442 Pa. 357 | Pa. | 1971
Opinion by
On March 14, 1966, one Hazel Deere, a 72 year old spinster, was murdered during the course of a robbery committed at her apartment. Shortly thereafter the appellant, Gus Kontos, was arrested and charged with the crime, to which he confessed. On October 8, 1966, Kontos, represented by private counsel, entered a plea of guilty to murder generally,
We deem it important initially to note the law in Pennsylvania with respect to collateral attacks on guilty pleas which are alleged to have been primarily motivated by constitutionally infirm confessions. In order successfully to overturn a plea on such grounds, a defendant must first show that he was so incompetently advised by counsel that he could not, under the circumstances, have knowingly and intelligently pleaded guilty. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763 (1970); Commonwealth v. Marsh, 440 Pa. 590, 271 A. 2d 481 (1970); Commonwealth v. Rogers, 440 Pa. 598, 269 A. 2d 449 (1970) ; Commonwealth v. Ward, 442 Pa. 351, 275 A. 2d 92 (1971). Our inquiry, therefore, is appropriately directed to the reasonableness of counsel’s assessment of the case and his advice to his elient in light thereof, including advice as to the implications and consequences of entering a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Ward, supra, at p. 351.
Neither in his PCHA petition nor at the hearing thereon did appellant assert that his trial counsel was incompetent in any manner. Moreover, our independent review of the record satisfies us that counsel acted competently in assessing appellant’s case, advising a plea of guilty, and making appellant aware of the consequences of entering such a plea. Accordingly, appellant’s assertion that he should now be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea must fail.
Notwithstanding the error of admitting the statements into evidence, we conclude that on the record •before us appellant is foreclosed from raising the issue on later collateral attack. Counsel made no objection
The record here contains colloquies between appellant’s trial counsel and the bench which indicate that both counsel and the court en bane were aware of the possible constitutional infirmity of appellant’s Confession. One of the judges inquired of counsel whether he was going to contest the admissibility of the confession, but counsel declined the opportunity to make an objection. We can only conclude, in light of the strong Commonwealth case quite apart from appellant’s confession,
Appellant’s original plea was not guilty, but was changed to guilty during the first day of trial. In the meantime, there had been a suppression hearing, to which reference will be made infra.
The length of the suppression hearing is accounted for by the fact that it pertained not only to Gus Kontos, the appellant here, but to three other codefendants who were charged with the same crime.
The explicit warnings required by the Miranda case apply to all trials (or degree of guilt hearings) beginning after June 13, 1966. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 16 L. Ed. 2d 882 (1966).
Aside from appellant’s confession and his own incriminating testimony offered at the degree of guilt hearing, the Commonwealth presented testimony from two codefendants that Kontos was involved in the robbery. There was, in addition, testimony by disinterested third parties which placed Kontos at the scene of the crime and circumstantially showed him to have been a participant.