*1 Sustrik; case constitutes a final order.
Triffin; Pleas Riggio. Courts of Common jurisdiction petitions
retain to consider fee days period
filed within a of 30 after
entry Henninger; final order. § 5505.
Pa.C.S.A.
¶ Here, of the our review record Appellee
reflects that did not file the fee days voluntary
petition within 30 April of the case. On
discontinuance Appellant praecipe filed to discon praecipe
tinue the action. This to discon equivalent judg
tinue was the of a final May days
ment. Sustrik. On
later, petition Appellee filed for award
counsel fees. The court entered an order January 2002.
awarding counsel fees on petition beyond
Since the fee was filed
30-day period which the court re jurisdiction, trial court lacked
tained late
any authority petition to act on the for Thus, subsequent
counsel fees. its order Ac nullity. Henninger;
was a Kluko. are to vacate the
cordingly, we constrained
order.
¶ 12 vacated. re- Judgment Jurisdiction
linquished. Pennsylvania,
COMMONWEALTH of
Appellee, KEYS, Appellant.
Sean Pennsylvania.
Superior Court of 7, May 2002.
Submitted
Filed Jan.
¶ municipal A court bench trial took not May 2001. The wife did place on and does testify at trial the record The reason for her absence. reflect the and officer recounted wife’s statements retrieved sword. described ¶ objected to Keys’ counsel said, testimony as what she officer’s hearsay. it was inadmissible arguing objection, The trial court overruled statements wife’s as an utterance. were admissible excited Baker, Defender, Public Karl Philadel- found of mak- Keys guilty The trial court appellant. for phia, him terroristic threats and sentenced Marshall, L. Dis- Catherine Assistant eighteen reporting probation. months of Attorney, Philadelphia, trict for Common- hearsay state- undisputed It is wealth, appellee. the sole offered ments were evidence Keys. against HUDOCK, BOWES, Before ¶ 11, 2001, CAVANAUGH, peti- Keys 6 On June filed JJ. certiorari, his challenging tion for writ CAVANAUGH, J. the basis trial court conviction on that the admitting the wife’s erred ¶ 1 Appellant Keys (“Keys”), ap- Sean 1006(l)(a). See Pa.R.CRIM.P. statements. from the order peals Septem- entered on Keys’ Sep- petition The court denied 12, 2001, denying ber writ of certiorari his 20, 2001, 12, 2001. On September tember Philadelphia Common Pleas Court this appeal filed a notice of with Keys after he was convicted making terroris- court. § tic threats. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. We
reverse. following issues Keys presents
¶2
for our consideration:
July
at
Keys,
On
while
home, reportedly
long
held a three-foot
not the
err
de-
Did
lower court
[I.]
neck,
cut
threatening
sword to his wife’s
Keys’
Mr.
of Certiorari
nying
Writ
Keys
her throat.
then was said to have
challenging his
conviction
wife
dragged
prevent-
his
her hair and
Municipal
the evidence
Court as
wife,
leaving
Keys’
her from
ed
home.
establish
offered was insufficient to
will,
overnight
allegedly
against
held
doubt,
beyond a
guilt
reasonable
escaped
day,
the next
ran at least
and,
sufficient,
only
even if
evi-
police.
ten blocks and contacted the
Keys at
against
offered
Mr.
dence
Municipal
was inad-
his
Court trial
Dingle
3 Officer Marcus
arrived and
hearsay.
missible
Keys’
visibly upset
observed that
wife was
the sole
specifically,
More
was not
angry.
to the officer’s
[II.]
trial, a
testimony
at
recounted
incident. The
offered
query, she
claim
defendant’s
that her
officer’s
officer noted
voice and behavior
hus-
told him that her
distraught and
The officer
wife had
were
erratic.
her,
in the
had
arrested
recovered
band
assaulted
subsequently
Keys and
testimony
Keys’
absence
the sword from
bedroom.
utterance,
any
wife herself or
evidence es-
statement is an excited
we have
tablishing that
assault had tak-
following:
considered the
and,
place,
en
both inadmissible
1)
declarant,
fact,
whether the
wit-
admissible,
if
even
insufficient to
2)
event;
nessed
time
*3
beyond
guilt
estabhsh
a reason-
elapsed
startling
between the
event
able doubt?
