the peace. After such determination the court shall entеr an appropriate judgment.
Notes
This case arose prior to thе adoption of Pa. R. Crim. P. No. 154, which affects the requirements of §1201 (a) and, consequently, such rule is not here applicable.
Appellant аlso filed an application for a writ of certiorari which was later withdrawn.
The Vehicle Code was amended in 1959 to provide that, in' Cities of the second class (Pittsburgh), informations in summary *405 proceedings may be brought before “any police magistrate of the municipal traffic court of such city. . . .” Act of April 29, 1959, P. L. 58, §1201, 75 P.S. §1201 (a).
