226 Pa. Super. 526 | Pa. Super. Ct. | 1974
Opinion by
Appellant was convicted by a jury on the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicating liquor. Appellant’s contentions center on the lower court’s refusal to suppress a breathalyzer test.
First, appellant argues that the statute establishing the breathalyzer test is unconstitutional. This argument can be broken down to two essential parts: (1) that it is a denial of due process to allow the Secretary
Appellant, in addition, argues that he was coerced into taking the breathalyzer test because the police officer warned that if he did not he would lose his license for six months. Appellant correctly states that the statute does not provide for an automatic suspension of driving previleges upon refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test, but that the Secretary may, in his discretion, do so on an ad hoc basis. The record reveals, however, that the police officer denied the alleged conversation. Instead, he said that “Miranda warnings” were given, and thereafter, appellant consented to the test. It was certainly within the discretion of the suppression hearing judge to believe the police officer’s testimony over that of the appellant, and thereby conclude that the appellant consented to the breathalyzer test.
Finally, appellant contends that the results of the test should have been suppressed because he was not in
Judgment of sentence is affirmed.
Recognizing the fact that operation of a motor vehicle in Pennsylvania is a privilege and not a right, our courts have upheld the power of the Secretary to suspend the license of an operator who refuses to take the breathalyzer test. See, Commonwealth v. Wolpert, 224 Pa. Superior Ct. 361, 368, f.n. 4, 369-370, 308 A. 2d 120 (1973); Commonwealth v. End, 6 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 347, 295 A. 2d 196 (1972). When an operator exercises this privilege and obtains a license, he impliedly consents to this provision of the code as he does with all the other requirements set forth in The Vehicle Code.