3)
declaration;
and the
whether
¶
It8
is weh-settled that
trial
“[a]
(inad-
in
statement was
narrative form
rulings
evidentiary
ques-
court’s
4)
missible); and, whether the declarant
by
tions ... ’are controlled
the discretion of
spoke
making
to others before
the state-
the trial court and this Court will reverse
ment,
opportunity
or had the
to do so.
’
only for clear abuse of that discretion.”
Blackwell,
343 Pa.Su-
5,
Cargo,
498 Pa.
444
426,
(1985).
per.
494 A.2d
431
639,
(1982) (quoting
A.2d
644
Common-
(Citations omitted) These considerations
Scott,
258,
140,
wealth v.
469 Pa.
365 A.2d
provide
guarantees
of trustworthi-
(1976)).
146
“Discretion is abused when
permit
ness which
a
admission of
pursued
the course
represents
merely
ut-
statement under the excited
an
judgement,
error of
but where the
exception.
terance
“It is
important
judgement
manifestly
is
unreasonable or
factors,
note that none
except
of these
apphed
where the law is not
or where the
requirement
that the
have
declarant
record shows that
action
a
is
result of
event,
startling
witnessed the
is
itself
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Cok-
Rather,
dispositive.
are to be
factors
Co.,
441,
er v.
Flickinger
S.M.
533 Pa.
625
surrounding
considered in all the
cir-
1181,
(1993) (citation omitted).
A.2d
1185
determine
a
cumstances
whether
statement is an excited utterance.” Id.
supreme
9 Our
court has con
also,
805,
Wright,
v.
497
[Idaho
See
U.S.
sistently defined “excited utterance” as:
820-21,
3139,
110 S.Ct.
¶ 11 It true that pre- is our courts have startling event occurred. We do not viously, occasion, liberally accepted find that the officer’s observations of her despite statements as an excited utterance agitated independently state establishes passage of substantial time between testimony event. No was startling event and the utterance. We note, however, “engage did in a holdings presented such were that she not upon based all consideration of the sur- process” prior to thought reflective rounding su- Sanford, circumstances. See with contact officer. (three J.,
pra
judge panel, Cavanaugh,
to
speculate
why
14
not
as
We will
Compare
dissenting).
Commonwealth v.
testify
Keys
appear
against
to
Mrs.
did not
(1952)
Noble,
138,
760,
371 Pa.
A.2d
88
763
it
ruling,
her husband. As
the court’s
circumstances,
(determining, given the
in the
may
emergent policies
cam-
be
that a statement elicited at
a half-
least
against
militate in fa-
paign
spousal abuse
hour after the
incident was
an excited
evidentiary
of
vor of relaxation
harsh
Penn,
utterance), with Commonwealth v.
believe, however, that
ex-
We
rules.
232,
1154,
(1982)
Pa.
497
439 A.2d
1159
rule as confirmed
ception
circumstances,
(finding that
“[under]
court, is
since it
inappropriate
the trial
reasonably
the suppression court could
followed, it
scope.
unlimited in its
If
is
conclude
statement” made within
reasoning
the sound
qualified
half-hour of incident
as an excit- would invalidate
utterance).
Barnes,
dramatically
ed
supra, and serve to
permit
the rules of evidence so as
relax
¶ Moreover,
12
no independent evidence
prosecutor
of a crime whenever the
proof
presented substantiating
alleged
was
has heard an
had available a witness who
incident. See Commonwealth v.
constituting
recitation
facts
excited
(1983);
480,
310
independent evidence that occurred, had an alleged
event excited ut
terance as an excep cannot be admitted rule.”
tion to case,
1037, 1040 In the present agitat victim’s
police officer observed the
ed emotional state at location to which immediately upon escaping.
she fled The him to
victim went with the scene
crime, they found Appellant. where The
officer used Appel recovered sword victim,
lant to threaten located
place the victim had described.
These circumstances all corroborated the story.
victim’s reasons, 4 For I these would conclude its trial court did not abuse discre-
tion the victim’s state-
ment was admissible as an excited utter-
ance.
TRIBUNE-REVIEW PUBLISHING WPXI,
COMPANY
Petitioners
DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT, Respondent. Pennsylvania.
Commonwealth Court of
Argued Oct. 2002.
Decided Jan.
